Brussels – When discussing EU enlargement, there is always one country marked with an asterisk. “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence”. Moreover, Kosovo remains the only country in the enlargement process that is not even a candidate, and this situation shows no sign of changing in the near future.
The European Union’s ambiguous position towards Pristina is rooted in the fact that five of its member states—Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Spain and Romania—have never recognised its sovereignty since its 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia. Yet recent interesting developments suggest there may be room for a broader conversation that goes beyond the positions of these governments.
One of these developments is reflected in the findings of the recently published Special Eurobarometer survey on enlargement. Although the survey shows that only 43% of EU citizens support Kosovo’s accession to the Union—the second-lowest figure after Türkiye—public opinion in the five non-recogniser states is far more nuanced. In Spain (53%), Romania (52%), Slovakia (46%) and Greece (45%), support is significantly higher than in several recogniser countries. By contrast, opposition is strongest in France (51%) and reaches 55% in both Italy and Germany, compared with just 27% in Spain (with 20% undecided).
“Recognisers can sometimes be more difficult than non-recognisers in obstructing Kosovo’s EU path,” observes Donika Emini, political analyst and a current member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG), in an interview with The New Union Post. One of the clearest examples of this paradox is the lifting of the EU’s punitive measures against Pristina, which, she notes, “have set Kosovo back years in its EU integration process.” Both international recognition and candidate status remain frozen, and, as Emini stresses, “Kosovo must first resolve the outstanding EU measures before it can seriously think about the next step.”
Recognisers and non-recognisers
“The EU path for Kosovo is almost non-existent because of the five non-recognising countries, and this remains the biggest challenge,” Emini explains, stressing the need for “a great deal of diplomacy to make even the smallest technical step forward.” Over the nearly two decades since its independence, there have been moments when the EU has had to bypass its own members—such as with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the visa liberalisation process—even though these were not strictly matters of enlargement.
The five member states lie on a spectrum from “soft” to “hard” non-recognisers. One of the “soft” non-recognisers is Greece, which maintains “very good bilateral relations” with Kosovo but withholds formal recognition because of the Cyprus issue. At the other end of the spectrum is Spain, whose position is shaped not only by EU politics but also by the legacy of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in the late 1990s and the link to the Catalan independence, “even though the two cases are not comparable,” Emini points out.
The other three countries sit at different points along this spectrum. Slovakia has traditionally supported Kosovo’s civil society, but the current government has shut down its office in Pristina. Romania remains largely disengaged. Cyprus is more cautious, “but I believe that if Greece were to move forward, it would likely follow,” particularly in the context of an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia that removes any parallels with the dispute involving Türkiye.
Lacking the diplomatic capacity to engage directly with these countries—and with Brussels rarely exerting pressure on member states over foreign policy—the political analyst warns that Kosovo’s path towards the EU is obstructed not only by the five non-recognisers but also by some of its traditional allies, which “expect certain behaviour from Pristina and penalise it when it does not comply.”
She finds the gap between public opinion and government policy revealed by the latest Eurobarometer survey “quite interesting,” but stresses that the wider political landscape cannot be ignored. With many EU governments on the brink of major political crises—France being the clearest example—”I believe they are reluctant to take bold decisions, even when public opinion is in favour of a particular policy,” as they fear such moves could further strengthen right-wing parties.
This is also true in the context of EU enlargement. “Issues such as Kosovo’s recognition are simply not seen as worth the political fight,” Emini acknowledges. As a result, governments tend to leave Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to be the face of the EU, with no member states pushing for any response to Kosovo’s membership application. “This is why the process will not move forward,” she adds. But with Pristina stuck dealing with the lifting of EU measures, “we are no longer talking about making progress on EU accession, but rather about moving from minus two back to zero.”
Despite the urgency for concrete steps to initiate the accession process, “the real problem lies in the lack of political will among major member states, such as Germany and France, to place the issue on the EU agenda,” Emini argues, noting that both Berlin and Paris have “actively discouraged Pristina from applying, offered no assistance when they held the EU presidency, and now simply do not wish to deal with Kosovo at all.”
It must be acknowledged that the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue is likely among the lowest priorities on the EU’s agenda, with both Serbia and Kosovo currently having fragile or no governments, “and the overall political environment is not conducive” to advance the process. At present, the EU prefers to focus on ‘easier’ cases in the Western Balkans, such as Albania and Montenegro, while “no significant diplomatic effort to mobilise the machinery in Brussels is in place for Kosovo,” as many capitals perceive Pristina “as uncooperative and unwilling to listen.”
The only notable sign of solidarity towards Kosovo has been the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Despite Pristina remaining under the EU’s punitive measures, the Commission still included the country in this initiative to support economic development and reforms in the region. Kosovo’s current difficulty lies in the fact that it cannot adopt the reform agenda required to access the funds—as it currently has no functioning parliament—”but this demonstrates that when the EU truly wants to act, it can,” Emini emphasises.
The impact of the EU’s measures against Kosovo
More than two years after the EU imposed measures on Kosovo—and almost six months after the Commission first revealed to The New Union Post that it had begun its “gradual, conditional and reversible” lifting—no further details about the process have been made public. According to Emini, “the situation has dragged on for so long that the measures have become almost meaningless,” because, at this point, “even their exact scope is unclear.”
The measures appear to be both personal and political, particularly in relation to Prime Minister Albin Kurti. In 2020, he presented himself as strongly pro-EU and opposed to the Trump administration’s plans in the region. “The EU believed it had a progressive leader on the ground who would help push forward the dialogue process,” Emini explains. Yet he later proved a more challenging partner, especially when it came to setting conditions. For example, “he wanted guarantees on progress with the five non-recognising countries” as prerequisites for the Association/community of Serb-majority municipalities in the north.
This is how the clashes between Brussels and Pristina began, followed by the EU’s response to the government’s actions in northern Kosovo in the spring of 2023. The real question now is: after the 12 October local elections, with ethnic Serb representatives returning to institutions in the northern municipalities, will the EU lift the measures? “In truth, nobody really knows what is required to have them lifted,” the political analyst confesses. Meanwhile, the measures remain “very real” in practice, with numerous projects excluded from funding and several civil society organisations unable to access the funds—”and they risk losing them altogether.”
This is why, for now, Kosovo must resolve this outstanding problem “before it can think seriously about the next step,” Emini explains, noting that “these measures have set Kosovo back years in its EU integration process.” Achieving candidate status “is not happening any time soon,” even if new members are admitted and the EU feels compelled to offer something to other enlargement countries. “This happened when negotiations were opened with Ukraine, prompting renewed discussions on Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, I do not think such a scenario is likely for Kosovo in the near future,” she concludes.
