Brussels – The meeting could not have come at a worse time—this had been clear for days. Only the most optimistic—or perhaps naïve—could have expected a radical shift in the relationship between the EU and Serbia’s leaders during the summit in Brussels on 25 March.
That is why the shift in tone from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (rather than European Council President António Costa—she has been the main figure accused of backing the corrupt system of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić) should be interpreted carefully.
With no press conferences following the meeting, the formal written statements issued by the two EU leaders underscored that national authorities must “take decisive steps towards media freedom, the fight against corruption, and electoral reform.” This is precisely what, for over four months, hundreds of thousands of students and citizens have been demanding.
Has von der Leyen changed her tone?
To analyse a potential shift in tone in Brussels-Belgrade relations, we must consider President von der Leyen’s stance in comparison to her visit to Belgrade in October 2024. At that time, during a joint press conference with the Serbian leade, the head of the EU executive praised the country’s progress on the rule of law and democratic reforms.
By contrast, the written statement released five months later highlighted the need to “deliver on EU reforms.” Moreover, it is worth noting that von der Leyen omitted a key sentence from the joint tweet shared by Costa: “Tangible achievements in areas that can directly benefit the Serbian people are within reach.” It is likely that, under mounting pressure, the President of the European Commission sought to avoid any risk of being criticised for achievements that do not really seem “within reach.”
However, this may not be enough to restore Serbian citizens’ trust in the EU’s institutions. As Srđan Majstorović, Chairman of the Board of European Policy Center (CEP) in Belgrade and member of Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG), noted, they expect EU leaders to “loudly and publicly” express what they are “probably telling their interlocutors behind closed doors.” Namely, that “they will no longer turn a blind eye to the violation of the rights and disrespect for the freedoms of citizens.”
While the public perception of the meeting “has been largely negative in Serbia, as many view it as a sign of continued EU support for Vučić’s increasingly authoritarian rule”—as Srđan Cvijić, President of the International Advisory Committee of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, told Eunews— a closer reading reveals that the political and social crisis has made Vučić “a far more toxic—and politically costly—partner for the EU.”
What is happening in Serbia
Following the collapse of Novi Sad’s railway station canopy on 1 November 2024—resulted in 15 deaths and two severe injuries—a wave of mass protests erupted across the country. After students were attacked in Belgrade during a silent tribute to the victims, blockades of educational institutions began on 22 November at the Faculty of Dramatic Arts, with other faculties and high schools joining in soon after.
The level of organisation behind the protests has reached remarkable heights all over the country. Universities are occupied, with decisions made through grassroots democracy in student plenums. Schools at all levels are either closed or holding discussions between teachers, parents, and pupils on the state of democracy and education. Every day at 11:52 a.m.—the time of the Novi Sad tragedy—students block major crossroads in Belgrade and in the other cities, observing 15 minutes of complete silence. People of all ages join their marches and urge to continue.
It is clear that President Vučić’s regime cannot meet the students’ anti-corruption demands without jeopardising its own survival. Take the Novi Sad railway station, for example—reopened just months before the tragedy after a three-year renovation by a consortium of Chinese companies. Yet, no public information is available on the tender or the project behind the infrastructure. Repression has intensified with a crackdown on NGOs and the deployment of a ‘sonic cannon’—a device capable of causing pain, dizziness, and hearing damage—against hundreds of thousands of people observing a 15-minute silence in Belgrade on 15 March.
The lack of support from Brussels for the movement advocating the rule of law in Serbia is widely seen as prioritising economic interests over core democratic values. The lithium extraction project in the Jadar River Valley is the most frequently cited example. The EU-Serbia Memorandum of Understanding on lithium, signed in July 2024, concerns the extraction of a resource crucial to the EU automotive sector’s green transition from one of the world’s largest deposits. More than just an economic deal, it exposes the nature of Vučić’s grip on power and the European Commission’s vulnerability.
