Brussels – Here we go again. Kosovo is preparing to hold its third parliamentary election since February 2025, after Parliament was dissolved over the failure to appoint a new President of the Republic. As the country waits to see who will steer it out of yet another institutional crisis, the consequences are being felt not only by its citizens, but also by the already fragile prospects of deeper EU integration.
“On the EU integration front, the stakes are high,” warns Dan Ilazi, Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS/QKSS), speaking to The New Union Post about the “blame game” surrounding the early elections scheduled for 7 June. With the country having effectively remained in a constant electoral cycle for the past 16 months, “the continuous institutional disruption is taking a measurable toll,” he adds.
This becomes particularly evident when looking at the electoral campaign. All the major parties appear more focused on convincing voters that the return to the polls is the adversary’s fault than on presenting a clear vision for the country. Within this context, issues related to the European integration process are “totally absent” from the political narrative. “That dynamic alone speaks volumes about the state of Kosovo’s political culture,” Ilazi comments bluntly.
It is not as though Pristina can really afford further delays. With five EU member states – Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain – still refusing to recognise its sovereignty, Kosovo’s application for EU membership has not been discussed by the Council since December 2022. Although the Irish presidency, which begins on 1 July, offers a “genuine window of opportunity” to secure EU candidate status, the current domestic situation and the electoral timetable make it “unlikely to be seized.”
Nor should it be forgotten that, without fully functioning institutions, Kosovo “will struggle” to deliver the reforms required under the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which allocated a total of €939.2 million in EU funding. “And the financial consequences of that failure will be real,” Ilazi further warns.
On this front, Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos recently warned all Western Balkans partners that, without the required reforms, EU funds promised under the Growth Plan will not flow. As two sources familiar with the matter explained to The New Union Post, Kosovo risks losing €68.8 million if EU-related reforms are not implemented by June 2026, even though EU restrictive measures have finally been lifted and Pristina has recently received the first tranche of €61.8 million in pre-financing under the Growth Plan.
And now?
As the Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies explains, the 7 June elections will take place against a backdrop of “deep affective polarisation,” turning the vote into a sort of “referendum” on the outcomes of the previous two elections – either confirming the results of February or those of December 2025.
Predictions remain difficult. On the one hand, the opposition does not yet appear to represent a credible alternative, having remained “largely anaemic – reactive rather than programmatic,” and that perception is “unlikely to shift dramatically in a short campaign.” On the other hand, disappointment with Vetëvendosje is “real and visible,” and the recent dramatic split between current Prime Minister Albin Kurti and former President Vjosa Osmani represents “a significant new variable” that could lead to a greater or lesser loss of support for Kosovo’s largest party.
If no single force commands a majority after the vote – as was the case following the February 2025 elections – some form of grand coalition will become “a practical necessity,” Ilazi argues. On the contrary, if Vetëvendosje once again secures 50% of the vote, as it did in December 2025, the opposition may find itself with “little choice but to support its agenda.” Either way, the real question is whether “the political will and the necessary trust exist” to make a coalition work after the elections.
Another issue is particularly intriguing. The first order of business for the newly elected Parliament will not be forming a government, but electing a new President of the Republic. “That alone creates immediate coalition pressure before a government is even on the table,” Ilazi points out, noting that “coalition-building is structurally baked in from day one.”
Whether this translates into genuine cooperation will depend heavily on the tone of the election campaign. In other words, “if parties continue to use divisive language and deepen existing fault lines, the conditions for a functional coalition will be even harder” to create after the vote. On the other hand, if some of the main political actors shift towards more conciliatory rhetoric, “there is a path towards the kind of political settlement Kosovo urgently needs.” This is why, with just a month remaining before the 7 June elections, what is at stake is not only the outcome of the vote, but also whether Kosovo’s political class can begin to rebuild “the minimum level of trust that governing together would require.”
What happened in Kosovo in the last 16 months
On 9 February 2025, the left-wing nationalist Vetëvendosje party won the parliamentary elections. However, the result fell far short of expectations. Unlike in the 2021 elections, Prime Minister Kurti did not gain enough support in the 120-seat Assembly to form a government with Vetëvendosje’s 48 MPs and the 10 MPs representing the non-Serb, non-majority communities.
Kurti rejected any cooperation with the Serb List – the largest party representing the Serb community – but was unable to reach an agreement with the third-largest party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), with which he had been in coalition when he first became Prime Minister in 2020.
With opposition parties unable to form an alternative coalition, the process of electing the Speaker of Parliament remained blocked for months, with the Constitutional Court intervening twice in an attempt to resolve the institutional crisis. However, another issue further prolonged the stalemate, as the Serb List denounced what it described as a potential violation of the constitutional right of the largest party representing the Serb community to appoint a Deputy Speaker.
Before the Constitutional Court issued its decision, Kurti failed to form a government. President Osmani dissolved Parliament and called snap elections for 28 December. At the second vote of 2025, Vetëvendosje secured a landslide victory – increasing its share of the vote from 42.3% to 49.3% – giving Prime Minister Kurti a clear parliamentary majority for his third consecutive cabinet, which was formed on 11 February.
Despite high expectations of renewed momentum in relations with the EU, the presidential elections in March 2026 jeopardised both the election of a new head of state and the stability of the government.
The two-thirds threshold in Parliament – requiring at least 80 MPs to be present and voting in the first two rounds – was not met due to obstruction by the opposition parties, prompting then-President Osmani to dissolve Parliament on 6 March. The decree was challenged by Prime Minister Kurti, with the Constitutional Court setting a deadline of 28 April for the election of a new President of the Republic. The failure of the vote on 27 April paved the way for acting President Albulena Haxhiu to call snap elections, scheduled for 7 June.
