Albania’s progress in accession talks can’t mask the EU’s “acrobatics” on the rule of law

Brussels – There is growing enthusiasm within EU institutions over Albania’s swift progress in its EU accession talks, as the country has opened three-quarters of the negotiating chapters in just over six months. However, it is precisely this near-blind enthusiasm that risks obscuring the fact that the road ahead remains highly complex and will require substantial domestic reform efforts from Tirana.

“You can’t use acrobatics to get around these challenges—the core principles of the accession negotiations must and should stand. Otherwise, the EU risks deterioration from within,” said Daniel Prroni, Researcher at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM), in an interview with The New Union Post.

While Albania appears to have claimed the title of frontrunner—alongside Montenegro—after years of stalled progress, Prroni warned that “there is concern about whether this progress is sustainable.” Opening chapters requires “substantial” technical work between the Commission and national administrations, but also “largely depends on the goodwill of leaders” at the political level. However, closing the chapters will demand tangible reforms and rigorous scrutiny from EU institutions and Member States, regardless of the stated timelines. “From this point on, it won’t be smooth sailing.”

All the challenges ahead

The starting point has to be the timelines. The Albanian government has declared its intention to conclude all accession negotiations by 2027, and the European Commission has backed this ambition. “This is a positive signal, but many questions remain about how this goal will be achieved,” the Albanian researcher noted.

For instance, the Commission’s annual reports rate Albania as “below medium preparedness” in several chapters, while the pace of yearly progress “does not support the government’s level of ambition.” Fundamental reforms—particularly those related to the rule of law and the economic criteria—”are not keeping pace,” and the implementation rate of the Commission’s recommendations “remains low.” As Prroni made clear, if past performance is used as an indicator, “it does not support the 2027 narrative, as the political declarations lack a solid, evidence-based justification.”

In terms of preparedness to meet EU benchmarks—used to assess a candidate country’s progress towards closing negotiating chapters—there are mounting concerns, particularly regarding a “deteriorating” situation in the rule of law. Parliament remains “very weak” and lacks the capacity for “effective oversight” over the government, while lawmaking is often driven “more by private interests than by the public good,” Prroni noted.

“Persistent issues” also affect judicial independence, notably in relation to “external pressure” and the intimidation of judges and prosecutors, “including by politicians and government officials.” Media freedom “is under strain,” with a high concentration of ownership and strong political influence. Brain drain is another “pressing concern,” as skilled professionals—such as nurses, doctors, and teachers—continue to migrate to EU countries: “As we often say, Albanian citizens are joining the EU before the country does.”

Moreover, organised crime poses a “significant and growing threat”—not only to public safety but also through its infiltration of the economy for money laundering and the expansion of criminal operations. “This drives up living costs for citizens, compounded by weak social protection systems“—another key benchmark for EU accession.

“At present, there is no clear roadmap for addressing these challenges in a way that gives credibility to the 2027 target,” Prroni said. Taken together, these issues make Albania’s ambition to join the EU by 2030 increasingly unrealistic. “Goodwill between leaders alone won’t be enough to carry us across the finish line without genuinely addressing and transforming the core issues in a fundamental and irreversible way,” he added.

From Brussels’ perspective, may choose to incentivise progress while remaining silent on certain challenges when politically convenient. “But a time will inevitably come when these issues must be confronted.” Serbia offers a clear example: despite having opened 22 chapters, its accession process is now stalled, with no clear way forward. “Our hope is to avoid a similar situation,” the Albanian researcher pointed out, “not by pushing ahead while overlooking or bypassing serious concerns.”

Finally, both in the EU and in Albania, there is a lack of clarity about the direction of an accelerated accession process. “Are we heading towards full EU membership, or towards a different model of integration?” Prroni questioned, pointing to scenarios such as partial integration—joining the single market or selected policy areas without full membership. “It is not for the Albanian government alone to accept whatever offer is put forward by the EU,” he added, noting that the Albanian people have mandated it to “pursue full membership—not a diluted or alternative form of integration.

The same old story

One key factor behind Brussels’ ambiguous stance on Albania’s EU accession progress—regardless of the state of its democracy—is its relationship with Tirana’s strongman, Prime Minister Edi Rama. His efforts to cast himself as a credible and responsible international leader are “the main reason” he has been chosen as a close partner by the EU, “to demonstrate some visible progress,” Prroni explained.

EU leaders “value the fact that he acts as a mediating, rational, and stabilising force in the region,” and also appreciate his cooperation on specific issues of concern to member states—for instance, the migration deal with Italy. “He responds when called upon to help resolve certain matters, and it seems he is rewarded for doing so.” But according to Prroni, this strategy is ultimately “unsustainable,” as Albania “cannot rely on transactional exchanges and goodwill alone to reach the end of the process.”

Turning a blind eye to internal issues—such as corruption and the rule of law—in order to secure a stable partner in the Western Balkans is nothing new for EU leaders. “An old article by Rama from 1997 criticised the same tendency,” the Albanian researcher recalled, noting that “it is an old story: make yourself useful, and you will be rewarded by the EU“—a dynamic from which all Albanian leaders have benefited over the past 30 years.

What Prime Minister Rama has done most is to find “his own way of playing this role, adding a touch of ‘circus’—entertainment, showmanship, and other elements that make it all seem more acceptable.” While this approach may carry on for a little longer, it will eventually reach its limit. “I don’t believe Albania can join the EU with this attitude,” Prroni noted, adding that for the EU too, “it is not healthy to adopt a mindset of postponing problems until the very end of the accession process.”

The state of EU-Albania relations

Albania’s application for EU membership was submitted in April 2009. EU candidate status was granted in June 2014. In April 2018, the European Commission issued a recommendation to open accession negotiations with Tirana, as Albania and North Macedonia were grouped together under the so-called ‘package approach’, meaning that either both would advance together or neither would.

Due to deteriorating relations between North Macedonia and Bulgaria, Tirana’s path towards EU accession negotiations also stalled until 19 July 2022, when the accession conferences took place in Brussels. On 25 September 2024, the Council positively assessed Tirana’s alignment with the opening benchmarks for the first cluster of chapters.

As of now, 24 negotiating chapters out of 33 are currently open. Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ was launched on 15 October 2024, Cluster 6 – ‘External Relations’ on 17 December 2024, Cluster 2 – ‘Internal Market’ on 14 April 2025, and Cluster 3 – ‘Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth’ on 22 May 2025. In Tirana, the goal is clear: to conclude negotiations by 2027, with full membership in sight by 2030.