Strasbourg – At last, the long-debated ‘return hubs’ have found their way into the European Commission’s proposal for the Return Regulation – a new piece of EU legislation that ramps up punitive measures against migrants deemed to be on the EU territory irregularly, including those whose asylum applications have been rejected.
The proposal put forward by von der Leyen’s Commission on 11 March marks a seismic shift in EU migration policy, one that could have profound consequences – not only for migrants’ rights and the mounting human and financial costs, but also for the growing securitisation of migration management. Crucially, it could also reshape relations between the 27 EU Member States and the potential future members, particularly those in the Western Balkans.
For years, bilateral agreements such as Denmark-Kosovo and Italy-Albania deals – despite their differences and specificities—have been seen as test cases for a broader European strategy. Now, the European Commission is seeking to formalise that general approach, laying out a common legal framework that would allow Member States to deport migrants to third countries. These would not necessarily be countries of origin or transit, but any country willing to sign a bilateral deal – raising concerns over the outsourcing of EU’s migration responsibilities.
An increasing number of EU candidate countries could find themselves pressured into accepting bilateral agreements with EU Member States to host ‘return hubs’ on their territory, using them as a bargaining chip to speed up their accession process. At the same time, they may view these agreements as an economic opportunity – gaining substantial financial support without the responsibility of managing the centres themselves. Ultimately, these would all be political decisions carried out at the expense of migrant people.
The ‘return hubs’ in the new Regulation
A close reading of the Return Regulation reveals that ‘return hubs’ are explicitly outlined in the provision allowing “the possibility to return third-country nationals who have been issued a return decision to a third country with which there is an agreement or arrangement for return.” This is made possible by the expanded definition of ‘country of return’, which now also includes “a third country with which there is an agreement or arrangement on the basis of which the third-country national is accepted.”
According to the legislative proposal, the return of irregular migrants to such third countries should be subject to “specific conditions,” including agreements being signed only with countries where international human rights standards, “including the principle of non-refoulement“, are respected. The bilateral agreements on ‘return hubs’ must set out the modalities of transfer, the conditions for the period of stay – “which may be in the short or longer term” – as well as monitoring mechanisms. Unaccompanied minors and families with minors “are excluded” from this scheme.
“Changing the legal basis is problematic because it would basically mean that models like Italy-Albania or Denmark-Kosovo could be framed as so-called return hubs,” warned Silvia Carta, advocacy officer at PICUM, a European network of organisations dedicated to ensure social justice for undocumented migrants. “We are talking of crimmigration, the increasing tendency to view migration through a securitarian lens,” she added.
As outlined in Article 37, Member States are authorised to communicate “as necessary” with non-recognised third-country entities – Kosovo being a key example. This provision allows countries such as Spain, Greece, Romania, Cyprus, and Slovakia, which do not recognise Kosovo’s sovereignty, to engage with authorities in Pristina on “what is necessary for carrying out the readmission procedure.” Crucially, such communication “shall not amount to diplomatic recognition of the entities concerned.”
Article 10 sets out the conditions for extending entry bans “for a maximum of 10 years,” with the possibility of further extensions “by successive periods of a maximum of five years.” An entry ban can be imposed on any individual subject to removal, on those who have not complied with a return decision “within the time limits,” and, most significantly, on those who “pose a security risk.”
This concept of “security risk” is outlined in Article 16 and is broadly defined as “a threat to public policy, to public security or to national security.” Migrants deemed to be a security risk may be subject to an entry ban exceeding the maximum duration by up to an additional 10 years and may also be “detained in prisons and kept separated from ordinary prisoners.” Such derogations could be used “in a discriminatory way, regardless of whether the person has received past convictions, and by giving repatriations a punitive function, beyond the principles of criminal law,” Carta pointed out.
Article 29 defines the grounds for detention “for the purpose of preparing the return,” which include the risk of absconding, obstructing return procedures, security risks, the need to determine or verify identity or nationality, and failure to comply with alternative measures. According to Article 32, detention may also apply to minors and can last 12 months, plus a potential extension of further 12 months “where the return procedure is likely to last longer.”
However, as Carta warned, the Commission’s proposal conceals a deeper issue: “Attention is being completely diverted from the complete lack of implementation of the current rules on migration governance,” as well as the risk of creating a “dependency on third countries with questionable human rights records.”
The Denmark-Kosovo deal on detention centres
It was on 15 December 2021 that Denmark and Kosovo signed the Treaty for the lease of Gjilan prison “for the purpose of the execution of Danish sentences.” This agreement established that the 300 prisoners who may be transferred to the Kosovar penitentiary will be foreign nationals currently serving sentences in Denmark, “including persons upon whom an expulsion order from Denmark is imposed” and those “in custody” pending enforcement of an expulsion order.
According to the Treaty, Gjilan prison will be leased for an initial period of five years, with the option to extend for a further five years. In return, the Danish government will allocate €15 million to Pristina for each year of the agreement (up to a maximum of 150 million) as well as €5 million for the renovation of the prison to ensure detention standards comply with Danish regulations.
“There was no public information, nor was there any debate on the issue,” Fatmire Haliti, lawyer and programme manager at the Kosova Rehabilitation Center for Torture Victims (KRCT), told The New Union Post. Following its ratification by the Parliament of Kosovo on 23 May 2024, the agreement is legally in force, though its implementation has yet to begin. At present, there are currently over 200 detainees in Gjilan prison, but “the detention centres in Kosovo do not have the capacity to take them,” Haliti warned, highlighting that “any transfer plan would lead to overcrowding.”
Additionally, the Denmark-Kosovo deal raises broader questions about the future implementation of other ‘return hubs’. “If these people cannot return to Denmark and do not apply for asylum in Kosovo, what will happen when their sentence ends?” asked Orjana Demaliaj, country manager at the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), speaking with The New Union Post. According to the Treaty, detainees are to be transferred back to Denmark “prior to their release,” unless an agreement is reached for repatriation “upon release.” However, a grey area remains for individuals in custody awaiting repatriation, whose countries of origin refuse to cooperate.
Experience on the ground shows that problematic situations can arise. “In Kosovo, there are detention centres for foreigners who lack identification documents, have not applied for asylum, or have failed to leave the country within two weeks of their application being rejected – despite not having committed any crimes,” JRS expert explained. Detention lasts for a full year, after which “the door of the centre is simply opened, and the government claims the issue has been resolved without providing any further information.” This is “the beginning of a vicious circle,” as these people either continue along the Balkan route or end up back in detention if stopped by the police.
The Denmark-Kosovo Treaty has already drawn the attention of the other 26 EU Member States. For instance, Belgium’s new coalition agreement refers to it as an “example” for potential agreements with third countries. “We know that several countries have contacted Kosovo regarding the possibility of signing agreements similar to the one with Denmark,” confirmed KRCT programme manager Haliti. “Non-EU countries are willing to sign any kind of agreement in order to make a good impression” with EU Member States and to “accelerate their own integration process” into the European Union.
The Italy-Albania protocol on migrant holding centers
Another frequently cited model in discussions on ‘return hubs’ is the Italy-Albania Protocol on migrant holding centres signed on 6 November 2023. Under this agreement, one centre at the port of Shëngjin is designated for screening and registering people rescued by Italian vessels on the high seas, while a second centre in Gjadër is responsible for processing asylum claims and detaining individuals whose applications are rejected pending repatriation. Although both centres were formally opened on 11 October 2024, they have yet to become operational due to ongoing legal disputes over the definition of a ‘safe country’.
The two centres have a combined capacity to accommodate approximately 1,000 migrants per month, with the potential to expand to 3,000, while a small detention facility can house an additional 20 individuals. According to the Protocol, Italy retains full responsibility for assessing asylum claims and resettling recognised refugees, with Italian personnel operating under Italian jurisdiction. Albania’s role is limited to leasing its territory and providing external security guards. The agreement is expected to cost Italy up to €985 million over five years.
From the outset, the feasibility of replicating the Italy-Albania model at the EU level has been questioned, as EU law requires asylum claims to be processed within the Union whenever they are presented on its territory, at its borders, or within its territorial waters. Offshoring such procedures to a third country can only be carried out if migrants are intercepted on the high seas or at land borders outside the EU.
This is why, rather than offering a clear model to be replicated by other Member States, the Italy-Albania protocol can be seen as a failed first attempt at outsourcing migration management. However, with the new Return Regulation, it can easily be transformed into a ‘return hub’. The facilities in Albania are already in place, Italian personnel can be redeployed, and the shift in purpose will likely be a matter of time, pending the new EU legal framework.
However, this could not happen “until the new Regulation comes into force,” Andreina De Leo, a member of the Italian Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), told The New Union Post. Under the current legislation, individuals found to be staying irregularly within EU territory can only be returned to their country of origin, transit, or habitual residence.
Everything could change with the interpretation of the new legal framework, which would expand the definition of a third country to include those that have an agreement with a Member State. In such cases, “the jurisdiction of that country could apply as the return process would end once the people are sent to the third country, which would require an amendment to the Protocol,” De Leo concludes.
