Brussels – Under hardly disinterested pressure from US President Donald Trump, the process towards peace talks between Ukraine and Russia appears to be gaining momentum. Following the controversial summit in Alaska on 15 August between Trump and Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin, and a series of meetings three days later in Washington with Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and European leaders, it is now time to assess whether all this looks as promising as claimed.
As a potential meeting with Putin looms—with the format still undefined—experts warn of a major risk for Ukraine and the so-called coalition of the willing. Trump could pressure Zelensky into accepting Putin’s conditions to reach a peace agreement and then blame him and the Europeans if talks with Russia collapse. “Kyiv, with its allies, should try to shift the blame where it belongs—towards Moscow,” Volodymyr Dubovyk, senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), told The New Union Post.
This concern is shared by Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre (EPC), argues that the US president is looking for an excuse to pull out of the conflict in Ukraine and to normalise relations with Putin. “For him, the narrative is: ‘I’ve tried; you Ukrainians and Europeans are the ones being intransigent. So now it’s your problem, not mine, and don’t even think about involving NATO in any of this.'” In short, he is not committed to Europe’s defence, and anything that conflicts with his personal interests is likely to be ignored or blamed.
Can Trump be trusted?
Before and after the meeting at the White House on 18 August, European leaders emphasised that transatlantic cooperation has been strengthened and that there is a shared determination to end the massacre that has been unfolding for the past three and a half years. Common ground appears to include a general understanding on the need for “security guarantees” for Ukraine, US participation in the negotiating process, and the principle that no deals on Ukraine can be made without Kyiv at the table.
However, as the US president seems to constantly change his mind and prioritise only his own interests, the most worrying question remains: can Trump’s words and promises be trusted? “Absolutely not,” Zuleeg warns. “On this particular issue, it is even less likely.” It is no secret that Trump does not want US soldiers involved in foreign conflicts and, furthermore, he is pushing to act outside the NATO framework. “I think the security guarantee that would come from the US would not be worth the paper it is written on,” he adds.
Dubovyk offers a more optimistic perspective, noting that the outcome of the Washington meeting was “generally positive” for Ukraine and European security, as it helped “offset some of the negative implications” of the Alaska summit. At the same time, he acknowledges that it remains to be seen whether any binding security guarantees will be offered. While the very fact that the US formally participates in the process “is very significant,” he warns that this approach “is not guaranteed” to endure in the White House and could be altered.
Security guarantees and the territorial issue
At present, the main focus of discussion is the “security guarantees” for Ukraine, intended to prevent any future aggression by Russia. However, it remains unclear what these guarantees would entail or how they would function. In practice, they have yet to be defined, and the terms would first need to be negotiated with the US before any talks with Moscow could begin.
“The security guarantees Trump has in mind are simply statements, which are worthless,” the EPC Chief Executive says. Both Zuleeg and CEPA’s Dubovyk stress the need for “concrete and solid” guarantees. However, everything is still being worked out, from mechanisms inspired by NATO’s Article 5 to the defence of borders and the development of the military-industrial sector. “We also have to consider the entire Eastern flank—from the Arctic down to Türkiye—and what this implies for overall security,” Zuleeg adds, acknowledging that “Russia is likely to breach, push, and test all of these arrangements,” just as it did with the Minsk agreements in 2014–2015.
What is clear is that—behind the words and the smiles in Washington—Zelensky is in an extremely difficult position. In exchange for security guarantees, Trump is expected to demand major concessions from Kyiv, possibly including the ceding of all or significant parts of the territories currently occupied by Russia. “The Ukrainian people are not willing to concede any territory. I don’t see how he could give up any land permanently,” Zuleeg explains, a view echoed by Dubovyk, who warns that “it would be detrimental to Ukraine’s security, no doubt.”
On the one hand, any territorial concession would require a legislative and constitutional process. On the other, “there may be no need for this, because it would not constitute formal recognition of these lands as belonging to Russia,” CEPA senior fellow points out. As with Crimea, Kyiv might agree to some form of temporary concession without relinquishing its legal claim to the territory. Yet, based on current reports from the US meetings, this does not appear to satisfy Trump’s aims: “His idea is something permanent,” the EPC Chief Executive recalls.
The Donbas region stands at a critical juncture, with Putin seeking at the negotiating table what he has tried to achieve through military force since 24 February 2022. Ceding the entire Donbas would carry serious consequences. First of all, it would make it far harder for Ukraine to defend its territory, “and it could also trigger instability within the country,” Zuleeg warns. Looking across the wider Eastern flank, a major concern is that Russia could continue to push its narrative that certain territories rightfully belong to it. As EPC Chief Executive notes, “Moscow could make a similar argument, for example, about Estonia, which has a large Russian minority.”
The implications extend far beyond Ukraine. Zuleeg warns that “all borders in the world will become more insecure,” since any aggressor state with sufficient power may see redrawing borders by force as “an effective way” to pursue its policy goals. This could heighten the risk of nuclear proliferation, as nations that feel threatened by their neighbours may consider acquiring the means to defend themselves. “And they have learned a harsh lesson from Ukraine, which gave up its nuclear weapons,” he adds.
What’s the European leaders’ strategy?
In this context, questions arise about European leaders’ strategy—what brought them to Washington and prompted them to double their efforts to coordinate ahead of potential talks with Russia. “This is an attempt to stay in the debate and maintain influence over the outcomes,” Zuleeg points out. Yet, “it is largely about damage limitation—trying to avoid the worst—and keeping the US engaged, at least to some extent.”
Whether this strategy will succeed remains uncertain, as it is “far from clear” whether Trump intends to give Europeans a real role in the negotiations. Putin, for his part, is unlikely to support any meaningful European involvement, since Ukraine’s position is stronger when backed by its European partners. As Dubovyk echoes, Russia will most probably “oppose any format” that brings Ukraine and the Europeans together at the negotiating table.
Although the diplomatic game remains open, Zuleeg observes that, for now, Putin is achieving much of what he wants—avoiding isolation and evading international sanctions. Drawing a parallel with 1938, following Hitler’s aggression against Czechoslovakia, he warns that “Trump wants peace so desperately that he may accept conditions which, in the end, leave everyone less secure and are unlikely to endure.”
