Brussels – Ukraine’s EU accession has increasingly entered discussions on potential security guarantees in peace negotiations – at least in talks involving the US administration under Donald Trump. However, the latest developments pointing to an accelerated accession timetable are raising serious questions about one of the core principles of EU enlargement: its strictly merit-based nature, grounded in demonstrable progress on reforms.
Kyiv’s EU membership “is the political anchor of the security guarantees,” the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, said, commenting on the role of the EU accession process in the talks between Ukrainian, US and European negotiators. She argued that this link also reflects the origins of the conflict with Russia, which, she noted, “started when Ukraine decided to go its European way” by signing the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement, which entered into force in 2016.
According to some Financial Times sources, the latest draft of the peace proposal currently under negotiation – and backed by European negotiators – envisages Ukraine joining the EU by 1 January 2027 under a fast-tracked process. Such a move would imply admitting a new member state without the full completion of all 33 negotiating chapters, compelling EU institutions to revisit the logic of the accession framework and to design phased access to EU funds, voting rights and common policies.
“This is not the time for speculation. We need to see what emerges at the end,” Kos warned on the margins of the Foreign Affairs Council on 15 December. What matters most for Brussels, she stressed, is that Kyiv continues to deliver on reforms, as discussed during an informal meeting in Lviv on 11 December. “The Commission has received clear guidance from the Member States, allowing us to proceed at the technical level with Clusters 1, 2 and 6,” she said, emphasising the “enabling role” of the accession process, regardless of dates and deadlines.
Is 2027 a realistic scenario?
While EU institutions remain reluctant to comment on the prospect of a fast-tracked accession by 1 January 2027 and its implications for the merit-based nature of the enlargement process – only HRVP Kaja Kallas noted that this push from the US “could be a good signal for one of our member states to unblock the opening of the clusters” – several experts interviewed by The New Union Post argue that such an outcome cannot be ruled out, particularly in light of the political stakes involved.
From a strictly negotiating standpoint, the current push may reflect an attempt by Kyiv to “secure US support for accession” by locking future EU membership “as part of any future arrangement,” says Ondrej Ditrych, senior analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).
For Brussels, however, any accelerated pathway would amount to “a conditional acceptance,” warns Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre (EPC), warns, contingent on Ukraine fulfilling all the conditions after accession and on unanimous approval in the Council. This is where a major bottleneck emerges: Hungary’s veto over the opening of Kyiv’s accession talks. Yet, Zuleeg argues, “if there is sufficient political will,” both practical challenges – including lengthy transition periods – and Budapest’s opposition could be overcome, “not least by putting Orban’s intransigence in front of Trump.”
Engjellushe Morina, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), echoes this view, arguing that the Hungarian prime minister’s double game – portraying himself as Trump’s closest ally in Europe while simultaneously blocking all decisions related to Ukraine – should be openly challenged by Washington. “If the US wants to see Ukraine in the EU by 2027, it would be best to put pressure on Hungary,” she says.
In any case, there is little doubt that such an outcome would have implications for the EU as a whole. First, there is “no indication” that either the European Commission or the Council is prepared to pursue a fast-track option, warns Volodymyr Dubovyk, senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Second, the EU “cannot offer Ukraine effective protection” in terms of security guarantees, given that the mutual defence clause under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) does not override the neutrality of certain member states and remains consistent with the commitments of NATO members.
Yet, according to Bohdan Popov, political adviser at United Ukraine, while EU accession is formally merit-based and Kyiv still has substantial work to do, reducing the debate to a technical checklist “misses the political and strategic reality” in which the process is unfolding. “Ukraine today is not merely a candidate country, it is a frontline security provider for the entire European continent,” he argues, noting that it is absorbing human, economic and security costs that most EU Member States do not bear directly. This, he argues, gives Kyiv “a strategic advantage” compared to other enlargement cases.
At the same time, policy discussions are increasingly converging around an integration model based on political accession followed by an extended transitional phase. Under such an approach – combining phased integration, targeted derogations, post-war screening and substantial EU-backed investment – reforms would continue “inside the EU framework rather than outside it,” Popov notes. Delivering this model would ultimately depend on overcoming existing vetoes through “sufficient political will at the European level.”
All things considered, Ukraine’s EU accession by 2027 “is ambitious, but not unrealistic,” provided the case is not treated as a ‘business as usual’ enlargement. Popov argues that this would require “a conscious political choice” by the EU to treat Ukraine as “a strategic asset, not just another applicant.” However, such a move could also have significant repercussions in the other candidate countries – many of which have been waiting for decades at the EU’s door, blocked by bilateral disputes or a lack of political will within Member States – as the European Union could come to be seen as unreliable and driven by strategic interests rather than predictable principles.
The state of EU relations with Ukraine
Just four days after the start of Russia’s war of aggression, on 28 February 2022, Ukraine submitted its application for EU membership. On 23 June 2022, the European Council endorsed the European Commission’s recommendation to grant Kyiv candidate status.
At the European Council meeting on 14 December 2023, EU leaders gave the green light to open accession negotiations. Following the Council’s approval of the negotiating frameworks, the first intergovernmental conference was held on 25 June 2024 in Luxembourg. As recognised in the 2025 Enlargement Package, the screening process has been successfully concluded with Ukraine.
With Hungary continuing to veto the start of Ukraine’s EU negotiations and Kyiv’s goal to complete them by the end of 2028, on 11 November the Danish presidency secured enough informal support among the member states in the Council to continue engaging with the candidate country at working level, as requested by Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos. The discussions – focused on monitoring progress in the implementation of reforms requested under the EU acquis – are taking place solely at a technical level, with no political decisions and no clusters of chapters formally opened or closed.
Once Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ – the first group of five negotiating chapters (out of 33), focusing on economic criteria, the functioning of democratic institutions, and public administration reform, is opened, the other groups of negotiating chapters can follow. According to the Commission, Ukraine is now ready to open all clusters. The unanimous approval of all 27 EU member states in the Council is now the only step remaining.
