Brussels – Sometimes shared interests can give rise to the most unexpected alliances. Such was the case on a sweltering midsummer day in Belgrade, when Volodymyr Zelensky and Aleksandar Vučić met and signalled a clear willingness to support and advance their respective EU membership processes, calling on Brussels to speed them up.
“We want Ukraine to open all clusters as soon as possible, to close them as soon as possible,” the Serbian president said after the meeting on 8 August. “We will be glad if Serbia’s path towards EU membership accelerates,” the Ukrainian president replied. But what lies behind this understanding, and why on an issue that is causing deep divisions among EU member states?
“It seems to have been a useful meeting for restoring a balance in which EU accession serves as the point of equilibrium between the two sides,” explains Giorgio Fruscione, Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and a current member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG), speaking to The New Union Post.
What emerged from the meeting is that the EU enlargement dossier is “the only real common ground” between the two countries, although “both are currently, for various reasons, some way off full membership.” For Belgrade, this is because it is not making progress in opening new negotiating clusters. For Kyiv, it is because it has only just begun the process, while resistance to its membership persists at many different levels across the majority of EU member states.
As Fruscione underlines, there is “a degree of common ground” between the two candidate countries, particularly given that “Vučić feels less need to insist on ‘Balkans first’, given that his government is not actively pursuing reforms in that direction.” For him, joining the EU remains a “strategic objective” that requires “little more than maintaining formal proximity” to the EU, even if, in practice, no progress is being made.
Meanwhile, for the European Union, “as always, it will be a political game” between different groups of member states, Fruscione warns. Some are pushing for the integration of the Western Balkans – such as the ‘Friends of the Western Balkans’ group – while others wish to prioritise Eastern Europe candidates. This is how “the true spirit” of the European Union comes to the fore – “a group of countries that must find political cohesion.”
The real difference between the two candidates is that Kyiv is “staunchly pro-European,” whereas when it comes to Belgrade’s EU integration, a sort of paradox emerges. As the ISPI Research Fellow stresses, “some member states are investing more in expanding the EU to include Serbia than Vučić’s government is.” For example, for Italy, integrating the Western Balkans has become “a matter of national interest,” while for Belgrade this is more “a strategic interest” to which it attaches a certain geopolitical importance, but which is “not as high a priority in foreign policy as it is for Rome.”
A general rebalancing of relations between Belgrade and Kyiv
Looking at the recent history of relations between Belgrade and Kyiv, Fruscione notes that “there has been a cooling of ties” since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the same time, however, the two countries “have never officially turned against each other.”
The complex relationship between the two countries is particularly linked to Belgrade’s historic relationship with Russia. In mid-July, Vučić refused to sign the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit’s joint declaration unconditionally condemning Russian aggression. Just a few weeks later, he welcomed the Ukrainian President in Belgrade while Ukraine’s national anthem played. All this shows that the first official meeting between the two leaders since the Russian invasion began “essentially served to restore a balance to relations.”
What they said to each other also confirms the ISPI Research Fellow’s interpretation. Zelensky confirmed that he will maintain the existing policy on Kosovo – that is, not to recognise it – immediately prompting an immediate reaction from Pristina, including the removal of the billboards that had been in place since 2022 bearing the words ‘Free Ukraine’. At the same time, Vučić reiterated that he will continue to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity, including Crimea.
“What has truly fallen by the wayside is the issue of sanctions,” Fruscione notes. Although alignment with the EU’s foreign policy officially remains one of Brussels’ demands, this topic was not addressed during the meeting with the Ukrainian President. One potential explanation is that “even in Kyiv they are aware that the aid Serbia has provided indirectly in the form of weapons represents a greater benefit than any concessions Serbia might make on sanctions.”
Not least because, in the broader picture of current geopolitics, “Belgrade is aligning itself more closely with certain Western positions,” Fruscione continues, referring to the rapprochement with Trump’s United States and the upcoming opening of an Israeli drone factory. All the “inconsistencies in today’s geopolitics” work to Vučić’s advantage in his “game of balancing” between Brussels and Moscow. He does not have to renounce friendly relations with Russia and can push EU integration into the background, “as long as relations with Kyiv remain aligned – at least on the surface – without openly discussing sanctions.”
The state of EU–Serbia relations
Serbia submitted its application for EU membership in 2009. Candidate status was granted in March 2012, and accession negotiations began in 2014.
To date, 21 chapters – plus an additional one on the normalisation of relations with Kosovo – are open, but only two are provisionally closed: Chapter 25 (Science and Research) in December 2016 and Chapter 26 (Education and Culture) in February 2017.
Relations between Brussels and Belgrade have cooled over the past year, especially following the violent crackdown on the protests by the national authorities and President Vučić’s decision not to attend the 2025 EU–Western Balkans Summit. Currently, around €1.5 billion allocated under the Growth Plan could be frozen over controversial judicial reforms and attacks on media independence.
The mass protests that have been taking place since November 2024 “reflect citizens’ disappointment, inter alia, over corruption and the perceived lack of accountability and transparency,” the European Commission’s 2025 report on Serbia recognised, identifying the slowdown in reforms and the lack of alignment with the EU – particularly in foreign policy – as the most worrying issues.
The state of EU–Ukraine relations
Just four days after the start of Russia’s war of aggression, on 28 February 2022, Ukraine submitted its application for EU membership. On 23 June 2022, the European Council endorsed the European Commission’s recommendation to grant Kyiv candidate status.
At the European Council meeting on 14 December 2023, EU leaders gave the green light to open accession negotiations. Following the Council’s approval of the negotiating frameworks, the first intergovernmental conference was held on 25 June 2024.
With Viktor Orbán‘s Hungary vetoing the start of Kyiv’s EU accession negotiations, the process stalled for two years. On 17 March 2026, technical guidance was provided by the Commission to continue work on EU reforms across all six negotiating clusters, before the change of power in Budapest brought a new momentum.
The new government, led by Péter Magyar, reached an agreement with Kyiv on the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, paving the way for the opening of Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ on 15 June 2026. To date, seven negotiating chapters have been opened.
