Brussels – All is ready in Red Square for the Victory Day Parade in Moscow—the ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany—where Putin will be joined by his closest partners and allies. Among them is Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, a major disappointment for the EU institutions.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s ongoing ambiguity risks having serious repercussions for Serbia’s path towards EU membership. “Visiting Moscow and thereby siding with the Russian dictator is the answer to the question of whether Vučić’s regime is truly committed to joining the EU,” Tonino Picula, the European Parliament’s rapporteur for Serbia, told The New Union Post.
The Croatian MEP added that Vučić “has clearly chosen a different course”, meaning that within the EU “he can only maintain close relations with [Hungarian Prime Minister] Orbán, [Slovak Prime Minister] Fico, and other like-minded politicians.” But even their support will face limits starting from today: “It will be very difficult for them to continue advocating for Serbia’s progress in the accession process, or ignoring all the open problems he has been unsuccessfully facing in the country for months.”
As stated in the report adopted during the European Parliament’s plenary session on 7 May, privileged ties with the Kremlin undermine not only Serbia’s “credibility” as a candidate country, but also the future of EU-Serbia relations. However, Picula warned that any potential attempt by the relevant European institutions to “cover up” Vučić’s visit to Moscow could “compromise the entire enlargement policy”, which is founded on the candidate countries’ commitment to fundamental values.
Asked by The New Union Post for a comment on this, a European Commission spokesperson said that “the EU has been crystal clear with our partners, including candidate countries such as Serbia—relations with Russia cannot continue as normal under Putin’s regime,” stressing that European leaders must “refrain from giving legitimacy” to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
The Commission “strongly” regrets the Serbian President’s visit to Russia and his participation in the Second World War commemorations, “which Russia is exploiting for propaganda,” the spokesperson said. They urged Belgrade to “reassure us” of its commitment to the EU and to demonstrate “a credible commitment” to European values. As of today, “to show support for peace, Kyiv is the right place to be on 9 May—not Moscow.”
Vučić between Putin and Brussels
Since the start of EU accession negotiations in 2014, Serbia has opened 22 of the 35 negotiating chapters, with two provisionally closed. However, non-alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains a significant obstacle to Belgrade’s EU integration—particularly its refusal to adopt restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, which runs counter to the EU’s strategic foreign policy positions.
“A true friend is recognised in times of difficulty—it is in these moments that one’s true face is revealed,” Vučić said in an interview with the Russian news agency TASS last year. In May 2022, the Serbian president signed a three-year gas deal with Putin, while in February 2024 the Russian-made Repellent anti-drone system was added to the Serbian army’s arsenal. Meanwhile, Vučić’s regime continues to raise concern in Brussels over the spread of Russian disinformation and anti-EU propaganda in the Western Balkans—particularly through Russia Today Balkan, a broadcaster banned across the EU but operating in Belgrade since July 2022.
Vučić has become an increasingly toxic—and politically costly—partner for the EU, both on the international and domestic fronts. Following the collapse of Novi Sad’s railway station canopy on 1 November 2024, which resulted in 16 deaths, a wave of mass protests erupted across the country. It is clear that Vučić’s regime cannot meet the students’ anti-corruption demands without jeopardising its own survival. As a result, repression has intensified, including a crackdown on NGOs.
However, the EU’s lack of support for the movement advocating the rule of law in Serbia is widely seen as prioritising economic interests over core democratic values. The lithium extraction project in the Jadar River Valley is the most frequently cited example, as it exposes the nature of Vučić’s grip on power and highlights the European Commission’s vulnerability so far.
