Brussels – Seven months have passed since the general elections in Kosovo, yet it still feels like the immediate aftermath of the vote. Political uncertainty has paralysed Parliament, which has yet to meet its constitutional obligations or elect all its leadership, preventing the launch of a legislature already seen as nearly unmanageable.
An institutional and political deadlock—triggered by the Pyrrhic victory of the governing party, Vetëvendosje, on 9 February 2025—that continues to drag on before the Constitutional Court. Above all, it has already shown “enormous consequences on many levels,” warns Dan Ilazi, Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS/QKSS), in an interview with The New Union Post.
“This stalemate is deepening polarisation in society, damaging people’s hopes for improvement and increasing fatigue among the business community,” Ilazi explains. All this is leading to “growing extremist views,” creating an environment where interethnic cooperation “becomes more difficult.” Not only has populism now become the norm, but “there is no longer a shared understanding that the Euro-Atlantic integration agenda should not be politicised.”
In this context, Kosovo risks sliding into a deeper political and institutional crisis. Depending on when the Constitutional Court rules on the latest controversy—the election of the Deputy Speaker of Parliament from the Serb community—”if we do not have a new government, early elections are most likely to be held by the end of the year,” Ilazi predicts.
What happened after the 2025 Kosovo elections
On 9 February 2025, the party of current Prime Minister Albin Kurti, Vetëvendosje, won the parliamentary elections. However, the result fell far short of his expectations, with only 42.3% of the vote. Unlike in the 2021 elections, Kurti does not have enough support in the 120-seat Assembly to form a government with Vetëvendosje’s 48 MPs plus the 10 MPs from the non-Serb, non-majority communities.
Kurti has rejected any cooperation with the Serb List—the largest party representing the Serb community—”which he considers a tool of Belgrade,” Ilazi explains. He attempted to reach out to the third-largest party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), with whom he was in coalition when he first became Prime Minister in 2020. However, “LDK rejected the proposal and suggested that Kosovo should form a technical government” comprising all parties. With no other options available—and the opposition parties simultaneously unable to form an alternative coalition—the process of electing the Speaker of Parliament has been blocked for months.
“We had two interventions from the Constitutional Court regarding this crisis,” KCSS’s Head of Research recalls. While upholding the constitutional right of the first-largest party to propose the Speaker, the latest decision unblocked the process, ruling that voting must be conducted openly and that a candidate who fails to secure support after three attempts can no longer be proposed. As a result, the Parliament managed to elect a Speaker—Dimal Basha of Vetëvendosje—on 26 August.
However, a new issue has further prolonged the stalemate. The two Deputy Speakers must be elected from the non-majority communities—one from the Serb community and one from the non-Serb. Vetëvendosje wants the current Minister for Communities and Returns, Nenad Rašić (For Freedom, Justice and Survival), as Deputy Speaker for the Serb community, a move that could potentially violate both the Constitution and parliamentary procedures, which grant this right to the largest party representing the Serb community. The Serb List—controlling nine of the ten Serb seats—has taken the case to the Constitutional Court.
Meanwhile, the new Speaker declared the Parliament constituted, holding the first meeting of the parliamentary chamber—to decide on meetings and agenda—on 1 September. In protest, the opposition did not attend. “We need to wait to see if the Constitutional Court will issue a new decision to unblock the situation,” Ilazi continues, warning of an even bigger issue on the horizon. “Vetëvendosje has signalled that they want to go ahead with forming the government,” even though technically it cannot be done without a functioning Parliament. “If they proceed with this next step, it could once again become a matter for the Constitutional Court to resolve.”
The risk of early elections
How likely is it that a new government will secure the support of a parliamentary majority? This depends on the decisions of the political parties. One thing is certain: without a coalition with the two main opposition parties—the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)—a government led by Vetëvendosje would be short-lived.
In practice, “Kurti might be able to form the government,” Ilazi says, describing a not entirely impossible scenario. In the event of early elections, “there is a party in Parliament, NISMA, that is unlikely to pass the 5% threshold.” Therefore, its leader, former minister Fatmir Limaj, “might want to avoid new elections,” NISMA’s three MPs to vote in favour “without being part of the coalition.” Such a government would reach the 61-seat threshold, but its majority would remain highly unstable—particularly given the challenges Kosovo faces next.
As Ilazi explains, “there are two hard deadlines coming up in this situation that could trigger early elections.” The first lasts 25 days and concerns the formation of the government (once the Parliament is considered constituted, it may also dissolve itself after 45 days). Under the Constitution, the candidate nominated by the largest party has 15 days to form a government through a successful vote in Parliament. If this fails, the President may nominate another candidate, who then has 10 days to try. If both attempts fail, early elections will be called.
The second hard deadline comes regardless of whether a government is formed. In March 2026, a new President must be elected. According to the Constitution, at least 81 members must be present and voting in the first two rounds. “Simply not attending these sessions gives the opposition significant leverage,” Ilazi notes, as failing to elect the President would also trigger early elections.
Causes and consequences
Everything related to this prolonged institutional deadlock is extremely worrying. Ilazi highlights the “distrust” between the opposition parties and Vetëvendosje, as well as Kurti’s reluctance to find a middle ground for compromise, “even if the opposition parties would welcome a conversation with him.” With Kosovo currently under EU measures—which have so far cost €613.4 million in suspended or indefinitely delayed projects—”it will be very difficult to reach an agreement on how to handle the situation,” he adds.
As support drifts towards sovereignist positions, Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic consensus has shown increasing signs of strain in recent years. KCSS’s Head of Research notes that, in the past, decisions essential to the integration agenda “were not politicised and would have been supported across the political spectrum.” Traditionally, this is how Kosovo politics functioned, but “with Vetëvendosje, this kind of consensus has started to be shaken,” beginning with tensions over the border demarcation agreement with Montenegro—a NATO member state—in 2018.
If the causes of the stalemate are worrying, the consequences of non-functioning institutions are no less serious. On a reputational level, “this could signal that Kosovo has a poor political and democratic culture,” potentially damaging the image of a country with a functional democracy “that deserves recognition.” Strategically, Kosovo is also losing ground. For instance, one way to advance NATO membership—a priority shared by all parties—is through increased participation in NATO operations and peacekeeping missions. “Kosovo’s security forces were invited to be part of a US peacekeeping force in Syria, but the US abandoned those plans because our Parliament failed to approve the necessary legal permission.”
At the policy and financial level, the EU’s suspension of support starkly illustrates the cost of seven months of institutional deadlock. Under the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, Kosovo is set to receive more than €880 million in direct transfers by 2027. Yet the first tranche of €68 million remains frozen because Parliament has not been able to approve the plan. “And the EU has warned Kosovo that it could lose this money if the situation continues,” Ilazi recalls.
When it comes to EU–Kosovo relations, Pristina is losing “many opportunities and time” in both the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue and the European integration process, Ilazi concludes. He highlights that “one of the European Commission’s priorities is the adoption of laws to meet EU benchmarks within the framework of sectoral reforms.” Public administration is a case in point: a law designed to streamline agencies in Kosovo is still awaiting parliamentary approval.
