Brussels – A month has passed since the European Commission first revealed to the New Union Post that it had begun the “gradual, conditional and reversible” lifting of the measures imposed on Kosovo since 2023. Yet, no further details about the process have been released, while the financial impact of two years of economic and diplomatic ‘punishment’ is beginning to surface.
According to an analysis by the GAP Institute for Advanced Studies, the punitive measures introduced in June 2023 have so far cost Kosovo €613.4 million in suspended or indefinitely delayed projects funded through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) and the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF), including affected third-party and national contributions.
“Even if the measures are lifted now, the impact of the two-year delay on these projects is greater than their face value,” warned Rrona Zhuri, Research Coordinator at the GAP Institute, speaking to The New Union Post. Moreover, “there is a risk of losing even more than the €7 million already lost, as some agreements are set to expire,” she added.
Despite these serious concerns, the European Commission continues to withhold information about the programmes affected, the procedure followed to lift the measures—since these are not classified as sanctions—the role of both the Commission and the EU Council, and the steps expected from the government in Pristina to meet Brussels’ expectations for “progress on the ground” and “sustained de-escalation” in northern Kosovo. “There is nothing more to add than what we have already said,” a Commission spokesperson said. That is, almost nothing.
How the EU measures affected Kosovo
Since Kosovo’s birth in 2008 until 2020, the European Union has contributed over €1.5 billion, representing a key partner in the country’s economic, political, and institutional development. However, following the tensions in northern Kosovo, the EU introduced “temporary and reversible” measures against Kosovo on 28 June 2023, which have negatively affected bilateral diplomatic relations, as well as financial support.
These financial measures have been particularly severe. Funding through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) has been frozen, while Pristina’s proposals under the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) are currently not being considered by the WBIF Management Board.
Analysing the suspended or indefinitely delayed projects, the GAP Institute has discovered that the financial and developmental impact amounts to approximately €613.4 million. Of this, €7.1 million has already been irretrievably lost due to the expiration of procedural deadlines.
Around €218 million relates to IPA projects, with the remaining €395.5 million attributed to WBIF projects—all expected to be financed through grants and loans, including €421 million from the EU, €162 million from third parties (such as international financial institutions), and €31 million from Kosovo’s self-financing. Among the IPA funds, three signed agreements from 2020, 2021, and 2022, as well as one pending agreement for 2024, have been affected. Under the WBIF, eight applications for grants and loans have been blocked—two submitted in 2023 and six in 2024.
The most affected sectors include the environment (€350.7 million), energy (€114.4 million), digitalisation (around €57 million), and culture (€15 million). In addition to the suspension of specific projects, Zhuri explained that the EU’s measures have not only “slowed economic development, hindered the energy transition, and affected environmental protection,” but have also “indirectly impacted citizens’ well-being.” For example, among the suspended funds is a €25 million project for local district heating in Pristina, which was intended to provide more affordable heating for residents.
Even more concerning, with each day that these measures remain in place, the economic damage is likely to increase. If they are not lifted by November, there is a risk of forfeiting the entire €32 million allocated under the IPA 2020 agreement, due to the expiry of the three-year deadline for initiating procurement procedures. While the EU is expected to reprogramme certain projects under IPA 2025–2027, “some projects risk being lost regardless, as IPA 2025 operates under new priorities that may not align with older projects,” Zhuri cautioned.
The risks to the EU’s credibility
“When the measures were first introduced, I was glad they were not labelled as ‘sanctions’, as sanctions carry a certain stigma,” said Besar Gërgi, Research Fellow at the Group for Legal and Political Studies (GLPS)—an independent, non-partisan, and non-profit public policy organisation based in Pristina—speaking to The New Union Post. However, nearly two years on, “I now wish they hadn’t been these so-called ‘reversible and temporary measures’, because they have proven to be neither reversible nor temporary.”
While sanctions require unanimous approval from all 27 Council member states every six months to be renewed, these measures follow a procedure the Commission refuses to disclose—one adopted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework and based on a unanimous Council vote on 14 June 2023.
In December 2024, the Council stated that the EU “will gradually lift the measures in parallel with further steps by Kosovo to de-escalate tensions in the north,” but a unanimous vote by all 27 governments is still required. Hungary—which has a particularly close relationship with Serbia—”has been especially vocal in opposing the removal” of these measures, “but France and Italy have also not been supportive,” Gërgi revealed.
“It is incredibly difficult to explain to people that we still have a European perspective and could one day become a member of the Union,” the GLPS Research Fellow added, highlighting that “it is the EU’s credibility that has suffered most as a result of these measures.” This is because the values the EU promotes “are clearly not being upheld by the institutions themselves,” and the Kosovar public now sees membership “primarily through an economic lens, rather than one rooted in shared values.”
To remove this financial and diplomatic barrier, “a more effective approach” could be “linking the dialogue with Serbia to the lifting of the measures,” Gërgi suggested. As EU leaders wish to relaunch the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue frozen since March 2023, this could represent “an ideal opportunity” for Kosovo’s leadership to “signal their willingness to sign all relevant agreements and to engage with Serbia,” on the condition that these measures are removed beforehand. “This strategy may have a better chance of influencing individual EU member states,” Gërgi concluded.
