Brussels – Just a couple of days since the establishment of the new European Commission, the newly-appointed EU High Representative, Kaja Kallas, has already begun addressing one of the main challenges of her mandate: the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. On the sidelines of the informal dinner with Western Balkans leaders, convened on 3 December in Brussels by President of the European Council António Costa, Kallas met Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti and President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić.
“The only way to EU membership is through normalisation of their relations, on the basis of the Ohrid agreement,” Kallas wrote on X, emphasizing her commitment to concluding the process started by her predecessor, Josep Borrell, nearly two years ago, and resolving the same challenges he faced until the very end of his mandate. “I welcomed the readiness to fully cooperate after the recent terrorist attack. Perpetrators must face justice,” the new EU High Representative added.
After the explosion at the Iber Lepenc/Ibar Lepenac water canal in Zubin Potok on 29 November, tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have reignited, with both sides accusing each other of orchestrating the attack on critical civilian infrastructure in northern Kosovo, further straining the already fragile Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.
Kosovan Prime Minister Kurti claimed that Serbia has “both the interest and the capability to execute such attacks”. Serbian President Vučić rejected the allegations as “politically motivated,” accusing Pristina of attempting to undermine Serbia’s European integration efforts and tarnish the Serb List party ahead of Kosovo’s parliamentary elections in February 2025.
The almost inextricable Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue
The formal talks between Belgrade and Pristina, which began on 8 March 2011, were the first in a series of negotiation rounds mediated by the European Union. The three main issues on the table were cooperation in the Balkan region, freedom of movement between Serbia and Kosovo, and the alignment of national laws. Seven months of negotiations produced some results on paper, including the end of the trade embargo, Belgrade’s recognition of Pristina’s customs stamps, and the sharing of land registry records and documents related to births, deaths, and marriages in Kosovo.
Another year and a half of technical agreements led to the first high-level Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in early 2013, chaired by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. The first major success was the signing of the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations—informally known as the Brussels Agreement—on 19 April 2013. This allowed work to begin on signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo and starting Serbia’s EU accession negotiations.
However, two key issues remained unresolved: Belgrade’s recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty and the establishment of the Association/community of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo. From 2014 onwards, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini was tasked with mediating in an increasingly tense environment. The Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue was frozen in November 2018, when the Kosovan government imposed a 100% tariff on goods coming from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The deadlock in relations between the two countries lasted until 12 July 2020, when EU High Representative Josep Borrell and EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajčák managed to bring the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo back to the negotiating table (remotely). Two other high-level meetings (in person) took place between 16 July and 7 September. While these three meetings did not lead to a decisive breakthrough, a final agreement between Belgrade and Pristina was considered in Brussels to be “a matter of months, not years.”
Tension escalated in northern Kosovo with the so-called ‘car plate dispute’ in mid-September 2021. Pristina required all Serbian vehicles entering Kosovo to change their number plates, affecting the Serb minority in northern Kosovo. The issue was temporarily resolved through EU mediation, but the lack of a permanent solution led to further tensions. By the end of July 2022, roadblocks and barricades appeared at the border, and two unsuccessful high-level meetings in Brussels failed to break the deadlock.
The situation worsened when the Serb List (the dominant Serb party in Kosovo, aligned with Belgrade’s interests) took control of popular protests in northern Kosovo. In November 2022, mass resignations occurred in the region’s public institutions, including the mayors of Kosovska Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Zvečan, and Leposavić. Early elections were scheduled for 18 December but were postponed to 23 April 2023 due to new barricades erected at the end of the year at the border crossings in northern Kosovo.
Meanwhile, the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue saw an expected positive twist. On 27 February 2023, the 11-point Brussels Agreement defined the specific commitments that Serbia and Kosovo must respect. Although the text was not signed, it became binding through the agreement on the implementation annex reached during the meeting in Ohrid (North Macedonia) on 18 March. The two agreements became an integral part of the paths towards EU membership for both countries.
The next crisis emerged in May 2023, when protests in northern Kosovo against the newly elected mayors in Zubin Potok, Zvečan, Leposavić, and Kosovska Mitrovica turned into a sort of guerrilla conflict involving NATO-led KFOR soldiers. Furthermore, three Kosovan police officers were arrested by Serbian security forces in June. An emergency meeting with Kosovan Prime Minister Kurti and Serbian President Vučić was convened in Brussels. Due to Pristina’s failure to adopt a “constructive attitude” towards de-escalation, “temporary and reversible” EU measures were imposed on Kosovo.
The situation further deteriorated with a terrorist attack near the Serbian Orthodox Banjska Monastery on 24 September 2023. A day of clashes between Kosovan police forces and a group of around 30 armed men left one officer and three attackers dead. One of the attackers was Milan Radoičić, deputy leader of the Serb List party, who later confirmed his involvement. Links to Belgrade emerged, while the U.S. denounced a “large military build-up” by Serbia near the administrative border.
After the resolution of the ‘car plate dispute’, thanks to mutual recognition for vehicles entering the border between December 2023 and January 2024, Kosovo’s enforcement of the euro as the sole legal tender since 1 February 2024 disrupted public services in northern Kosovo resisting currency regulations introduced in 2002. Belgrade continues to pay salaries, pensions, and benefits in dinars to many ethnic Serbs in the region, while Pristina pushes for complete sovereignty over northern Kosovo. In this context, it is difficult to expect progress in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.
