Brussels – All eyes are on Hungary and its new government’s attitude towards Ukraine, as Budapest could finally unblock EU accession talks that have long been held up in the Council by former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán‘s staunch veto. His successor, Péter Magyar, is approaching the issue cautiously, yet it is already becoming clear that he is pursuing a different path, with the first steps pointing in a more constructive direction.
“I informed the President of the European Council [António Costa, ed.] by phone that we had initiated a round of technical-level talks with the Ukrainian side,” he announced on 18 May, “aimed at securing legal guarantees as soon as possible for the linguistic, educational and cultural rights of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia.” At the same time, Magyar also revealed that President Costa had reminded Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on 17 May that “respect for the rights of the Hungarian minority living in Ukraine must come before any further steps.”
Minority rights have historically been one of the most sensitive issues in Budapest–Kyiv relations and were used by former Prime Minister Orbán as a pretext for not green-lighting the opening of EU accession talks with Ukraine. In June 2024, the previous government set out an 11-point plan focused on this specific issue, the implementation of which was deemed vital for opening the first cluster of negotiating chapters in Ukraine’s EU accession process.
The Orbán government has never been truly serious about engaging in resolving this dispute with Kyiv. On the contrary, the first week of the Magyar government appears to have taken a different direction.
“Both sides have appointed their negotiating delegations,” Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Orbán announced following a call with her Ukrainian counterpart, Andrii Sybiha, on the eve of the first joint expert-level consultations “with the involvement of representatives of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia.” The stated goal is to lay “an important foundation for the prompt and reassuring settlement of minority rights issues.”
Magyar’s right-wing stance on foreign policy does not differ in principle from Orbán’s, and it would be a mistake to think that the nationalist footprint will suddenly change with the new government. What is more reasonable to expect is the abandonment of obstructionist tactics, even when the Ukrainian side is ready to take steps forward.
A first step in this direction is the intention to hold a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky “in early June, symbolically in Berehove, a Hungarian-majority town,” Magyar indicated on 28 April, just two weeks after his electoral triumph. While Budapest’s first priority is always to “improve the situation of Hungarians in Transcarpathia” and to “put an end to the restrictions that have been in place for more than a decade” – as he reiterated – the new approach lies in the recognition that “it is in the interest of Hungarians living in Transcarpathia to place Hungarian–Ukrainian relations on new foundations.”
As soon as the Budapest–Kyiv bilateral dispute is considered resolved, it is for the Cyprus Presidency of the Council to place the topic of opening accession talks with Ukraine (and Moldova) on Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ on the agenda of the relevant Council committees. Once there is consensus among member states on the way forward, the issue will be put on the table for a final agreement on the negotiating mandate, paving the way for the ad-hoc intergovernmental conferences (IGCs).
As EU sources told The New Union Post, the negotiating mandate is “already on the table.” This is the document that has been under discussion since autumn 2025 and currently serves as the basis for the so-called “front-loading” work with Ukraine and Moldova, which is currently ongoing. The Hungarian green light is the only piece missing in this puzzle.
The state of EU relations with Ukraine (and Moldova)
Just four days after the start of Russia’s war of aggression, on 28 February 2022, Ukraine submitted its application for EU membership, with Moldova following three days later, on 3 March. On 23 June 2022, the European Council endorsed the European Commission’s recommendation to grant Kyiv and Chișinău candidate status.
At the European Council meeting on 14 December 2023, EU leaders gave the green light to open accession negotiations. Following the Council’s approval of the negotiating frameworks, the first intergovernmental conferences with the two countries were held on 25 June 2024 in Luxembourg. As recognised in the 2025 Enlargement Package, the screening process has been successfully concluded with both Kyiv and Chișinău.
With Hungary vetoing the start of Ukraine’s EU negotiations, Moldova’s accession has also been put on hold, as Chișinău’s EU process is tied to Kyiv’s through the so-called “package approach” (which has linked the two dossiers from the very beginning). While the Commission considers it possible for Moldova to complete accession negotiations by 2027, opening them “by November” this year, Ukraine’s goal is to do the same by the end of 2028, and is now expected to meet the conditions allowing the Council to open “all clusters before the end of the year.”
On 17 March 2026, technical guidance was provided to both Ukraine and Moldova to continue work on EU reforms across all six negotiating clusters, until political conditions allow the formal process to begin – meaning Hungary lifting its veto.
Once Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ – the first group of five negotiating chapters (out of 33), focusing on economic criteria, the functioning of democratic institutions, and public administration reform – is opened, the other groups of negotiating chapters can follow. The unanimous approval of all 27 EU member states in the Council is now the only step remaining.
