Brussels – There is something “bizarre” in how the European Union is handling the resignation of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Christian Schmidt and the process surrounding the selection of his successor. The same actor which should be considering a gradual phasing out of the post-Dayton framework, in order to potentially grant full membership to the Balkan country, is also the one that is pouring cold water on any prospect of change to its complex post-war institutional arrangements.
“The Office of the High Representative goes against the rule of law because it fails the basic democratic test,” warns Adnan Ćerimagić, Senior Analyst for the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative (ESI), speaking with The New Union Post. However, what is happening now is not the EU leading the process of phasing out or closing the OHR, but rather “the US together with Banja Luka and, partly, Russia.”
As Ćerimagić observes, “what is really bizarre” is that the EU is the main financial contributor to the OHR and has a “clear policy objective” aligned with Venice Commission opinions – that “both the OHR and its powers should be phased out and closed as part of the accession process.” However, he adds, “it is others who are now leading this process, with different goals.” He warns that this carries major risks.
What the EU should do now
According to Ćerimagić, the EU should adopt a two-step strategy: take stock and react.
First, it needs to reckon with the “almost total absence of influence” in the country and assess “to what extent its interests are aligned with those pursued by the US.” Over the past year, the Trump administration’s policies “did not bring any benefit to the EU, yet the EU has not challenged the US because it did not want to enter into a confrontation.” As a result, Brussels has not been able to influence political processes or institutional dynamics within the country.
The most positive period now seems well behind us. From summer 2021 – when Schmidt became UN High Representative – and spring 2022 – with the revival of the enlargement process with Ukraine – “there was at least a parallel track” through which Bosnia was moving towards candidate status and the opening of accession talks. However, since March 2024 “all that has collapsed” and, with the arrival of the Trump administration in January 2025, “the EU has been completely absent,” Ćerimagić makes clear.
At present, key political actors in Banja Luka have “completely rejected” the EU’s proposals – “not just the opening of accession talks but also engagement with Brussels on different issues.” Moreover, in Mostar, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH) appears “unwilling” to use its influence in Banja Luka to move the country decisively towards the EU path and use this venue to modernise the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Constitution, “preferring instead a strategy of waiting and preserving the status quo.”
The second step is to consider whether the election process for Schmidt’s successor is actually “the first big test where the EU should try to have its own interests included.” The EU’s High Representative, Kaja Kallas, has said that the red line is that the appointment must be made by the Peace Implementation Council. While the EU’s interest is not to have a High Representative who would dismantle the legal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ćerimagić is unsure whether it is possible to exclude the risk that this could become the agenda, “if someone were elected in a way that pleases that part of the US administration which is not particularly keen on protecting the rule of law.”
One indication is the fact that Washington has already announced that the next High Representative should be a candidate able to engage with Banja Luka. However, the EU should move away from the “dangerous premise” – which is both empirically and practically incorrect – that the OHR is fundamental to the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina, meaning that otherwise secessionist tendencies and attempts to unilaterally and unconstitutionally dismantle institutions would be given free rein.
As the ESI Senior Analyst points out, “this is not true,” as shown by the fact that whenever there has been an attempt to undermine or collapse institutions, “it has been domestic institutions, together with a group of countries and allies, that have pushed back against those efforts, not the OHR.” While the Bosnian Constitutional Court is functional and able to make decisions, “there has not been a single ruling in which the OHR was instrumental in stopping these threats.”
Finally, a further concern with this narrative is that “it gives a false signal to those actors that they have a go-ahead to try to succeed” in their unconstitutional objectives, “when the US says the OHR is not needed that much or when Russia has a say in the matter,” Ćerimagić concludes.
Controversy over the UN High Representative
Under the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the Balkan country was divided into two autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. These entities are linked through a central government in Sarajevo operating under international supervision. The High Representative’s “Bonn Powers” allow the office-holder to dismiss public officials who violate legal obligations and to impose binding decisions when local actors are unwilling or unable to act.
The selection process is led by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international body involved in post-war stabilisation. Its Steering Board – which includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Russia and representatives of the European Union – selects a candidate. Once appointed, the official heads the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Sarajevo, a structure that reflects the continued international oversight of Bosnia and Herzegovina nearly three decades after the end of the war.
Since his appointment in 2021, Schmidt has taken a firm stance against Milorad Dodik, the former president of Republika Srpska, who has pursued a secessionist agenda aimed at reducing central state authority in key areas such as the military, tax system and judiciary. The Serb-majority entity’s separatist rhetoric and its non-recognition of Schmidt’s legitimacy have been among the main obstacles to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards EU membership.
However, since Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, Schmidt has also come under pressure from the United States. In late April 2026, The Guardian reported that AAFS Infrastructure and Energy – a previously little-known US company linked to Trump’s personal lawyer Jesse Binnall – secured a $1.5 billion contract for the Southern Interconnection pipeline project without a public tender in Sarajevo.
While the European Commission’s spokespersons’ service denied allegations of any risk of confrontation with Washington over a commercial project involving individuals close to the US president – The New Union Post was told that the letter sent by the EU Special Representative, Luigi Soreca, to the Bosnian leadership should be regarded as a “constructive initiative” – Schmidt’s public concerns about the project appear to have quickly turned the US administration against him. Schmidt cited “private reasons” for his resignation.
The state of EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina relations
Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its official request for EU membership on 15 February 2016. More than six years later, on 15 December 2022, it was granted candidate status. The EU institutions moved forward with the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations on 21 March 2024.
Despite Sarajevo’s stated commitment, reform momentum has since stalled. Further efforts are needed to address the 14 key priorities outlined in the European Commission’s 2019 Opinion, as well as the steps detailed in the 2022 Recommendation. Two key reforms – a new law on the State Court and one on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council – as well as the appointment of an operational chief negotiator to advance the screening process are still pending. The Council has affirmed its readiness to adopt the negotiating framework only once these conditions have been met.
