Pro-EU Moldovan President Maia Sandu took office for her second consecutive term

Brussels – A second presidential term to reshape national history and further strengthen Moldova’s path towards the European Union. After last autumn’s tense elections, President Maia Sandu took office on 24 December, reaffirming her commitment to bringing Chișinău into the EU as soon as possible.

“Today, I take on a new mandate with gratitude and determination,” declared Moldova’s first re-elected President. She recall that, over on the past four years, “we have overcome great challenges, always choosing the right side of history,” and vowed to “continue building a European future and work for better lives for all Moldovans, with renewed ambition.” From Brussels, President of European Commission Ursula von der Leyen congratulated her counterpart in Chișinău: “Despite foreign forces working against you, you won fair and square,” adding that she “can count on me as Moldova moves forward on its path to our Union.”

One week after the start of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, on 3 March 2022, Moldova submitted its request for EU membership. On 23 June 2022, the European Council endorsed the European Commission’s recommendation to grant Chișinău candidate status. In the 2023 Enlargement Package, the Commission also recommended that the Council open accession negotiations, a decision taken during the EU leaders’ summit on 14 December 2023. Following the approval of the negotiating frameworks, the first intergovernmental conferences took place on 25 June 2024. Chișinău is aiming at opening the first EU accession negotiation cluster in the first half of 2025.

The 2024 presidential elections and EU referendum in Moldova

Sandu secured a second term as President of the Republic on 3 November 2024, following a closely contested runoff against pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. While she led the first round on 20 October with 42.5% of the vote, Sandu won the second round with 55%. During both rounds, the president’s national security office warned of “massive interference” from Russia in the electoral process, noting the “high potential to distort the outcome.”

Ahead of the election, Marina Tauber, vice-president of the Șor Party—founded by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, now a Russian citizen living in Moscow—and governor of Gagauzia Evghenia Guțul, met with Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova to discuss Moldova’s international relations. This development unfolded against the backdrop of a volatile situation in Transnistria. In February 2024, the authorities of the self-proclaimed pro-Russian republic appealed to Moscow for “protection” against the government in Chișinău.

Stoianoglo, who was dismissed as prosecutor general, denied being pro-Kremlin. However, he was supported by the pro-Russian Party of Socialists and the Șor Party and advocated for closer ties with Moscow. Stoianoglo initially led the race—performing strongly in autonomous and secessionist regions—and he secured over 51% of the national vote. However, Sandu dominated in the capital Chișinău and among expatriate voters.

The first round of the presidential elections coincided with a referendum on a proposed constitutional amendment to formalise Chișinău’s commitment to joining the European Union. Specifically, the amendment sought to add two new paragraphs to the preamble of the National Charter. One to “reaffirm the European identity of the people of the Republic of Moldova and the irreversibility of the European path,” and another to “declare integration into the European Union as a strategic objective of the Republic of Moldova.”

Although the referendum was widely expected to pass comfortably, the final result was razor-thin, with 50.35% voting ‘yes’ and 49.65% voting ‘no’. President Sandu attributed the narrow margin to foreign interference, describing it as an “unprecedented assault on democracy” supported by “clear evidence” of buying 300,000 votes. This allegation referred to an election fraud scheme involving a Russian bank under international sanctions. In the lead-up to the elections, millions of Moldovan lei were reportedly distributed to 130,000 citizens, who were trained by the Russian Federation to carry out anti-Western propaganda and to encourage votes for pro-Moscow candidates and a ‘no’ in the constitutional referendum.