Brussels – A new political momentum is set to take shape in Hungary and across the European Union following Viktor Orbán’s historic defeat in the parliamentary elections of 12 April, bringing an end to 16 years in power. Long awaited in Brussels, the result is expected to reshape relations with Budapest across a range of policy areas.
Yet, in the immediate aftermath of the vote, several crucial questions arise. What will the change of government mean for EU enlargement policy, from Ukraine to the Western Balkans? Is Péter Magyar likely to fundamentally alter Hungary’s foreign policy stance? And will the current deadlock in the Council truly be broken overnight?
A recalibration of approach to Ukraine
Ukraine was the most thorny issue during the final years of Orbán’s government. After having staunchly blocked the start of EU accession negotiations with Kyiv – which is linked to Moldova’s path, as the two are covered by the so-called ‘package approach’ – and the €90 billion support package to partially cover its 2026–2027 financial needs, the departure of the sovereignist Hungarian prime minister is expected to have a major impact on unblocking this politically sensitive dossier.
“For Ukraine, this is not just a political change in a neighbouring state, but a potential recalibration of one of the most problematic vectors inside the EU,” says Bohdan Popov, political adviser at United Ukraine, speaking to The New Union Post in the aftermath of the Hungarian vote.
For years, Hungary acted as an obstructionist member within the Union on key decisions related to financial assistance and political support for Kyiv, and on sanctions on Russia. “Even a partial shift away from this approach would significantly increase the EU’s institutional capacity to act more cohesively towards Ukraine,” Popov notes, pointing to a softening of Budapest’s positions – from a “transactional and often obstructionist approach” to a more constructive dialogue with Brussels that would “reduce friction” within the EU and “lower the political cost” of maintaining pressure on Russia.
What is expected in Brussels is the end of the politicised veto on both the formal start of accession negotiations and the financial support package. Yet the issue of Ukraine’s EU accession remains “more complex,” Popov warns. The long-awaited removal of veto leverage “does not automatically translate into active support” from the upcoming Hungarian government led by the centre-right Tisza party. However, if Kyiv is able to build a “working relationship” with the new leadership in Budapest, this would create “a window of opportunity” for cross-border cooperation and the normalisation of bilateral relations.
As Popov explains, Hungary could transition “from a spoiler to a neutral or even conditionally constructive actor” in Ukraine’s EU integration process. However, expectations should not be overstated, as structural mistrust accumulated over years “will not disappear instantly.” If Budapest, Kyiv, and Brussels are not able to convert the political reset into a functional partnership, “the change will remain merely tactical rather than strategic,” and the bottleneck in enlargement policy will remain.
No autocracy lasts forever
“Without Orbán in the picture, the EU can now have a stronger single voice and democratic leverage in the Western Balkans, which will hopefully be used wisely,” says Berta López Domènech, Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre (EPC), reached by The New Union Post for a comment about the impact of the Hungarian election results on pro-EU forces across Europe.
The Hungarian leader “has long been a close ally of the autocrats in the region,” namely the Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. On the one hand, he “actively” advocated accelerating Serbia’s EU accession “despite the remarkable rule of law deficiencies.” Meanwhile, when Dodik was convicted and removed from the presidency of the Republika Srpska entity, Budapest “continued to treat him as the legitimate leader of the entity.”
Her analysis is echoed by Giorgio Fruscione, Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and a current member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG). “Autocrats in the region acknowledge that no autocracy lasts forever, regardless of their grip over media, state institutions, and the economy,” he tells The New Union Post, commenting on the potential setback for autocratic governance in the Western Balkans.
This is particularly relevant for Serbian President Vučić, who has now lost his greatest ally within the EU. Although for the moment there may not be immediate consequences – as Magyar will have other priorities – as soon as elections are scheduled in Serbia, opposition and students “will be more encouraged by the fact that defeating autocrats through the vote is still possible,” Fruscione stresses. Consequently, a regime change in Serbia would eventually have consequences for Belgrade’s path towards the EU.
Another potential impact on EU enlargement policy is Tisza party’s promise to bring Hungary back to the EU. “Although Magyar’s political vision is largely in continuity with Orbán’s,” Fruscione cautions, this change of course suggests that the upcoming government in Budapest “may use its veto power less than Orbán did.” Drawing on his promise to fight corruption in Hungary, Magyar’s position towards the progress of the current frontrunners – Albania and Montenegro – could similarly be based “more on merit and their progress in fighting corruption,” contributing to a “more objective” stance and “less political interest” in vetoing their accession.
But it was not just Orbán
Finally, it is true that Orbán was beyond any doubt the most problematic leader in the Council. But he was not the only problem, and his long shadow risks remaining. Although his defeat represents “a crucial victory for democracy and European integration,” as Fabian Zuleeg, European Policy Centre’s Chief Executive and Chief Economist, tells The New Union Post, “it remains to be seen whether it will also help to bring momentum into the enlargement debate.”
At the last European Council, for example, conclusions on Ukraine were adopted by 25, without both Hungary and Slovakia. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico could easily become Orbán’s proxy in the Council, using his veto power to block the most sensitive issues where unanimity is required. Not to forget Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, the last Patriots for Europe’s leader in the Council, who is set to become the voice of the European far right within the EU institution.
Last but not least, the EPC’s Chief Executive warns that “there are a number of countries that are sceptical” about EU enlargement. The narrative that the Hungarian prime minister alone bears responsibility for stalling the enlargement process is an oversimplification, and it has a broader impact on the debate on overcoming unanimity in the accession process. If the current problem lies with Hungary over Ukraine, relinquishing the veto could well backfire on other capitals in the future. “At least they can’t hide behind Orbán’s veto anymore,” Zuleeg notes.
