Brussels – And suddenly, even EU enlargement is beginning to scare Russia. Perhaps not yet for what it represents, but for what it could become. NATO has always been – and still is – Moscow’s number one enemy, but if the European Union were to assume an increasingly credible role in the continent’s security, it would become far harder to ignore or dismiss politically, as Russia has done for years.
“The EU is no longer just an economic union. It can transform, and rather quickly, into a full-blown military alliance, one overtly hostile to Russia, and in some ways worse than NATO,” said the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev. The former Russian President and Prime Minister, well known for his hardline nationalist views, called for abandoning the “tolerant attitude” towards neighbours joining “what is now a military-economic European Union.”
It is highly debatable that the Russia’s attitude has been “tolerant” so far. Electoral, economic and political interference has taken place from Georgia to Moldova and the Western Balkans. Not to mention that the start of the conflict with Ukraine dates back to the 2014 Euromaidan protests, when civil unrest spread after then-President Viktor Yanukovych suddenly decided not to sign the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement under Russian pressure to maintain closer ties with Moscow. Back then, Medvedev was Russian Prime Minister.
However, it is in some ways true that Russia has always perceived the European Union as a relatively non-threatening political experiment, which could potentially be undermined from within by supporting anti-EU nationalist parties or even weakened through military force. An indication of this has been the reaction to the draft US–Ukraine peace plan, which proposed EU accession – not NATO membership – as a “security guarantee” for Kyiv. For this reason, Moscow did not oppose it a priori, well aware that the current Union does not represent a credible military power in Europe capable of defending its members in the event of war.
What Russia actually fears
Medvedev’s comments must be understood within the evolving context in Moscow, where EU enlargement and European integration are increasingly portrayed as part of a broader regional security challenge. In particular, discussions on defence cooperation within the EU and internal tensions within NATO – following US threats to European allies and to withdraw from the Alliance – are seen as a preview to an acceleration of the EU’s shift in posture on the global stage.
Recently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky urged the EU to evolve beyond “its current form” and to include more countries, in order to match Russia’s military capacity. Compared with Moscow’s approximately 1,264,000 active military personnel, EU–NATO members together can rely on around 1.286 million active personnel, a figure that would be doubled by the combined forces of Ukraine (677,000), Türkiye (355,000), the United Kingdom (150,000) and Norway (24,000). “Security comes first, economy second. Not vice versa,” Zelensky warned.
Moreover, with a transatlantic ally becoming increasingly unpredictable under Donald Trump’s administration, EU institutions and member states are examining the potential strengthening of an existing mechanism in response to external military aggression, similar to NATO’s Article 5. Under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the “mutual defence clause” provides that if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other EU members have “an obligation to aid and assist it by all the means in their power.” However, while the clause is binding, at the moment it does not affect the neutrality of certain member states.
In any case, it is not difficult to see why Moscow fears a scenario in which a modernised and strengthened European Union assumes responsibility for defence coordination on the continent, at the head of the largest military force – not necessarily a European army – and equipped with a real mechanism for mutual defence. Even without the United States, such a geopolitical actor would represent a potential upgrade of NATO’s role in Europe, as it would focus primarily on confronting Russia while also including Ukraine, thereby projecting Russian rhetoric about alleged “NATO expansionism to the east” onto the European Union.
This is why Medvedev’s remarks may signal a broader shift in Moscow’s attitude towards EU enlargement, that could jeopardise Kyiv’s request to include EU membership within the framework of peace talks aimed at ending Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine.
The first concrete indication of this shift emerged on 16 April, when the spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, warned that Georgia could face negative consequences if it continued on its path towards EU membership, including the suspension of air travel and the introduction of a stricter visa regime.
Until then, Moscow had not reacted harshly to Georgia’s EU aspirations, even after the country was granted candidate status in 2023. This change in tone does not appear to be coincidental and seems to target the weakest link first: Georgian Dream’s authoritarian backsliding has led to a freeze in the EU accession process, and this Russian threat could provide further justification for strengthening the ruling party’s narrative about the negative consequences of EU accession while the war in Ukraine is still ongoing.
