Georgian democratic forces call for EU support against ruling party amid push for “unified opposition front”

Brussels – Although it has largely disappeared from the focus of EU institutions, Georgia’s authoritarian drift continues unabated, and the prospect of losing one of the most firmly pro-EU candidate countries in the South Caucasus is becoming alarmingly real – despite more than 200 days of daily popular protests in the streets of Tbilisi and other cities across the country.

For this reason, a delegation of democratic forces has travelled to Brussels to amplify the voices of Georgians determined to preserve their European future, and to strengthen dialogue with EU institutions by presenting a credible political alternative to the increasingly authoritarian Georgian Dream regime.

“The only viable solution to this ever-deepening crisis is the holding of new, free and fair parliamentary elections. We are calling on the EU to support and advocate for such elections,” said Marika Mikiashvili, a member of the Droa Party (Coalition for Change), in a conversation with The New Union Post on the margins of meetings with the European Commission and the European Council.

In the context of EU enlargement and the recently adopted Black Sea Strategy, Mikiashvili stressed that “the EU needs a clear and coherent policy on Georgia” and called for “a comprehensive strategy to coordinate all actions” addressing the authoritarian drift that has stalled Tbilisi’s accession talks. “If the European Union cannot effectively respond to the situation in a small country with an overwhelmingly pro-European and resilient population, what does that say about the EU’s credibility?“

A “coalition of the willing”

The key demands include strengthening the EU’s policy of non-engagement with Georgian Dream’s authorities – “as they exploit any contact for propaganda purposes,” Mikiashvili warned; avoiding calls solely for the amendment or repeal of draconian laws, “since these will not bring about meaningful change”; insisting on the “immediate and unconditional” release of all political prisoners; supporting civil society organisations and independent media; and ensuring that, “whatever actions the European Commission takes,” communication clearly places responsibility on the ruling party.

However, attention should be focused on targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream’s officials (following the suspension of part of the EU-Georgia Agreement on visa facilitation). With Hungary and Slovakia blocking the adoption of EU sanctions – which require unanimity within the Council – Mikiashvili emphasised that a “coalition of the willing” among the other 25 member states could take action: “Sooner or later, sanctions may be seen as the only feasible option – so why not now, when they are most likely to be effective?”

The effectiveness of Western sanctions stems not only from the “social shame” they carry in Georgia, but also from the fact that Georgians “enjoy the benefits of being close enough to the EU and the US.” Despite pursuing Russian-style policies and rejecting EU reforms that would ultimately threaten its grip on power, Georgian Dream continues to portray itself as a pro-European political force committed to European integration, because “only a few people in Georgia are genuinely pro-Russian,” Mikiashvili confirmed.

Georgian Dream’s support base largely comprises people either swayed by its propaganda or comfortable with the lifestyle it provides. However, this lifestyle is “highly dependent on stability and economic comfort” – both of which could be undermined by sanctions. For instance, Mikiashvili noted that “businesses are already deeply concerned about the situation,” and the ruling party is struggling to reassure them that they will not be impacted and that “everything will soon return to normal.”

At the moment, “Georgia does not have a self-sufficient economy capable of sustaining a dictatorship,” Mikiashvili made clear. She stressed that, given these circumstances, sanctions imposed by EU countries “have a strong chance of influencing the outcome” of the political and social crisis and of destabilising the “key pillars of Georgian Dream’s power.” This situation is very different from Russia and Belarus, where Western sanctions may be less effective, as they target “well-established dictatorships that have spent decades building resilient, sanctions-proof economic systems,” she added.

The future for Georgian democratic forces

According to Mikiashvili, Georgian Dream continues to seek Western approval and legitimacy, “but only as long as it suits their interests.” The outlook is deeply concerning. “Once they are able to reorient Georgia’s economic foundations towards Russia, China, and Iran, they would not hesitate to do so,” she warned. In that scenario, Georgia risks becoming an isolated, authoritarian state, cloaked in ideology to justify repression – a sort of “Christian Iran,” as she described it.

To prevent this outcome, the EU must actively support Georgian democratic forces, as the situation on the ground is becoming “undeniably exhausting.” Despite the ruling party exerting “enormous” financial pressure on citizens, “protest sentiment remains strong, with no sign of normalisation with the regime,” Mikiashvili stressed. She also spoke of an “unprecedented level of democratic maturity” and an “almost limitless energy,” driven by a cause “deeply tied to national identity.”

How long this civic resistance can last “is highly unpredictable,” as it also depends on external support. Nevertheless, nearly eight months of daily protests cannot simply end with people stopping their demonstrations and everything returning to how it was before. As Mikiashvili predicts, “this will most certainly have a lasting effect on generations.”

Meanwhile, a viable political alternative must emerge to offer an alternative to the current regime. Although it remains uncertain whether participating in the local elections on 4 October 2025 would be beneficial, “an opposition front with a common operational strategy” is expected “hopefully within weeks,” Mikiashvili anticipated.

What is happening in Georgia

One month after the controversial elections on 26 October 2024 – marred by electoral fraud, as denounced by President Salomé Zourabichvili, opposition parties and civil society – Georgian Dream’s Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, announced that his government would not put the opening of accession negotiations with the EU on the agenda “before the end of 2028.” During this period, the Georgian Dream government also plans to “reject any EU budget support grants.”

The decision has sparked a wave of strong protests from citizens, who are overwhelmingly pro-EU and view the departure from the European family as a theft of their future. Since 28 October, protests have taken place every night, not only in Tbilisi but in almost all cities across Georgia. Peaceful protesters have increasingly faced violence from special police forces.

Meanwhile, the institutional crisis has deepened. Under the 2017 constitutional reform, the President of the Republic is elected by an electoral college of 300 members (150 MPs and 150 representatives of regional and local administrations). Georgian Dream nominated Mikheil Kavelashvili – a former footballer and leader of the far-right party People’s Power – who was elected as the new de facto president on 14 December 2024. While her term was due to end on 29 December, President Zourabichvili announced she will remain in office until new elections are held and a “legitimate successor” is appointed.

Protests continued across the country well into 2025, defying the authorities’ expectation that demonstrators would eventually grow weary of taking to the streets without tangible results. Meanwhile, violence and repression resumed, targeting members of opposition parties as well as ordinary citizens. Three of the four leaders of the Coalition for Change – Nika Gvaramia, Nika Melia, and Zurab Japaridze – are currently in jail, while journalist Mzia Amaglobeli, founder of the independent outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, faces up to seven years in prison following a minor altercation with police.

This crackdown follows a vast legislative agenda over the past months and years that has accelerated Georgia’s slide towards authoritarianism. Among the most alarming measures are amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences – which introduced anti-demonstration laws severely restricting freedom of assembly and expression – the Foreign Agents Law enacted in April 2024, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) passed in April 2025, targeting individuals deemed “foreign agents,” and legislation from May 2025 that streamlines the banning of political parties.