Brussels – One law at a time, one repressive measure after another, and within a year Georgian Dream has managed to construct an almost complete authoritarian regime. The final step is to turn the country into a one-party state—much like Russia—with no opposition remaining either inside or outside Parliament.
The first move towards realising this plan came on 28 October, when the Speaker of the Georgian Dream-controlled Parliament, Shalva Papuashvili, announced that the ruling party would petition the Constitutional Court to ban three of the largest pro-EU opposition forces: the United National Movement, Ahali—the biggest member of the Coalition for Change—and Lelo for Georgia. The parties, he claimed, represent “a real threat to the constitutional order.” Smaller parties are not yet included, but “their potential unconstitutionality could be examined later if they gain significant influence over the political process.”
“Whoever poses a more or less immediate electoral threat is outlawed, and parties are being banned for a mixture of so-called reasons,” warns Marika Mikiashvili, a member of the Droa Party, which forms part of the Coalition for Change, in an interview with The New Union Post. Her party has not yet been targeted, but she believes it is only a matter of time. There is no doubt it will happen if they gain more popularity among citizens. “That is exactly what they said,” she adds.
One alleged justification for claiming the unconstitutionality of the opposition parties—and specifically of the United National Movement—is the claim that it started the war with Russia in 2008. “The so-called parliamentary commission concluded that Mikheil Saakashvili [the former president of Georgia, currently in prison, ed.] started the war, which, as we all know, means blaming Georgia as a whole,” Mikiashvili says. Other supposed reasons include “sabotaging Georgia and not recognising the legitimacy of the government“—the case of Lelo for Georgia, which is not affiliated with the United National Movement.
Georgian Dream is expected to petition the Constitutional Court, which, “like all courts in Georgia, is completely controlled by Georgian Dream.” It would hardly be surprising, then, if the judges were to deliver a favourable ruling—whether for all three parties or only some—thereby cloaking repression in a veneer of constitutional legitimacy. The real danger for the opposition will depend on how Georgian Dream enforces such a decision. “We will no longer be able to use our infrastructure and will face further restrictions on our resources and reach,” Mikiashvili warns, adding that the regime may also prosecute individuals who continue party activities, “possibly jailing or fining them.”
What the opposition parties and the EU can do now
The situation for Georgia’s opposition has become almost unbearable. “What we will do is what we have always done: refuse to obey and continue to resist. That has always been our strategy—although it is getting tougher every day—and I still believe it is the only right one,” says the member of the Droa Party. “We escalate, we do not accommodate. When they assault us with laws, we stubbornly resist. There is no room for even a single step back.” This stance will likely lead to more arrests, but she insists that “a gradual surrender of freedom would be no better.”
According to Mikiashvili, Georgian Dream has deliberately targeted some opposition parties while sparing others in order to sow division among the democratic forces and make unity appear less attractive. “We have always been the unionists—none of our parties will treat this as someone else’s problem.” The only glimmer of hope in this political and institutional tragedy, she adds with a bitter smile, is that it might become “an opportunity for genuine unity, that perhaps we will eventually achieve. And I hope this is also an opportunity for Lelo for Georgia to return to the protest movement.”
Those who can make a real difference, however, are the institutions in Brussels and the 27 member states. “The EU can completely isolate Georgian Dream—a no-handshake policy should be the baseline,” she encourages an action that has long been awaited. “Targeted sanctions that actually work must be approved,” even if there is little hope that Hungary will lift its veto. For this reason, Mikiashvili remains hopeful that “at least there will be a coalition of the willing, including the UK and the US.”
Financial support is another crucial factor. “The resistance is being financially suffocated, and it is impossible to fight barehanded against someone whose personal wealth equals 25% of Georgia’s GDP and who enjoys Russian backing,” namely the pro-Russian oligarch and founder of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili. Even if a more consolidated and attractive political alternative emerges, “it cannot succeed without funding, because it is almost impossible to reach out to people otherwise.” This is why the EU must find a way to honour its long-standing promise to allocate funds to civil society.
The authoritarian backslide in Georgia
The acceleration of the authoritarian backslide in Georgia started one month after the controversial elections on 26 October 2024—marred by electoral fraud, as denounced by President Salomé Zourabichvili, opposition parties and civil society. Georgian Dream’s Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, announced that his government would not put the opening of accession negotiations with the EU on the agenda “before the end of 2028.” During this period, the Georgian Dream government also plans to “reject any EU budget support grants.”
The decision has sparked a wave of strong protests from citizens, who are overwhelmingly pro-EU and view the departure from the European family as a theft of their future. Since 28 October, protests have taken place every night, not only in Tbilisi but in almost all cities across Georgia. Peaceful protesters have increasingly faced violence from special police forces.
Meanwhile, the institutional crisis has deepened. Under the 2017 constitutional reform, the President of the Republic is elected by an electoral college of 300 members (150 MPs and 150 representatives of regional and local administrations). Georgian Dream nominated Mikheil Kavelashvili—a former footballer and leader of the far-right party People’s Power—who was elected as the new de facto president on 14 December 2024. While her term was due to end on 29 December, President Zourabichvili announced she will remain in office until new elections are held and a “legitimate successor” is appointed.
Protests continued across the country well into 2025, defying the authorities’ expectation that demonstrators would eventually grow weary of taking to the streets without tangible results. Meanwhile, violence and repression resumed, targeting members of opposition parties as well as ordinary citizens. Journalist Mzia Amaglobeli—arrested on 12 January following the detention of several peaceful protesters in Batumi—was sentenced in August to two years in prison on political grounds. She became the first journalist since the end of the Soviet Union to be imprisoned in Georgia as a political detainee, and she has been awarded the 2025 Sakharov Prize by the European Parliament.
After the opposition failed to form a unified opposition front, almost all pro-EU parties boycotted the local elections on 4 October to avoid legitimising the ruling party’s grip on power. Against a backdrop of daily protests and a brutal new wave of repression in the capital, Tbilisi’s mayor Kakhaber Kaladze—a former football player, since 2013 secretary general of Georgian Dream—won 71% of the vote in an election marked by one of the lowest turnouts in the country’s history.
This crackdown follows a vast legislative agenda over the past months and years that has accelerated Georgia’s slide towards authoritarianism. Among the most alarming measures are amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences—which introduced anti-demonstration laws severely restricting freedom of assembly and expression—the Foreign Agents Law enacted in April 2024, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) passed in April 2025, targeting individuals deemed “foreign agents,” and legislation from May 2025 that has streamlined the ongoing banning of political parties.
