Brussels – Three is the number of the Cluster that is fuelling a polarised debate in Brussels. Three is also the number of Serbia’s accession chapters under discussion, with EU member states divided between those advocating a merit-based approach and those who fiercely oppose opening them, not to send “the wrong message” to a country that has been in the midst of a societal crisis for more than a year and a half.

As an EU diplomatic source explained to The New Union Post, the exchange of views in the EU’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) on 8 July served to establish “where everybody stands, not to take decisions” on the opening of all the remaining chapters not yet opened under Cluster 3 – ‘Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth’ in Serbia’s accession negotiations.
Having positively assessed the opening benchmarks for two of the three chapters (the other one has none) as early as 2021, the European Commission is seeking to advance negotiations based on its evaluation of the country’s preparedness for talks under this specific group of accession chapters.
However, as confirmed by several diplomatic sources, a group of eight countries – Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden – expressed their opposition to opening the three chapters under discussion, citing concerns over respect for rule of law standards, Belgrade’s alignment with the EU’s foreign policy and its “strategic orientation.”
Three more EU member states – Denmark, Latvia and Luxembourg – also believe that Serbia needs to show further progress, but are more “flexible” to reconsidering their positions and giving the green light to the opening all the negotiations under Cluster 3.
What is at stake
Let’s analyse the situation from a technical point of view.
Cluster 3 – ‘Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth’ comprises eight chapters. Serbia has already opened five of them, two of which – Chapter 25 (Science and Research) and Chapter 26 (Education and Culture) – have been provisionally closed.
The chapters yet to be opened are Chapter 10 (Information Society and Media), Chapter 16 (Taxation) and Chapter 29 (Customs Union). This is because Serbia began its accession negotiations before the revised enlargement methodology reorganised the process for all candidate countries around six negotiating clusters.
Since 2021, once a cluster has been opened by unanimity among the member states, negotiations may begin on all the chapters it contains. Those chapters are then provisionally closed one by one, again by unanimity. Serbia therefore finds itself in a hybrid situation, with some chapters within the same cluster already open while others remain unopened.
As several diplomats pointed out, it is quite unusual for a discussion on the technical aspects of the accession process to take place at the level of the 27 EU ambassadors, which is far more political than the Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU (the Council’s preparatory body responsible for relations with candidate countries).
Yet this shows how the issue is “mostly political, and not at all based on the merits” of Serbia’s ability to meet the technical conditions for opening negotiations – Chapter 10 has no opening benchmarks, while the Commission has already assessed that Serbia has met those for Chapter 16 and Chapter 29.
Three different sources from member states in favour of opening the chapters highlighted the fact that the “merit-based approach” of the entire accession process is at risk if issues that are “not pertinent” to the technical evaluation are brought to the table to veto “a sign of the EU’s goodwill with a crucial partner” in the Western Balkans, which may “seriously” abandon the accession perspective if it remains stuck for years.
On the other side, those opposed to opening all of Cluster 3 refer to the “merit-based” approach in the broader context of the candidate country’s institutional, political and societal situation. “We cannot consider just the technical aspects – this is not how the accession process works,” a diplomat from one of the eight opposing countries told The New Union Post, also referring to developments in Ukraine’s and Moldova’s cases. Moreover, there is a desire not to send “the wrong signal” to the Serbian population.
All in all, just like the decoupling of the “package approach”, the “merit-based” enlargement process is a political and arbitrary concept that can be used both to justify any form of resistance and to push negotiations forward without taking into consideration the broader picture within and outside the EU.
The state of EU–Serbia relations
Serbia submitted its application for EU membership in 2009. Candidate status was granted in March 2012, and accession negotiations began in 2014.
To date, 21 chapters – plus an additional one on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo – are open, but only two are provisionally closed: Chapter 25 (Science and Research) in December 2016 and Chapter 26 (Education and Culture) in February 2017.
Relations between Brussels and Belgrade have cooled over the past year, especially following the violent crackdown on the protests by the national authorities and President Vučić’s decision not to attend the 2025 EU–Western Balkans Summit. Currently, around €1.5 billion allocated under the Growth Plan could be frozen over controversial judicial reforms and attacks on media independence.
The mass protests that have been taking place since November 2024 “reflect citizens’ disappointment, inter alia, over corruption and the perceived lack of accountability and transparency,” the European Commission’s 2025 report on Serbia recognised, identifying the slowdown in reforms and the lack of alignment with the EU – particularly in foreign policy – as the most worrying issues.

































