Brussels – If there is one conviction that has taken root in Brussels in 2025, it is that Montenegro is the frontrunner in the EU enlargement process, widely expected to become the next member. This is what emerges from the Commission’s statements and assessments, which endorse Podgorica’s ambition to close all negotiating chapters by the end of 2026. Yet how well do we truly understand the country’s socio-political reality – well enough to justify such confidence?
“Closing all remaining chapters within a single year would require an almost perfect, uninterrupted reform sprint, but nothing in the current political or institutional environment suggests such momentum,” warns Zvezdana Kovač, Strategy and Outreach Director at the Centre for Civic Education (CCE), in an interview with The New Union Post.
So far, Montenegro has managed to provisionally close seven of the 33 chapters. By the end of the year – at the forthcoming 24th meeting of the Accession Conference – a further five could follow. “Based on the current pace, this goal appears highly ambitious,” Kovač notes, emphasising that, to meet the schedule, more than half of the remaining work would need to be completed in less than a year, ideally by early autumn 2026.
However, this is not just a matter of arithmetic. “The deeper problem is that substance continues to lag behind rhetoric,” she argues. Reforms in the most sensitive areas remain “slow, inconsistent, and often shaped by short-term political interests” rather than EU standards, while political polarisation and institutional blockages “further undermine the stability” required for sustained progress.
In other words, as Kovač stresses, completing accession by 2026 for Montenegro is possible “only in formal terms and if the EU chooses to prioritise geopolitical considerations over the merit-based approach.” Not exactly what the Commission and the vast majority of member states continue to assert in public.
How ready is Montenegro?
The scepticism of the Montenegrin NGO working on civil society development stems from what its Strategy Director describes as “the core weakness of Montenegro’s accession process”: Chapters 23 and 24, which are intended to align candidate countries with the EU acquis on the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security.
These two chapters are traditionally regarded as the most demanding in the entire accession process, as they cannot be closed through administrative compliance alone but require “structural changes,” Kovač stresses. She refers to a genuinely independent judiciary, credible prosecution of high-level corruption and organised crime, politically neutral institutions, and a free and pluralistic media environment. Yet “in all of these areas, Montenegro remains fragile,” she argues.
Several examples are put forward to support this stark assessment. Since late 2024, Montenegro has been struggling to appoint two of the three judges to the Constitutional Court, amid a political and institutional crisis that still has not been fully resolved. Similarly, members of the Council of the Audiovisual Media Agency have yet to be appointed, undermining the role of the independent regulator – in breach of the final benchmark of the provisionally closed Chapter 10 (Information Society and Media).
Long-delayed electoral reform and the continuing failure to implement OSCE/ODIHR recommendations “further illustrate the pattern of incomplete reform.” Kovač also cautions that anti-EU narratives and the growing influence of political actors linked to the authorities in Serbia – themselves aligned with Russian propaganda – “are increasingly present in public discourse.”
Domestic and regional issues
Beyond the institutional risks, the ambition of closing all EU negotiating chapters by the end of 2026 may also be undermined by domestic and regional dynamics. As Kovač notes, a political landscape “dominated by populism, ideologically driven revisionism, daily political tactics and internal conflict” makes the consensus needed for deep, structural reforms “extremely difficult” to achieve.
Although formally pro-European, significant parts of the ruling majority are increasingly anti-Western and pro-Russian “in substance” – including New Serb Democracy (NSD) and the Democratic People’s Party (DNP). At the same time, anti-EU and anti-NATO narratives “have become more visible and effective” across the media environment, “contributing to declining public support for integration.” According to the latest Balkan Barometer, public support for EU membership fell to 39% in 2024, despite the EU’s strongest-ever backing for Montenegro’s accession
The key domestic obstacle – a “lack of genuine political will and value-based leadership” – carries serious diplomatic consequences, ultimately weakening Montenegro’s position abroad. The clearest example is the adoption of the Jasenovac resolution in July 2024. Officially framed as a commemoration of the genocide committed at the concentration camp in Croatia during the Second World War, it was in fact a condition set by the pro-Serbian NSD party – a close ally of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić – in return for its support for the government, despite the predictable deterioration in relations with Zagreb.
It is Croatia itself – one of Montenegro’s staunchest supporters within the EU – that now poses a potential risk of slowing Podgorica’s accession path over bilateral issues. Although “public support in Croatia for Montenegro’s accession is high, and Zagreb has consistently backed enlargement,” it is nevertheless Zagreb that blocks the closure of Chapter 31 (Foreign, Security and Defence Policy) in reaction to the Jasenovac resolution.
Kovač describes Croatia as “a manageable risk, not the central obstacle,” noting that its responses “are not driven by a strategic desire to block Montenegro, but rather by tactical reactions” to developments across the border, as it retains “a clear interest” in having EU member states as its neighbours. In her view, the responsibility for “problems that could have been gradually resolved through diplomacy and have now become costly political disputes” rests with Montenegro’s own leadership, which “continues to provoke conflicts that make constructive diplomacy impossible.”
The state of EU-Montenegro relations
Montenegro submitted its application for EU membership in 2008. Candidate status was granted in June 2010, and accession negotiations began in 2012. To date, all 33 screened negotiating chapters have been opened, and seven have been provisionally closed: Chapter 5 (Public Procurement), Chapter 7 (Intellectual Property Law), Chapter 10 (Information Society and Media), Chapter 20 (Enterprise and Industrial Policy), Chapter 25 (Science and Research), Chapter 26 (Education and Culture), and Chapter 30 (External Relations).
Moreover, in June 2024, Podgorica received a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR), indicating that it has met the interim benchmarks in Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) – a prerequisite for closing chapters deemed ready for provisional closure. For these reasons, Montenegro is considered the most advanced country in the EU enlargement process, with the aim of closing all chapters by the end of 2026.
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