Brussels – A community of around 100,000 people – and probably fewer today – held up the EU accession process of a country of around 35 million inhabitants for two years, despite having lived there for generations. The Hungarian minority in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region is, in reality, “the victim of a larger political game” between Budapest and Kyiv, with disputes over minority rights that do not reflect “any serious tensions on the ground”.
To understand why this issue has become such a key obstacle in the debate over opening Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations – even under the Hungarian government led by Péter Magyar – The New Union Post spoke with Tadeusz Iwański and Andrzej Sadecki, respectively Head of the Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova Department and Head of the Central European Department at the OSW Centre for Eastern Studies.
Although the agreement announced on 3 June should pave the way for the formal opening of Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ with both Ukraine and Moldova, the two experts caution that “this will always be a sensitive issue in Hungary, because it is an easy tool for mobilising public opinion.” In other words, while Budapest’s approach has changed following Viktor Orbán‘s loss of power, much will also depend on whether Kyiv implements the terms agreed during the technical-level negotiations.
The dispute over the Hungarian minority
Drawing on field visits, Iwański and Sadecki explain that Hungarians, Ukrainians, and other minorities – mainly Romanians and Roma – live together “peacefully,” with varying levels of interaction and cooperation.
The last Ukrainian census in 2001 indicated that around 150,000 Hungarians were living in Ukraine, with the absolute majority of them in the Transcarpathia region. However, the Russian invasion represented a watershed moment for them, accelerating the process of Hungarians leaving the country. “The truth is that this is not the number anymore due to demographic and economic reasons,” Iwański highlights. The estimated number now is around 50,000–60,000, “maybe a little bit more,” also counting the Hungarian speakers among the Roma population.
Sadecki confirms that “in the last four years, there have been no major incidents on ethnic grounds.” Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, “isolated cases” were registered in the region, “very often with a Russian element to provoke them from outside.” However, the general situation is now “rather stable”, despite people calling for more rights in terms of language.
This is where the issue of minority rights lies. As Iwański notes, “you can have a feeling that the rights are violated and that they cannot speak in Hungarian,” when referring to the communication of former Prime Minister Orbán – and to a certain extent that of Prime Minister Magyar. However, “this is not the case,” as there are Ukrainian schools with Hungarian classes across the region.
The dispute largely revolves around “very symbolic issues,” including Hungarian-language schooling in Ukraine and the political representation of the Hungarian minority in the Verkhovna Rada (the unicameral parliament) in Kyiv. In particular, the second condition set out by Budapest in its 11-point list of requirements cannot be addressed by the Ukrainian leadership because “there is no reason for a minority that counts less than 0.5% of the whole Ukrainian population.”
In any case, what has long been a key issue in Budapest’s foreign policy – the protection of the rights of Hungarians abroad – became “even higher” on the agenda under Orbán’s government, clashing with the trend in Ukraine since 2014 to strengthen the presence of the Ukrainian language, which has become dominant following the Russian invasion. “On one hand, there is an attempt to make the Ukrainian language more present,” Sadecki explains, referring to the 2017 education law. “On the other, there is a will to protect the use of the Hungarian language.”
In recent years, therefore, the issue of minority rights “has become increasingly political,” framed within “broader dispute involving Kyiv and an increasingly pro-Russian government in Budapest.” Ultimately, it has become a convenient pretext for Orbán to block Ukraine’s EU accession path, despite the fact that Kyiv, in December 2023, had already withdrawn from the most contentious issue – namely the proposal to gradually expand the use of the Ukrainian language across the education system.
A provisional agreement
This deadlock ended with the change of government in Budapest. Sadecki acknowledges that there will most likely be “some continuity” in Hungary’s policy – as the protection of minorities will remain “a central issue” – but it is already clear that a “significant difference” can be seen in Magyar’s approach. “He does not have all the baggage of the past and the disputes with Ukraine, he has not demonised Zelensky and he does not need to run a whole anti-Ukrainian campaign at home.”
The “comprehensive agreement” on expanding the rights of the Hungarian minority in the Transcarpathia region can be seen as a step in this direction. However, while Magyar’s government also sat at the negotiating table with “maximalist demands,” there is still no full clarity on the exact details of the agreement.
Iwański points to a potential agreement on reinstating Hungarian schools and expanding the possibilities for using minority language in contact with authorities or when receiving public services, medical assistance, or during the organisation of events. Currently, this is possible only in municipalities with the status of traditionally inhabited by a minority – namely, where a given ethnic group has lived in a specific area for at least 100 years and constitutes at least 10% of the population. They will be also allowed more bilingual street names, national flags on public buildings, and public information in the Hungarian language. However, he notes that all these amendments are “conditional on the promise of opening accession talks, not on the actual fact.”
His colleague Sadecki highlights another interesting point – the timing of the agreement – as it gives Magyar the opportunity to demonstrate at the European Council meeting on 18–19 June that “he is constructive and has resolved the main obstacle” to Ukraine’s EU accession path.
At the same time, he has already signalled that “this is just the beginning.” It is true that the new Hungarian Prime Minister is ready to withdraw the veto, but “there will be plenty of other occasions to block the process,” including the announced popular referendum on Kyiv’s EU membership once negotiations are concluded. “The most problematic part was resolved” – Sadecki warns – “but I would be cautious about thinking that the issue is no longer on the agenda.”
In any case, Magyar is “a new player with a blank page” in relations with Ukraine and President Zelensky. As this remains highly significant in domestic political debate, “he will try to show that he cares for Hungarian minorities” – not making Budapest the easiest partner for Ukraine if the EU accession negotiations advance – “but there has been a clear change of attitude since he took power,” the two analysts at the OSW Centre for Eastern Studies make clear.
