Brussels – The EU institutions are still licking their wounds after the Icelandic ‘no’ in the referendum on reopening accession negotiations. Yet the true lesson for EU enlargement policy should not be sought in Iceland, lest we misunderstand what is really at stake for the future of the Union.
“Iceland’s EU membership would have been a nice win from an image point of view. But, in fact, the EU is not losing in Iceland,” says Adnan Ćerimagić, Senior Analyst for the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative (ESI), speaking with The New Union Post. “The EU is losing in other candidates, which are far less integrated with the EU in terms of security and economics.”
While Reykjavík remains, in any case, the EU’s most integrated partner outside the Union, all the other candidate countries “present potentially the biggest loss for the EU, if the debate continues in the way we see it now,” Ćerimagić warns. This is why the real failure of enlargement policy is not Iceland rejecting full membership, but “not being able to integrate Ukraine” – which is already a pillar of the European security architecture – “as well as Serbia and the other candidates in the Western Balkans.”
Beyond the Icelandic referendum
The outcome of the Icelandic referendum already has a negative effect on the EU’s overall enlargement policy, “but for the wrong reason,” Ćerimagić believes. His analysis stems from the trust that “too many people in Brussels and in several capitals” placed in Reykjavík resuming the accession negotiations, in order to link Montenegro’s and Iceland’s negotiation processes. In this view, not only would Podgorica’s path have sped up, but the image of EU enlargement would also have benefited.
After being left “in a weaker position” following the shock of the Icelandic ‘no’, the narrative has now evolved into the idea that wealthy countries do not want to be part of a political Union and that any type of integration short of full EU membership leaves the Union fragile. Ćerimagić challenges both conclusions of this interpretation of the weaknesses of enlargement policy.
First of all, “it was wrong from the start to bet on a referendum,” he says, describing it as “not just reckless, but also not serious” to put the future of EU enlargement and of the European security and political architecture in the hands of tens of thousands of non-EU citizens.
Moreover, “it is wrong to assume that not being a member – but being part of the Single Market and Schengen – is not enough.” This is particularly relevant given all the global challenges that demonstrate the need for “as many democratic countries in Europe as possible” to be “as much integrated with the EU as possible.”
Finally, the ESI Senior Analyst calls for “a fundamental rethinking of what is possible in today’s Europe, not in Brussels but in the member states.” This directly involves the most advanced candidate on its EU accession path – Montenegro. If Podgorica manages to finalise all the reforms and close all 33 negotiating chapters in the coming months, and if the 27 governments are ready to sign the Accession Treaty, “we will be putting the whole ratification process in the hands of referenda in the EU member states.” And, again, nobody knows what can happen.
A broader strategy for EU enlargement
It is precisely Montenegro that demonstrates the need for a change of attitude within the Union. While it is almost certain that a referendum on the ratification of its Accession Treaty will result in a ‘yes’ there is a chance that all the work done might be rejected in countries such as France or the Netherlands.
This is why Ćerimagić advocates including a clause in Montenegro’s Accession Treaty foreseeing that, as soon as it is ratified in Podgorica, the country will be integrated into the EU “in the way that Iceland is” – meaning that it becomes part of the Single Market, starts to receive EU funding and works towards becoming a member of Schengen.
Such an approach would entail a twofold positive effect. On the one hand, Montenegrin citizens and businesses would feel the immediate benefits of the reforms and of the signing of the Treaty. “It basically follows the logic of the Croatian Accession Treaty” in 2011 – when Zagreb was able to send observer members to the European Parliament and take part in Council meetings – but now expanded beyond the institutional level.
On the other hand, the ratification process would no longer be under pressure to deliver, as “the credibility of the enlargement process would not depend only on that.” On the contrary, with Montenegro being included, observing rules and becoming a constructive acceding country, this would make it “possible to convince parliaments and citizens in the EU member states.”
There is also the potential spillover effect on all the other candidates. It would not only “boost the attractiveness of the process” for frontrunners such as Albania, Moldova and Ukraine, but also “potentially change the debate” in countries such as Serbia and North Macedonia, as they would see that “the whole process is not about a referendum or lengthy ratification.”
By integrating as many candidates as possible that are founded on the rule of law and implement all EU standards and rules into the single European regulatory space, Ćerimagić assumes that symbolic wins may be replaced by a broader vision of “a Union able to expand its rules and the scope of the EU institutions on its own continent.”
A first step towards pursuing this strategy could be taken as early as the European Council summit on 15 October, when EU enlargement will feature as one of the main topics on the agenda. “EU leaders need to just come up with a vision that they can explain,” the ESI Senior Analyst concludes. While regretting the outcome of the referendum in Iceland, they should acknowledge that “it is still the country most integrated with the EU” and should push “at least for the same with Montenegro, as they await political support in the member states.”
