Brussels – Although recent months have shown that the EU enlargement negotiations are gaining renewed momentum, it is still unclear where the process is heading. Many questions remain unresolved, and too many uncertainties – both within and outside the EU – make it difficult to understand whether and how the Union will expand over the next decade.
Offering a compass to navigate this volatile environment is a report published by Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations, with the support of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Europe, which sets out four scenarios for the future of EU enlargement in wartime Europe. “The credibility of the accession process will depend heavily on its results,” says Maria Gargano, researcher at the Egmont Institute and co-author of the report, speaking with The New Union Post.
“Undoubtedly, much will depend on the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine and on the possibility of a negotiated settlement,” she explains. This is a factor that cannot be ignored, because “almost any agreement is likely to include provisions” defining the future EU–Ukraine relationship. “Such an agreement would confront the European Council with important choices, even if the broader decision were ultimately taken elsewhere.”
Many internal factors should also be regarded as key drivers, both within the candidate countries and the EU member states.
In the candidate countries, changes of government, the extent to which new administrations pursue a pro-European agenda, their capacity to implement reforms, and the resurgence of new bilateral disputes “can all have a significant impact on the enlargement process.”
Within the EU member states, one crucial factor is the outcome of the 2027 French presidential election. However, “I do not believe there is a direct link between a possible victory for the Rassemblement National and a complete halt to enlargement,” Gargano warns. “Such an outcome could equally arise under other political leaderships.”
Finally, among the so-called ‘Black Swans’ – the low-probability, high-impact scenarios outlined in the report – is the possibility of a change of government in Serbia. “This is not to say that Serbia’s accession path under the current status quo would come to a complete standstill,” says the researcher at the Egmont Institute. Yet “a change in political direction could inject fresh momentum” into a country that plays “a pivotal role” in the enlargement process, particularly across the Western Balkans.
Four scenarios for EU enlargement
“The first and fourth scenarios are, respectively, the slightly more optimistic and the slightly more pessimistic. The two middle scenarios differ only subtly, but both appear to be the most likely, although combinations of elements from each are also possible.” This is how Gargano introduces the findings of the study.
The first scenario is ‘dynamic enlargement’. Here, a strong consensus among EU member states drives a dynamic dual-track accession process. Full membership is granted to the frontrunner candidates – Montenegro and Albania – while less advanced countries – Moldova and Ukraine – are brought in through the logic of gradual integration. This approach allows the EU to admit new members without compromising its institutional functionality.
The second scenario is ‘cautious integration’. Divergent views among member states reduce the EU’s enlargement policy to the lowest common denominator, namely the shared recognition that the process should continue. Only Montenegro, as an exceptional case, succeeds in joining the EU, as both enlargement sceptics and pragmatists who want to keep the process moving are satisfied with this outcome. The geopolitical urgency is acknowledged in principle, but in practice the process remains gradual, incremental and merit-based.
The third scenario is ‘differentiated membership’. Here, geopolitical considerations become the dominant driver and the EU moves away from the binary choice between membership and non-membership towards three concentric circles of integration. The urgent need to anchor the Eastern European and Western Balkan countries within the European security order – especially in the context of a possible peace settlement in Ukraine – enables a political bargain between the Baltic and Nordic countries and the Friends of the Western Balkans. Political and security integration comes first, creating an institutional bond before the candidates complete reforms across all policy areas, while strict post-accession conditionality is maintained.
The fourth scenario is ‘enlargement frozen’. The name says it all: domestic scepticism in the EU member states and poor reform progress in the candidate countries lead to a systemic freeze in the accession process. Even the safeguards included in Montenegro’s Accession Treaty are not considered sufficient, and the member states fail to agree on its ratification. This breeds deep dissatisfaction and erodes the EU’s transformative leverage over reform efforts in the other candidate countries. The dynamic ultimately backfires on the EU, as the prospect of a “ring of friends” is replaced by a more sceptical neighbourhood that is increasingly susceptible to the economic and political influence of global powers such as Russia and China.
Exploring uncertainty
As Gargano explains, the research used the intuitive logics scenario planning methodology “to capture uncertainty”. In other words, the aim was not to create scenarios that are 100% certain and mutually exclusive, but rather to “identify and explore the key sources of uncertainty.”
Alongside this objective, “we identified the main drivers,” first and foremost the course and eventual outcome of the war in Ukraine. This represents “the most important factor in shaping the development of these four scenarios”, even if it is necessary to distinguish between integration approaches based on pre-accession conditionality and those relying on post-accession conditionality.
The timeframe considered extends to the end of the current institutional cycle, in 2029. “Across almost all the scenarios, we regard Montenegro’s accession as highly likely,” the researcher at the Egmont Institute continues, pointing out that the progress of the other candidate countries should be seen more as “lines of reasoning about possible developments” than as fully developed scenarios. “Between now and 2029, I do not expect many further accessions,” she notes.
Considering the EU policies likely to come under the greatest pressure from enlargement – including cohesion policy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – the second and third scenarios take “a more cautious approach” by allowing for gradual, staged integration, while creating “a buffer that enables member states to act in line with their own interests.” However, Gargano warns, “it is important to distinguish genuine concerns from what often becomes a cry of alarm, which is then used to undermine more constructive discussions, particularly with regard to the CAP and Ukraine.”
It should not be forgotten that, at the heart of both the second and third scenarios, lies the tension between merit-based accession and geopolitical urgency. As Gargano stresses, “we need to place the Union’s narrative on these two concepts in the proper context,” because “it is entirely possible” to continue with a process identical to the current one while maintaining a sense of geopolitical urgency. This means that a faster pace does not require changing the methodology.
One particularly interesting point is that the end of the war in Ukraine could have “ambiguous consequences.” On the one hand, “it would remove a major source of instability” for the whole continent, but on the other, “it could reduce the sense of geopolitical urgency” at the EU’s borders. “This is not an outcome that is either desirable or openly discussed, but it remains a possibility,” Gargano concludes.
