Trump’s second term shadow looms over EU enlargement

Brussels – The day of Donald Trump‘s return to the White House has come. On 20 January, the most controversial, polarising, and disruptive U.S. President is set to begin his second term in office, marking his return to power four years after his electoral defeat and the Capitol riots. From Brussels, the EU leaders are watching the presidential inauguration with mounting concern, as the 47th President of their closest ally could bring a wave of uncertainty across Europe.

At a critical moment for the future of the European Union, the EU institutions are closely observing the direction of Trump’s future policies regarding the continent. On one hand, a potential U.S. disengagement from highly sensitive regions—Ukraine, the Western Balkans, Moldova, and the South Caucasus—could risk creating instability. On the other hand, it could significantly influence the role of EU enlargement as a key security asset for the entire continent.

“We have no clear idea of what Trump is thinking or what he has in mind,” Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe, told The New Union Post. The only point of reference is his first term (2016-2020), during which “under his presidency, U.S. policies and actions did not support the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans or anywhere else.” As major geopolitical shifts have occurred in Europe in recent years—including the Russian invasion of Ukraine and EU membership applications from Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia—this issue is now set to have a far greater impact on transatlantic relations than it did back then.

The Ukrainian issue

There is no doubt that Ukraine is the country most affected by discussions surrounding the policies of the incoming U.S. administration and their potential impact on EU enlargement. Apart from a number of Trump’s pronouncements about bringing peace in 24 hours or in six months in Ukraine, there is complete uncertainty. In Europe, the prevailing assumption is that his priorities will not align with Ukraine’s or Europe’s interests. “There is a very high risk that he will reach a deal with Putin that does not take into account Ukraine’s territorial integrity or its Euro-Atlantic aspirations,” Balfour warned.

However, Carnegie Europe’s director emphasises that the majority of Trump’s advisers in key positions—those tasked with shaping future policies—”are committed to NATO.” As a result, “we should not necessarily assume that the U.S. will abandon Europe.” Would the EU be ready to fill a potential vacuum left by the U.S.? “This is the big question mark looming over the fate of Ukraine,” Balfour confirmed, pointing out that “there is an expectation for Europe to step up its support for Ukraine’s goals, but we do not see unanimity” among EU Member States.

A “coalition of the willing” could include the Baltics, Poland, Scandinavian countries, and France—along with Norway and the UK—but it remains uncertain whether this would be enough. On the other hand, there is an increasing number of countries “that are quite in favour to Russia’s arguments and propaganda, and to ending the war by any means,” such as Hungary, Slovakia, and the upcoming far-right government in Austria. Germany remains “another big question mark,” as the country heads into elections and Chancellor Olaf Scholz has hinted at revising its support for Ukraine.

As Melinda Haring, Senior Advisor at Razom for Ukraine—a US-based organisation—pointed out during the EPC conference ‘EU enlargement as a geopolitical imperative for transatlantic security’, what should motivate EU Member States to bolster their support for Kyiv is the fact that “if the U.S. decides to stop funding, the European Union could become the pivotal actor in safeguarding the security of the entire continent,” with its enlargement process “at the heart of this project, starting with Ukraine.”

Trump and the Balkans

Another key area for assessing the impact of Trump’s administration on EU enlargement is the Western Balkans, a region that has been engaged in the accession process for over 20 years. “A potential disengagement of U.S. diplomatic and intelligence services would create a vacuum, allowing harmful initiatives to flourish in the region,” Adnan Ćerimagić, Senior Analyst at the European Stability Initiative (ESI), told The New Union Post. Bosnia and Herzegovina, northern Kosovo, and Serbia are in the spotlight.

The New Union Post‘s BarBalkans newlsletter analysed all the critical dimensions of a weakened relationship between Washington and Brussels in the region, spanning from the secessionist agenda of Republika Srpska (the Serb-majority entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina), to the revival of the controversial land swap plan between Serbia and Kosovo—which could freeze the EU-mediated dialogue—and the economic interests of Trump’s family in Serbia and Albania. If the U.S. will actively support actors in the region pushing for a negative agenda, “this could have damaging effects,” ESI Senior Analyst Ćerimagić warned.

Connections between Belgrade and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, are well-documented, as are those between the U.S. President and some of Europe’s most controversial leaders, including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Bosnian Serb President Milorad Dodik, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. Moreover, during Trump’s first term, his former special envoy for Serbia-Kosovo negotiations, Richard Grenell, was highly active in opposing the EU’s efforts in Kosovo. In this context, Ćerimagić argued that “the EU would not be able to have a positive impact, as some of its members would align with Trump’s agenda,” particularly in relation to “security concerns” in northern Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There is also a positive scenario for EU enlargement following Trump’s return to the White House. “It could prompt the EU to intensify its efforts,” ESI Senior Analyst Ćerimagić noted. For example, a new package of technical and financial support could be targeted “only at those countries that genuinely wish to join the EU and implement reforms.” A decisive push from Brussels through “a Growth Plan 2.0 with full integration into the Single Market,” could be seen as “a positive spillover,” even if the EU is not yet ready for enlargement. While this would not necessarily mean all candidate countries would join by 2030, they could still enjoy the benefits of the EU “as if they were Member States.”