Brussels – The past three years, shaped by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have given fresh momentum to the EU enlargement process, driving it toward increasingly tangible results. Progress is no longer confined to setting dates—significant in itself compared to the stagnation of recent years—but extends to real advancements and new opportunities in accession negotiations. At the same time, as in Georgia, there have been setbacks from the authorities, triggering widespread public protests.
In 2025, the EU enlargement process must gain greater consistency to eliminate unpredictability from the negotiating table, especially given the repeated emphasis by EU institutions that the process remains strictly “merit-based.” A preview of the year ahead in EU enlargement was offered by the General Affairs Council, which on 17 December approved the conclusions on Enlargement, outlining a roadmap for the work set to continue in January 2025.
“The Council reaffirms its full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova,” the conclusions state. Türkiye remains a candidate country and “a key partner in many areas of joint interest,” while the course of action taken by the Georgian government jeopardises Georgia‘s European path, “de facto leading to a halt of the accession process.”
Albania
At the accession conference on 15 October 2024, Albania opened the Cluster – Fundamentals and subsequently Cluster 6 (External Relations), which includes two negotiating chapters: External Relations (Chapter 30) and Foreign, Security & Defence Policy (Chapter 31). The Council expressed its readiness to open further negotiating clusters “as soon as possible, once the conditions are met.”
While political polarisation continues to affect the activities of the parliament, progress has been made in key reform areas, “notably in the fundamentals and the rule of law.” However, further efforts are required to enhance media independence and pluralism, freedom of expression, and the rights of minority groups. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation—particularly with Greece—remain “essential elements” of the EU enlargement process. Albania’s “steadfast and long-standing full alignment” with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is highlighted as a “strong signal” of its commitment to European integration.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The starting point for Bosnia and Herzegovina is the European Council’s decision on 21–22 March 2024 to open accession negotiations. Further efforts are needed to address the 14 key priorities outlined in the European Commission’s 2019 opinion, along with “all relevant steps” detailed in the 2022 recommendation. The Council has affirmed its readiness to adopt the negotiating framework “the moment these conditions are met.”
Despite the political leadership’s stated commitment, the reform momentum has stalled since March 2024. The EU remains “unequivocally committed” to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU perspective “as a single, united, and sovereign country.” In this context, all political actors are urged to refrain from “provocative divisive rhetoric and actions,” particularly in reference to legislation and initiatives in the Republika Srpska entity “that run counter to the EU path of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” including secessionist rhetoric and questioning the constitutional order of the country.
Limited progress has been made in the area of fundamental rights, while no advancement has occurred on freedom of expression, media independence, or the protection of journalists. The Council stressed that “further decisive steps” are required in combating corruption and organised crime. Concerning the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, Sarajevo is expected to submit its Reform Agenda “without further delays,” as this is a key prerequisite for potential payments. Bosnia and Herzegovina has demonstrated full alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, but restrictive measures—including on Russia and Belarus—have not been fully implemented yet.
Georgia
In response to democratic backsliding in Georgia and the Georgian Dream government’s declaration to suspend the EU accession process “until the end of 2028,” the EU has reaffirmed its “steadfast” solidarity with the Georgian people and its commitment to supporting their European aspirations. “Serious concerns” have been raised regarding the whole course of action taken by the Georgian authorities, including the adoption of the law on transparency of foreign influence and “other legislation which runs counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded.”
As highlighted by the European Council in June and October 2024, such actions jeopardise Georgia’s European path, following the granting of candidate status on 14 December 2023. The EU Council “strongly condemns” the violence against peaceful protesters, media representatives, and politicians during the protests that have been ongoing since 28 November 2024: “All acts of violence must be investigated, and those responsible held accountable.” It urges Georgian authorities to “urgently revert to the EU path.”
The backsliding in democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights, along with intimidation, violence, and discrimination against civil society, as well as electoral irregularities at the parliamentary elections on 26 October, are causes of “deep concern.” These issues have exacerbated political tensions, fueled anti-EU rhetoric, and spread disinformation. Additional critical issues include the backsliding in the functioning of the judiciary, the growing lack of independence of institutions, Georgia’s non-alignment with EU visa policies and with EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy positions and restrictive measures.
Kosovo
Kosovo submitted its formal application at the end of 2022. However, five EU Member States—Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Spain, and Slovakia—still do not recognise Kosovo’s sovereignty following its 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, blocking its candidacy. It is up to the EU Council to unanimously ask the European Commission to assess the potential candidate’s ability to meet the membership criteria and to recommend granting candidate status.
Some progress has been made in the fight against organised crime, limited progress in the fight against corruption and the protection of fundamental rights, and good progress in developing a functioning market economy. The parliamentary elections on 9 February 2025 will be held under a new electoral framework, which implements recommendations from successive EU election observation missions.
“Deep concerns” remain about the situation in northern Kosovo, as Brussels “will gradually lift these measures in parallel with further steps by Kosovo to de-escalate tensions in the north.” The Council expects Kosovo to engage in the EU-facilitated Dialogue “in good faith” and achieve a comprehensive, legally binding agreement with Serbia on the normalisation of relations. This includes the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities, “starting with the transmission of the draft Statute.
Moldova
On 25 June 2024, formal accession negotiations with Moldova were launched alongside Ukraine. Despite the “significant challenges” posed by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and hybrid attacks targeting Moldova, the screening process “is progressing according to plan.” The next step involves initiating the Cluster – Fundamentals “as soon as possible, when the conditions are met,” with the goal of opening the first EU accession negotiation cluster in the first half of 2025.
Chișinău is recommended to continue making progress on justice reform, combating corruption, and implementing the action plan on de-oligarchisation. Administrative and institutional capacities need to be strengthened across all levels. On the economic front, the EU Council underscores the importance of advancing transformative economic reforms, enhancing sectoral cooperation, and deepening integration into the EU internal market. The Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Moldova lays the foundation for enhanced collaboration in critical areas.
Montenegro
Montenegro is the most advanced candidate country in the EU enlargement process. In 2024, Podgorica successfully closed three accession negotiation chapters: Intellectual Property Law (7), Digital Transformation & Media (10), and Enterprise & Industrial Policy (20). Additionally, Montenegro has met the interim benchmarks for the rule of law chapters, Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security). “This is an important milestone that marks the beginning of a new and final phase in the accession negotiations,” the Council emphasised. To date, all 33 screened chapters have been opened, and six have been provisionally closed.
Provided Montenegro maintains “steadfast” progress on reforms and fulfils the necessary requirements, the Council “stands ready to initiate in due time the preparations for the drafting of the Accession Treaty.” Podgorica’s political institutions have set a target to complete negotiations by 2026, aiming for Montenegro to become the EU’s 28th Member State by 2028.
North Macedonia
North Macedonia’s accession negotiations remain stalled, despite the new nationalist government declaring EU integration as its strategic goal. Skopje has yet to complete the constitutional changes it committed to, particularly regarding the treatment of minorities, including the Bulgarian minority. “As soon as North Macedonia has implemented its commitment,” the Council reaffirmed its “readiness to convene another intergovernmental conference, without further delays or additional political decisions.”
In Brussels, “serious concerns” have been raised about recent amendments to the Criminal Code, which impact numerous high-level corruption cases. Additionally, the full and “good faith” implementation of bilateral agreements—including the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness, and Cooperation with Bulgaria—remains critical. Failure to uphold these agreements risks undermining North Macedonia’s EU accession prospects.
Serbia
Serbia has opened 22 of the 35 negotiating chapters in its EU accession process, with two chapters provisionally closed. In 2024, the country was invited to submit the two remaining negotiating positions under Cluster 3 (Competitiveness & Inclusive Growth): Taxation (Chapter 16) and Social Policy & Employment (Chapter 19). However, the interim benchmarks for of the rule of law Chapters 23 and 24 have not yet completed, alongside limited progress on improving freedom of expression and media independence.
Non-alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) continues to be a significant challenge for Serbia’s EU integration. This includes its stance on restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, as well as “actions and statements that contradict EU positions on foreign policy and other strategic matters.”
The Council emphasises that the benchmarks for Chapter 35 (addressing issues outside other negotiating chapters) have been revised to reflect Serbia’s obligations under the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation with Kosovo and its Implementation Annex, agreed in early 2023. The conclusions stress that “normalisation of relations and implementing their Dialogue commitments are essential conditions on the European path of both parties and both risk losing important opportunities in absence of progress.”
Türkiye
Türkiye’s accession negotiations have been at a standstill since 2018, and “no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing.” As the EU seeks a “stable and secure environment” in the Eastern Mediterranean, it remains “ready to engage” with Ankara in areas of common interest, but in a “phased, proportionate, and reversible manner.”
Relations with Greece have to be further improved to de-escalate the tension in Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara is urged to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU Member States, particularly by “actively” contributing to a peaceful resolution of the frozen conflict on the island of Cyprus. Türkiye remains the only country to recognise the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and efforts to reach a compromise have been stalled since 2017.
“Serious concerns” persist regarding the “continued and deeply worrying” situation in the areas of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights. These include the “systemic” lack of judicial independence, undue pressure on the judiciary, and significant restrictions on free and safe expression. The EU Council “deeply regrets Türkiye’s very low alignment rate” with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and its non-alignment with EU restrictive measures against Russia.
Türkiye and the EU continue to cooperate on migration management, with an additional €1 billion (on top of the €9 billion already provided) from Brussels to support refugees and host communities in the country. Ankara must fulfil its obligations under the Customs Union in order to remove remaining trade barriers and facilitate further progress.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s EU accession process remains closely linked to the support provided by Brussels since the onset of Russia’s invasion. On 25 June 2024, formal accession negotiations with Kyiv were launched. The screening process is progressing “according to plan,” and both Brussels and Kyiv are now focused on the next steps, starting with the opening of clusters, particularly the Cluster- Fundamentals, “as soon as possible, once the conditions are met.” The aim is to open the first EU accession negotiation cluster in the first half of 2025.
Progress has been made in areas such as the rule of law and judicial and public administration reform, with the ongoing renewal of the judiciary—particularly the Supreme Court—being a key focus. Despite challenges posed by Russia’s war of aggression, the EU Council encourages Ukraine to sustain efforts to strengthen freedom of expression and media independence, address remaining challenges, and further enhance its anti-corruption institutional framework. Additionally, sectoral cooperation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU internal market can be deepened through improved implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.
