Brussels – Over the past two decades, Georgia has developed a singular bond with football. Before the rise of Khvicha Kvaratskhelia—first the star of Napoli and later of Paris Saint-Germain—two footballers captured the nation’s imagination. Today, those same figures are among the most detested politicians in a country that dreams of joining the European Union: Mikheil Kavelashvili, elected President of the Republic by the Georgian Dream-controlled parliament in December 2024, and Tbilisi’s mayor, Kakhaber Kaladze.
While Kavelashvili’s role—both as a former Manchester City forward and as a politician—is of little interest, Kaladze represents perhaps the more intriguing case. Abroad, his image remains tied to the famous red-and-black shirt of AC Milan. At home, that image has long faded. Today, he stands as a symbol of the ruling party’s repressive tactics, its political and economic entanglements with Moscow, and the anti-European drift that is derailing the country’s path towards EU membership.
After the opposition failed to form a unified opposition front, almost all pro-EU parties boycotted the local elections to avoid legitimising the ruling party’s grip on power. Against a backdrop of daily protests and a brutal new wave of repression in the capital, Kaladze won 71% of the vote in an election marked by one of the lowest turnouts in the country’s history—just 31%—raising further serious questions about its democratic legitimacy.
But who is “Kakha” Kaladze really? And how did a footballer once cheered in stadiums across Europe become one of Georgia’s most powerful politicians—and a central architect of its deepening political and institutional crisis?
“Kakha” the footballer, Kaladze the politician
Remember when Kaladze scored two own goals in eleven minutes? This is how people in Georgia console those struck by misfortune. The phrase refers to the World Cup qualifying match against Italy on 5 September 2009, when the captain inadvertently sealed—twice—his national team’s defeat and its last-place finish in the group.
Despite that infamous episode, he remained an undisputed football icon in his homeland. His career boasts two Champions League titles, two UEFA Super Cups, a FIFA Club World Cup, and an Italian Serie A championship. During his years at Milan, Kaladze developed a personal rapport with then–club president and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, publicly crediting him with helping to mediate an end to the 2008 Russian–Georgian war, thanks to Berlusconi’s close ties with Vladimir Putin
Three months after retiring from professional football in 2012, he was elected as a member of parliament with the Georgian Dream party, swiftly becoming Minister of Energy and Deputy Prime Minister. His rapid political ascent did not stop there: within a year, he was appointed secretary general of the ruling party and became a close ally of its founder, pro-Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Kaladze’s ownership of the energy investment company Kala Capital soon attracted accusations of conflicts of interest, particularly given its operations in Russia. In 2017, he was elected mayor of Tbilisi, and subsequently re-elected in 2021 and 2025.
Between Tbilisi and Moscow
In a country that has been protesting nonstop since the rigged 2024 general elections, Kaladze’s identity as a politician has largely overshadowed his legacy as a footballer. Public opinion reflects a complex mix of nostalgia and resentment. Public opinion reveals a complicated mix of nostalgia and resentment. According to Irakli (a pseudonym used to protect his safety), a well-known Inter Milan supporter in Tbilisi, “only people in their fifties or sixties still remember him as a great player. For most of us, he is just one of the most powerful figures in Georgian Dream.”
Mamuka Andguladze, president of the Media Advocacy Coalition, describes a similar perspective. “He used to be part of popular culture,” Andguladze tells The New Union Post, “but that changed when he began abusing his position for personal gain.” Tbilisi’s mayor has frequently flaunted his wealth, insulted journalists, and embraced strongly conservative, anti-Western rhetoric. His political behaviour, Andguladze notes, increasingly mirrors that of the Kremlin: “He could be the mayor of a Russian city.”
Alexandre Crevaux-Asatiani, deputy director for external relations of the United National Movement—the main opposition party—shares this view, recalling that “he was a celebrity at a time when our country had few, right after the post-Soviet collapse. But fame soon gave way to questionable business practices.” As Minister of Energy, he facilitated Gazprom’s growing presence in the country and, in 2023, approved the purchase of 44 Russian-made subway cars for Tbilisi—despite earlier pledges to avoid deals with sanctioned entities. “While many members of Georgian Dream are pro-Russian out of necessity, Kaladze has direct financial interests in Russia. Even Ivanishvili struggles to control him,” Crevaux-Asatiani explains to The New Union Post.
A symbol of anti-European drift
In 2024, Tbilisi’s mayor made headlines by comparing the European Union to the Soviet Union, claiming that both imposed “standardisation dictated from outside.” In a country still scarred by decades of Soviet rule, such statements provoked a sharp backlash.
Yet Kaladze simultaneously presents himself as “the most pro-European and pro-American person in this country.” This contradiction captures the essence of Georgian Dream: a party that must appear to support EU membership in appearance—as over 80% of the population backs this geopolitical orientation—while enacting policies increasingly aligned with Moscow. In recent years, the ruling party has advanced legislation modelled on Russian laws, including measures against “foreign agents” and restrictions on LGBTQ+ rights.
Following the freezing of EU accession talks in June 2024, the party’s rhetoric grew openly hostile toward Western partners, holding EU membership ambitions hostage until the end of 2028. “Kaladze is among those who speak most aggressively against Europe, echoing Russian propaganda,” says Giorgi Butikashvili, head of foreign affairs for the pro-EU Coalition for Change, speaking to The New Union Post. Long an advocate for a “negotiated solution” with Moscow regarding the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, he also proposed “non-aggression agreements” that would tacitly acknowledge Tbilisi’s share of responsibility for the 2008 war.
His comments on the conflict in Ukraine have followed a similar line, accusing NATO and the EU of pressuring Georgia to open a “second front” against Russia. In the aftermath of the 2024 vote, he denounced Western “liberal fascism” and accused external forces of financing “radical instigators.” As Butikashvili puts it, “once you board the Russian boat, you can no longer get off.” That warning may now carry consequences far beyond the fate of a single man who once defended AC Milan’s back line—and who now defends a government drifting ever further from Georgia’s European future.
