Brussels – Russia remains a threat in the Western Balkans, but with sufficient political will, its destabilising influence can be significantly contained. This is one of the central findings of a new report published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), which analyses how the EU can push back against the Kremlin’s global strategy.
In the section dedicated to the Western Balkans – curated by analyst Bojana Zorić – the report states that “Russia offers no credible alternative to the EU.” As all Balkan countries “increasingly turn westward, Moscow is reduced to playing the role of a disruptor.” However, while Russia lacks the economic and institutional capacity to present itself as a viable alternative to the EU, the report warns that “it continues to exploit divisions and vulnerabilities in the region” to serve its strategic interests.
One of the Kremlin’s “key objectives” is to prevent further NATO and EU enlargement, as well as to hinder the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration – developments it perceives as a direct threat to its geopolitical influence. Yet, a growing vulnerability for Russia lies in its “waning strategic position” in the Western Balkans.
Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia – EU candidate countries and NATO members – have fully aligned with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Even Serbia, often seen as a Russian stronghold, “has shown signs of leaning towards the West”, particularly in the area of arms procurement. While Belgrade maintains “strong defence trade ties” with Moscow, its military modernisation and evolving security partnerships suggest a “strategic pivot” towards EU countries. Notably, in 2024, Serbia purchased 12 French Dassault Rafale multirole fighter jets to replace its ageing Soviet-era fleet.
From an economic perspective, the report highlights that “the decline in energy leverage is mirrored in Russia’s shrinking economic footprint across the region.” For years, the gas industry served as “a powerful leverage tool”, meeting much of the region’s energy demand. But as Moscow’s energy monopoly erodes, it risks losing one of its most effective means of exerting pressure on regional governments. With TurkStream/Balkan Stream now the sole pipeline supplying Russian gas to Serbia via Bulgaria, the wider shift in European gas supply “has prompted Serbia to explore diversification options.” Furthermore, when it comes to trade and investment, the EU and its Member States “overwhelmingly dominate” the Western Balkans.
The EUISS report also delves into Russia’s tools of interference across the region. In particular, the Serbian Orthodox Church is identified as “a key instrument of influence”, exerting “significant socio-political power” in countries with predominantly Orthodox populations – including Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moscow leverages shared Slavic heritage and Orthodox Christian traditions to “cultivate a sense of kinship,” a narrative frequently reinforced through public diplomacy efforts and state-supported media channels.
In the information domain, regional outlets such as Sputnik and RT Balkan (launched in Serbia in November 2022 despite EU restrictions) play a key role in amplifying Kremlin messaging across the Balkan countries. The decentralised nature of social media – “where content is easily shared by individuals, often without oversight or accountability” – enables the rapid spread of disinformation, which becomes “deeply embedded in the information ecosystem”, echoing and reinforcing narratives shaped by Moscow.
How the EU could reduce Russia’s influence
Finally, EUISS analyst Zorić outlined several priorities for the EU and its Member States to help “further reduce Russia’s harmful influence” in the Western Balkans. First, the need to avoid the political and strategic vacuums left unaddressed by the EU – particularly in countries like North Macedonia, which changed its name to advance EU membership, yet still faces delays in accession talks. “This prolonged stagnation is weaponised by Russian and local influence agents alike,” the report warns.
The report also recommends the creation of a “coalition of the willing” to impose targeted sanctions on local actors, individuals, and companies in the region. A “coordinated approach” among several EU capitals, it argues, “would be far more effective in reinforcing the EU’s credibility.”
Another recommendation is to strengthen public diplomacy on the ground by expanding EU-funded education and youth programmes, organising EU-themed events to “foster a sense of European identity”, and increasing the EU’s visibility in local communities to demonstrate the “tangible positive outcomes” of EU investment. “The EU should step up its response by supporting (local) independent journalism,” the report concludes.
