Brussels – In what was expected to be a critical week for EU enlargement – from Ukraine to the Western Balkans – it is ultimately the “noes” that are prevailing, at least for now. Following Hungary’s veto on the 2025 enlargement conclusions, the annual EU-Western Balkans Summit on 17 December was overshadowed by a significant absence: neither President Aleksandar Vučić nor any other political figure represented Serbia at the high-level summit in Brussels.

The decision had already been anticipated on the eve of the summit by Vučić himself, who told the Radio-Television of Serbia (RTS) that “the Western Balkans will be without the Republic of Serbia.” He described the absence as a personal choice, which he had explained to several EU leaders, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, and French President Emmanuel Macron. “I am truly grateful for the respect shown towards Serbia,” Vučić continued, stressing that through this decision “I believe I am protecting Serbia and its interests.” It remains far from clear, however, how those interests are advanced by staying away from a summit with all 27 EU leaders.
The reality is that this decision further exacerbates relations between the EU and authorities in Belgrade, following a year of ambiguity in Brussels’ response to democratic backsliding in Serbia and to its support for Serbian students’ calls for respect for the rule of law. Acknowledging no progress on the EU-related reforms has emerged as the only meaningful institutional response, intended to avoid rewarding a regime that has become increasingly problematic. While Serbia remains a partner that cannot be isolated due to its strategic importance in the region, it continues to show a lack of alignment with the EU – both on the respect of fundamental rights and on foreign and security policy, particularly with regard to sanctions against Russia.
It is no secret that Vučić – facing growing pressure at home and in Brussels – is seeking to raise the stakes to escape a corner. On 10 December, during a dinner with von der Leyen and Costa, he proposed that the entire Western Balkans region should join the EU simultaneously, rather than through the standard accession process for each individual candidate. “If you admit two or three countries in the region, what will happen to the others?” he asked, emphasising that “mutual admission is the best solution and would contribute to regional stability.” The proposal is far from attractive to the vast majority of current EU members, though not to all.
The reactions to Serbia’s absence
This brings the focus back to Viktor Orbán‘s Hungary, which has openly described the EU enlargement process as a “complete failure over the past four years.” Referring specifically to Serbia as a “key country” not only economically but also “in defending the European Union against migration,” the Hungarian Prime Minister, speaking on the sidelines of the EU–Western Balkans Summit, condemned the “shameful and unfair” treatment of Belgrade and called for Serbia to be prioritised – “and then proceed with the others.”

Orbán is the most outspoken leader defending Serbian interests – and, arguably, his own, since a nationalist and authoritarian Serbia under Vučić would serve as a key ally for his sovereignist agenda within the EU. Yet the view that “without Serbia, we cannot do anything” is shared by other countries, including Italy. Senior diplomats confirmed growing concern in Rome over the EU institutions’ failure to recognise progress on the implementation of accession reforms in Belgrade, coupled with calls to finally open Cluster 3 – ‘Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth’.
Kosovo’s President, Vjosa Osmani, delivered the strongest response to both the absence of Serbian representatives and Vučić’s counterproposal to break the deadlock. “This is not a proposal,” she declared, stressing that Pristina supports the region moving forward “based on merit, with each country doing its homework.” By contrast, her Serbian counterpart “is seeking a way to avoid his obligations” regarding the rule of law, EU values, and sanctions against “malign countries harming the European continent.” She urged the EU not to open its doors to any country until it fully adheres to the rule of law, democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, “and all the other values that the rest of us in the Western Balkans are committed to upholding.”
The conclusions of the 2025 EU-Western Balkans Summit
Against the backdrop of Serbia’s absence – and with the leaders of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia present – the 2025 EU-Western Balkans Summit unfolded largely as expected. According to the declaration, work will continue on strengthening cooperation in security, defence, migration, trade, and EU-related reforms, including through the Growth Plans. Alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the gradual integration of Western Balkans partners into the EU Single Market emerge as key priorities, while all partners will also focus on the “strategic communication” of the benefits of enlargement and gradual integration.
The final press conference was eventually cancelled due to delays and the already scheduled discussions during the working dinner, especially as the summit failed to produce any substantive outcomes. What is more interesting – again – is what is absent from the formal document, namely the bilateral and multilateral discussions on specific issues shaping relations between the EU and the candidate countries.

“Progress should be assessed based on achievements and reforms, rather than individual bilateral issues,” said the Prime Minister of North Macedonia, Hristijan Mickoski, in response to the pending constitutional amendments on the protection of national minorities – especially the Bulgarian minority – which are blocking the opening of Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’. “Citizens deserve to see tangible results from their institutions’ efforts”, he added, further emphasising that “bilateral disputes or disagreements [with Bulgaria, ed.] should not obstruct the broader ambition of European integration.”
Speaking of unmet expectations, Kosovo’s President Osmani made it clear that “we are here as a committed partner, no matter how hard it will be.” However, with five non-recogniser EU members – Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, and Romania – no progress is in sight for a membership application pending since 2022. “I know it is a complex process, but it is not impossible,” she continued, pointing to “flexible formulas” that have allowed Pristina to make progress in the past, for example with the Growth Plan. The EU itself would benefit from Kosovo’s membership, she argued, warning that the longer the EU leaves the Western Balkans in the waiting room, “the more Russia, China, and Iran will seek to increase their influence.”
On a more positive note, Montenegrin President Jakov Milatović welcomed the provisional closure of five additional negotiating chapters on 16 December – bringing the total to 12 out of 33 – which brings Podgorica closer to its goal of concluding accession negotiations by the end of next year and becoming the 28th EU member state by 2028. “We hope that, during the Cypriot Presidency [starting 1 January 2026, ed.], the EU will begin drafting Montenegro’s Accession Treaty,” President Milatović stated, describing this as “a major step towards full membership.”



































