Brussels – A manifesto published by the Serbian students’ movement has caused particular controversy in recent weeks on one of the most sensitive issues for the country’s European prospects – its relations with Kosovo.
The four-point Memorandum on Kosovo and Metohija, dated 17 May, is dense collection of nationalist stereotypes with an almost epic tone. It reiterates that the region is “inalienable and integral part of the Republic of Serbia,” framing the issue as a “historical and moral imperative not subject to negotiation over its substance.”
Internationally, the memorandum was taken very seriously and met with strong criticism. However, what may be seen from outside Serbia as an extremist position is, domestically, something that – at least for now – is impossible to avoid for any movement hoping to defeat Aleksandar Vučić‘s regime and advance the country’s democratisation.
“I have the impression that there is not enough understanding outside Serbia about the context in which these protests are taking place and what the Serbian mainstream actually is,” explains Nikola Burazer, Programme Director at the Belgrade-based think tank Centre for Contemporary Politics (CPS), Executive Editor of European Western Balkans and current member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG), speaking to The New Union Post.
Drawing on his analysis published by BiEPAG, Burazer does not conceal that the memorandum “was certainly controversial,” but argues that it did not significantly damage the credibility of the student movement. Less than a week after its publication, a mass rally in Belgrade gathered almost 200,000 people, “because the main struggle is actually against the government.”
At the same time, the memorandum has “certainly disappointed” some EU observers and institutions, raising the risk that it could “shape how developments in Serbia are framed.” In other words, people may wonder if this is a struggle between an autocratic regime and a student-led democratic opposition, or a confrontation between old and new political forces that are, to varying degrees, both nationalist and sceptical of Europe.
How to frame the Serbian student’s memorandum on Kosovo
To understand the context in which this memorandum was conceived, it is important to recall that the Serbian students’ movement is, above all, “heterogeneous.” As Burazer points out, it is therefore “not surprising” to see both nationalist and pro-European sentiments emerge from time to time.
The movement is also “a reflection of wider society,” where opposition to the government is not confined to voters with pro-EU or progressive views. To build a broad coalition, it must also appeal to nationalist voters. Indeed, Burazer argues that these may be among the most important voters, as they include former supporters of the government and undecided citizens who have never previously backed a pro-European political option. “We are not all blind to the differences, but some things have to be tolerated for the sake of victory.”
Most importantly, the position expressed in the students’ memorandum – despite its “quite controversial rhetoric” – falls “entirely” within the political mainstream when it comes to the view that Kosovo is part of Serbia and should never be recognised as an independent state.
As a “highly symbolic” issue in Serbian politics, Kosovo tends to defy rational debate, Burazer argues. Much of society, he says, “buries its head in the sand” when confronted with the reality of the situation, the actual state of the dialogue process, and what is realistically achievable for Serbia. “Kosovo is not an issue on which there is a particularly rational debate about interests and realities,” he adds, noting that “you cannot gain anything by being more rational” on the Kosovo issue.
Between international reputation and domestic electoral strategy
In a context where there is a “significant gap” between what the government is actually doing – engaging in dialogue with Pristina – and what it claims to be doing – resisting any move towards recognising Kosovo – other political forces have little choice but to adopt “broadly the same position in principle,” not to be accused of betraying the national interest. Vučić then uses this dynamic in Brussels to argue that the alternatives to his government are even less palatable.
As Burazer explains, “this has shifted the entire political spectrum to the right when it comes to dealing with Kosovo,” and it is likely that Vučić will use the students’ memorandum in much the same way. “This is not the first time that he has used this argument against them,” he says, citing the narrative surrounding the absence of EU flags during the Serbian protests, which “was presented as evidence that the movement is anti-European.”
The real risk is that the EU may revise its assessment of the credibility of the pro-democracy student movement because of its positions on such a sensitive issue as Kosovo. If the movement were to disregard its international reputation entirely, “it could certainly damage its own prospects and help the government.” On the other hand, if it were simply to do exactly what international observers expect and then lose the elections as a result, “everything will have been in vain.”
In short, Burazer argues, the challenge facing the student movement is to balance its international reputation as a pro-democratic, anti-authoritarian and fundamentally pro-European alternative to Vučić with the domestic electoral strategy required to win elections.
At the same time, the tactical considerations behind the movement’s reluctance to embrace an explicitly pro-EU stance should not be overlooked. “Doing so would reduce its chances of defeating the regime” and, for that reason, even Serbia’s most pro-European citizens do not expect students to wave EU flags at every demonstration or openly campaign for EU membership. “We are more concerned with what their actual values are.”
Actions such as last year’s run to Brussels represent “a rational way” of demonstrating commitment to core European values while avoiding an overtly pro-EU posture at home, where such a stance would bring “little benefit” to the movement and could even prove counterproductive.
Serbia’s essential interest in the EU
With the prospect of early elections and a change of government that could see the Student List become part of a governing coalition, it remains unclear how a decentralised movement – with countless plenums and decision-making bodies across the country – could transform itself into a cohesive political actor capable of taking decisions quickly and effectively.
In any case, Burazer argues that “Serbian politics is largely shaped by reality and by the environment in which the country finds itself.” For this reason, even the student movement would be unable to ignore the reality that pursuing European integration remains in Serbia’s “essential interest.” This is why it is unlikely that any future government would abandon the EU accession process or withdraw from the dialogue with Kosovo. “Despite all its controversies and unpopularity, it remains the only viable path forward,” not least in light of the position of Serbs living in Kosovo.
The same dynamic happened with the current government. While in opposition, Vučić’s party criticised its predecessors for participating in the EU-mediated dialogue with Kosovo. Once in power, however, it expanded the process while continuing to employ anti-Kosovo rhetoric at home. “There is not much room for manoeuvre for any future government either,” Burazer points out. For the student movement, the most important objective will be the democratisation of the country, which would also help unblock Serbia’s stalled EU accession process.
One of the main reasons why pro-European citizens support political change despite their reservations is precisely the belief that “the democratisation of the country would create space for an honest public debate, including on European integration and Kosovo.” In other words, it would become easier to “genuinely advocate for our ideas, rather than trying to defend our positions in an environment dominated by captured media and toxic nationalist narratives.”
A parallel can be drawn with the recent Viktor Orbán‘s defeat in Hungary – Vučić’s closest ally within the EU. Not everything Péter Magyar said during the campaign was welcomed domestically or internationally – particularly some of his populist rhetoric and controversial positions on migration – but many observers understood such statements as “politically necessary to compete” under the conditions created by Orbán’s long rule.
Serbia faces a similar situation, “although probably a much more complicated one, because propaganda and state control of the media are considerably stronger.” This is why developments such as the memorandum on Kosovo must be understood in their proper context. “Some international observers seem to expect Serbian students to adopt positions that are supported by only five per cent of citizens” – Burazer stresses – “and then somehow win elections with just that.”
