Brussels – Just days before the presentation of the long-awaited pre-enlargement policy reviews, the European Commission finds itself at a historic crossroads: setting in motion a process aimed at changing the EU enlargement decision-making process, to prevent this policy agenda from being derailed by hesitations, deadlocks and vetoes among the 27 member states in the Council.
“Ursula von der Leyen has always claimed that she is not opposed to Treaty change, but she has never actually proposed it – and this is her chance to do so,” urges former MEP Andrew Duff, honorary president of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) and author of a paper published by the European Policy Centre (EPC) on how to address the current unreadiness for EU enlargement. Speaking to The New Union Post, Duff noted that “it is going to be very hard to reach an agreement” on overcoming unanimity in the Council, but that, with no proposal on the table, “there is no earthly chance of there ever being an agreement.”
What the former British MEP expects from the Commission is “a practical, formal and clever proposal” that would “shoulder the historic responsibility that it has always had under the Treaty.”
After months of talking about moving to qualified majority voting (QMV) in foreign policy, something urgent must be done in Brussels. Concrete ideas are already on the table – such as Mario Draghi’s proposal to trigger the passerelle clauses, legal mechanisms that allow certain changes to the EU’s decision-making procedures without formally amending the Treaties. “We foresaw this as an opportunity in the Treaty of Lisbon,” Duff stresses, highlighting the need for a “more expeditious” procedure to prevent the EU enlargement process from being hijacked in the Council.
Among the proposals for preparing an enlarged Union, EU reforms should also address the size of the College of Commissioners, which would increase with the potential accession of new countries to the Union. Reducing the size of the Commission in 2029 would probably be the easiest reform to implement, as this is already provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon – two-thirds of the number of member states. However, as Duff warns, this would require all current EU members, big and small, to recognise that “a stronger Commission – as a more federal and supranational body with strengthened authority – is required to govern a Union of 30+ members.”
The risks of EU enlargement failing
Moving from the well-known stance that EU enlargement is a “strategic opportunity,” Duff warns against the “substantial strategic mistake” of failing to prepare the Union to deliver on the promise of membership made to Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans. “It has always been the purpose of EU integration since the creation of the Community,” he explains, describing it as a federal concept. “Federations are designed to expand and to accept countries on the fringes that agree with their principles and direction.”
While he considers it “regrettable” and “a historical mistake” that the Western European countries – the UK, Iceland and Norway – are proving to be “standoffish” towards the EU, the honorary president of the Union of European Federalists believes that, in particular, Ukraine’s accession “can trigger a positive chain reaction.” What the Union “cannot afford” to do is obstruct that trigger, as more than 20 years have passed “since we were bold and clever enough to accept an expansion of the Union.”
As said, a major obstacle to EU enlargement is the need for unanimity in the Council. But how can member states be persuaded to accept the loss of their veto power, when that power is precisely what protects their national interests? “We are asking them to change the processes of governing the EU on behalf of the common good of all member states,” Duff argues, turning the perspective towards the “great damage to the quality and the speed” of decision-making if everyone clings to their own veto.
At the national level, Duff denounces the fact that many political parties “have neglected this idea of a common general interest” of the EU as a whole. “But if we are not prepared to search for that, we might as well all go home.” Crises, mistrust and stagnation would be the natural consequences of member states refusing to face their responsibilities, “at a time when we cannot afford to be inert.” Meanwhile, the Commission is being asked to articulate “a positive forward strategy,” with its president von der Leyen expected to “exercise that power of leadership which she has not always done.”
In this effort to imagine how an enlarged Union may function, a delicate balance needs to be struck: how to develop a differentiated EU between its slower- and faster-moving members without creating a Union of first- and second-class members.
Looking at the present Union, Duff notes that “there are some member states more in front than others.” For example, those in the eurozone or the Schengen area “are more integrated” than those that are not; likewise, those with a defence posture and capability “are more committed to the cause” than those that lack them. “It is not a surprise that some members are keener on integration than others and are capable of going faster than others.”
At the same time, however, “it should be avoided” that official first- and second-class members are created. According to the former British MEP, the UK case demonstrated that this approach can be of “great harm,” as any slower – or less integration-minded – member can conclude that “it can draw if it is a victim of those that want to go further and faster.”
Looking at the prospects for EU enlargement policy, Duff warns that “we cannot put too much pressure on the Ukrainian economy by obliging it instantly to have the EU acquis in full,” as it will take time to catch up. Transition periods should be “properly spelled out,” and enhanced cooperation should be put in place “where it can make a difference,” including in areas that have never been tried before – “for example, AI policy and climate policy.”
This is how properly differentiated common policies should work. “You have a common policy, but you apply micro-prescriptions that are slightly different,” Duff concludes. “If a federation is historically to be a success,” differentiation within the Union is “a necessary price to pay.” This can be “a hard and tricky issue to manage effectively,” strengthening the argument for “a stronger executive authority in Brussels in the European Commission.”
