Chișinău – National elections often hide a deeper meaning. Sometimes you need to find it. Other times it lies right on the surface, as with an “emotional and geopolitical” vote that speaks for itself. Such is the case with Moldova’s parliamentary elections on 28 September—far more than a routine ballot to elect new members of Parliament.
“These elections also serve as a new referendum on the European Union,” says Ion Manole, executive director of Moldovan NGO Promo-LEX—which advocates for democracy and human rights—in a passionate interview with The New Union Post on the eve of these crucial elections. Moldova already held a referendum in October 2024 to enshrine EU accession in its Constitution, alongside a pivotal presidential election, but that vote was “largely symbolic.” This time, the polls will not be a stress test but rather a decisive moment.
“The next Parliament will be responsible for forming a new government that will determine our future,” Manole explains. Losing a pro-European majority, he warns, could slow or even halt Chișinău’s path towards the EU. Yet “we must wait to see what kind of government emerges before assessing the situation.” Nor should we forget that Moldova’s European future will also depend on the war in Ukraine, a neighbour whose fate is closely tied to Chișinău on many levels. “If Kyiv loses this existential battle, the scenario will be very serious for all of us,” he warns.
The stakes of 2025 elections in Moldova
“When a pro-European party is in government, support for the pro-EU direction tends to fall. When pro-Russian forces control the country, support for the pro-EU direction rises quickly.” This distinctly Moldovan paradox, as Manole explains, has shaped elections “ever since our independence.” Compared with 2021, however, “this time it is a matter of security,” with the war in Ukraine close to national borders and Russian troops stationed in the separatist region of Transnistria.
According to polls, no party or coalition is expected to win an outright majority, but it is highly likely that the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) will lose its absolute majority in Parliament. “Over the past four years, power has been held by a single party. All of society’s problems have come to be associated with its inability to address them,” Manole says, offering an explanation for the significant drop in support for the political force that has driven the pro-EU agenda and positioned Chișinău as a potential frontrunner for accession to the Union.
Take the energy crisis as an example. “Pro-Russian forces have accused the ruling party of incompetence, claiming it was unwilling to negotiate with Russia,” while promoting the idea that “if we lived in friendship with the Kremlin, we would receive very cheap gas.” Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest countries, with GDP per capita around six times lower than the EU average. “You can imagine how effective this kind of propaganda can be.”
It should not be overlooked that the government has also made mistakes. While more time may be needed for reforms to bear fruit, “people are disappointed by the lack of progress on anti-corruption measures and in the justice system,” Promo-LEX’s executive director warns. At the same time, while enjoying strong backing from international partners thanks to the war in Ukraine and Moldova’s strategic position, the authorities have at times set “a dangerous precedent by ignoring the rules“—for example, “by adopting laws without consulting civil society and within a very short timeframe.”
On the eve of these crucial elections, the outcome remains wide open. Polls are “very uncertain and cannot really be trusted,” Manole stresses, noting that around one-third of voters remain undecided. With such a large share of the electorate poised to tip the balance, Russian networks are working through propaganda campaigns and vote-buying schemes. As seen in 2024, they could push people to support a particular candidate or political force by offering money in exchange for votes. “In this context, if the majority of undecided voters were to cast their ballots in a unified way, it could become problematic.”
The risk of becoming “a second Belarus”
But what would it mean for Chișinău’s EU accession if pro-European forces were to lose their absolute majority in Parliament? “Nobody can know this, because everything depends on Russia’s plans.” Manole does not hide his concern: “If Russia decides to escalate the conflict, it will use Moldova as well.”
The recent past offers a warning. When the Russian army tried to encircle Kyiv in February 2022, it also sought to cut off Odesa by pushing towards Transnistria. “If there had been a pro-Russian government in Chișinău, Moldova could have been used as a second Belarus,” he recalls—opening another 1,222 kilometres of hostile border and almost encircling Ukraine. “I don’t know if Kyiv could have resisted in such a situation.”
Three and a half years later, little has changed, given the deep interdependence of Moldova and Ukraine. Promo-LEX’s executive director insists that “it is now very important for Russia to take Moldova—not by military means, but through electoral ones.” This, he argues, explains why Moscow is willing to spend heavily to interfere in the electoral process “through manipulation and disinformation,” exploiting the sheer imbalance between the two economies. “For Moldova, a few hundred thousand euros is a lot of money. For Russia, it is nothing—they spend that amount every day on drones and bombs in Ukraine.”
Two pro-Russian parties—former prosecutor Victoria Fortună‘s Greater Moldova and Irina Vlah‘s Heart of Moldova, part of the Patriotic Bloc—were barred from the electoral race at the very last moment by the Central Electoral Commission, accused of voter bribery, illegal party financing, and money laundering. Manole warns that “Russian propaganda is very well organised, with strong narratives and effective channels for spreading disinformation.”
Among the instruments of influence are the Russian Orthodox Church, which controls around 90% of churches in Moldova; PSB Bank in Transnistria; the Eurasia Foundation, led by Alyona Arshinova, a Russian Duma MP originally from Transnistria; and fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor, who “coordinates from Moscow Moldovan forces trained in vote-buying schemes and linked to criminal networks.” National minorities, who make up roughly 20% of the population, are a primary target of Russian propaganda, as “the central authorities have failed to integrate them into Moldovan society,” Manole adds.
What will come out from these elections remain unpredictable. “We cannot rule anything out and should take all possible scenarios into account,” including that possibility that, if pro-European forces need only a few votes in Parliament, some MPs from pro-Russian political groups could side with them to form a coalition. “I believe many people understand what could happen to Moldova if it abandons the European direction,” Manole concludes. “And some pro-Russian politicians also realise that they would lose everything.”
The state of EU-Moldova relations
One week after the start of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, on 3 March 2022, Moldova submitted its request for EU membership. On 23 June 2022, the European Council endorsed the European Commission’s recommendation to grant Chișinău candidate status. At the European Council meeting on 14 December 2023, EU leaders gave the green light to open accession negotiations. Following the Council’s approval of the negotiating frameworks, the first intergovernmental conferences were held on 25 June 2024 in Luxembourg.
With the aim of opening the first EU accession negotiation cluster in 2025, the screening process has been ongoing since autumn 2024. As recognised by the Council, Chișinău continues to make progress on justice reform, the fight against corruption, and the implementation of the action plan on de-oligarchisation. At the same time, administrative and institutional capacities need to be strengthened at all levels, while advancing transformative economic reforms, enhancing sectoral cooperation, and deepening integration into the EU internal market remain major economic challenges.
As anticipated by the European Commission, both Moldova and Ukraine “are ready” for Cluster 1 – Fundamentals to be opened. The first group of five negotiating chapters focuses on economic criteria, the functioning of democratic institutions, and public administration reform. Moreover, two additional screenings have been sent to the Council for both Chișinău and Kiev—on Cluster 2 – ‘Internal Market’ and Cluster 6 – ‘External Relations’. The unanimous approval of all 27 EU member states in the Council is now the only step required.
