Update, 26 September 2025: Two parties – former prosecutor Victoria Fortună’s Greater Moldova and Irina Vlah’s Heart of Moldova, part of the Patriotic Bloc – have been barred from the electoral race by the Central Electoral Commission, accused of voter bribery, illegal party financing, and money laundering in connection with Russia.
Chișinău – After last year’s test of resilience, marked by the presidential elections and the constitutional referendum on EU accession, Moldova now faces its most decisive test for its future: whether to press ahead towards membership of the European Union or to remain mired in Russian propaganda and drift back into the Kremlin’s orbit.
This is what is at stake in the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025, when voters will head to the polls to elect a new Parliament. In a country standing at an existential crossroads, the political situation could hardly be more uncertain.
On the eve of the vote, polls indicate that no single party or coalition is likely to win an outright majority, pointing to a scenario of tough and protracted negotiations that could already slow—if not jeopardise—Moldova’s rapid progress along its European path.
The electoral system
The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova is composed of 101 members, elected for a four-year term by proportional representation with different electoral thresholds: 5% for political parties, 7% for electoral coalitions, and 2% for independent candidates.
Although the President of the Republic has limited executive powers – such as representing the state internationally, overseeing foreign policy, and exercising certain discretionary powers to safeguard the constitutional order – President Maia Sandu nevertheless led the country to early elections in 2021, following two years of constitutional crisis.
The diaspora role
Moldovan citizens will cast their ballots in 2,274 polling stations: 1,973 within Moldova, including 12 for residents of Transnistria (outside the separatist region), and 301 abroad. The vast majority of these overseas stations will be in Europe (75 in Italy, 36 in Germany, 26 in France, 24 in the United Kingdom, 23 in Romania, and 15 in Spain). Only two stations will be open in Russia, and one each in Azerbaijan and Belarus, while 22 will operate in the United States and seven in Canada.
Of the 3,299,396 registered voters, around 8% are expected to vote from abroad. As polling data does not include samples from these voters – or from Transnistria – the diaspora is once again likely to play a decisive role. As was also the case in the 2024 presidential elections and the EU accession referendum, the outcome of the election could remain uncertain until the very end.
The competitors
At the 2025 parliamentary elections, 23 contenders are registered: 15 political parties, four electoral coalitions, and four independent candidates.
The Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) – the ruling party, which also represents the President of the Republic – is led by Igor Grosu and will stand alone in these elections. Although it secured an absolute majority in 2021 (62 out of 101 seats), the road ahead looks steeper this time. Polls suggest the party could secure between 34% and 48% of the vote, insufficient to avoid forming coalitions in the next term. Over the past three years, PAS has pushed forward the EU agenda, but critics argue it has done too little to ease the economic impact of the war in Ukraine and has fallen short on implementing promised reforms.
PAS’s main rival is the Patriotic Bloc (BEP), composed of the Party of Socialists (PSRM), the Party of Communists (PCRM), Heart of Moldova (PRIM), and Future of Moldova (PVM). Led by former president Igor Dodon, this left-wing coalition supports closer cooperation and strategic partnership with Russia, seeks to rebalance relations with the EU, and advocates for Moldova’s neutrality. According to polls, it could secure a relative majority with around 36% of the vote, although some surveys place it behind at 21%.
Left-wing, pro-Russian populist Our Party (PN), led by former Bălți mayor Renato Usatîi, could secure between 8% and 12% of the vote.
The centre-left Alternative Bloc (BeA) – currently polling between 7% and 8% – presents itself as a pro-EU coalition, but all its leaders have ties to the Patriotic Bloc’s head of list Dodon. Chișinău mayor Ion Ceban (National Alternative Movement) is a former PSRM member; Alexandr Stoianoglo (Common Action Party – Civic Congress) was the Socialist presidential candidate who challenged Sandu in 2024; and Ion Chicu (Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova) served as Prime Minister between 2019 and 2020 with the support of then-President Dodon.
Victory, the electoral coalition closest to fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor – now a Russian citizen living in Moscow – has not been admitted to the race. However, former prosecutor Victoria Furtună, the candidate backed by Șor in the 2024 presidential elections, will compete with her own party, Greater Moldova (PMM).
What could happen
Uncertainty dominates the political landscape. Polls indicate that more than a third of voters are still undecided, meaning the final outcome will hinge on the official results released by the Central Electoral Commission on the night of 28 September.
If these polling trends hold, PAS may lose the absolute majority in Parliament required to maintain a one-party government. In that case, PAS would need to seek support from other parties or rely on external backing for key legislation, raising the prospect of political gridlock.
At the same time, without an absolute majority even for the Patriotic Bloc, it is unlikely that a new government would be led directly by Dodon. The composition of any coalition – potentially including the Alternative Bloc or Our Party – will be decisive, with President Sandu possibly agreeing to technocratic prime ministers supported by a pro-Russian left-wing coalition.
Such an arrangement would not necessarily halt Moldova’s EU accession process, but it would likely prompt efforts to reopen dialogue with the Kremlin while keeping EU membership talks alive. This ambiguous foreign policy would mirror Georgia’s approach and could find support from Viktor Orbán‘s Hungary.
Russia’s interference
Moldova plays a crucial role in supporting Ukraine. Despite being one of Europe’s poorest countries, it has hosted over 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees at the height of the war and still provides shelter for more than 100,000. The country also helps facilitate the shipment of grain to and from Ukraine through its Danube ports, providing an alternative route that eases pressure on the Black Sea corridors, which are frequently disrupted by Russian blockades.
Because of its strategic role – and the Kremlin’s broader ambition to reassert influence over former Soviet states – Moldova has become a prime target for Russia’s propaganda machine. Just as during the autumn 2024 elections, disinformation campaigns have been intensifying in the months leading up to the 28 September parliamentary vote, as President Sandu highlighted in a recent speech to the European Parliament.
Independent experts warn that Russia’s tactics are multifaceted. Extensive bot networks amplify anti-EU narratives and criticise the government online, while AI-generated websites mimic credible news outlets to push pro-Kremlin content. Fake government directives are circulated to suggest EU integration threatens traditional values, and the Russian Orthodox Church has also been leveraged to sway voters in favour of Moscow. Vote-buying schemes, sometimes using cryptocurrencies, seek to influence undecided voters, while fabricated official documents further erode trust in the government and electoral process.
The security threat is compounded by the presence of around 1,000 Russian troops in Transnistria, the separatist region on the Ukrainian border. Since declaring independence in 2006 – a move recognised by neither Moldova nor the international community – the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic has deepened its ties with Moscow and, in February 2024, even requested protection from Chișinău. However, when Gazprom halted gas supplies to Moldova in late 2024, only EU economic support prevented a major energy blackout in the region.
The state of EU-Moldova relations
One week after the start of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, on 3 March 2022, Moldova submitted its request for EU membership. On 23 June 2022, the European Council endorsed the European Commission’s recommendation to grant Chișinău candidate status. At the European Council meeting on 14 December 2023, EU leaders gave the green light to open accession negotiations. Following the Council’s approval of the negotiating frameworks, the first intergovernmental conferences were held on 25 June 2024 in Luxembourg.
With the aim of opening the first EU accession negotiation cluster in 2025, the screening process has been ongoing since autumn 2024. As recognised by the Council, Chișinău continues to make progress on justice reform, the fight against corruption, and the implementation of the action plan on de-oligarchisation. At the same time, administrative and institutional capacities need to be strengthened at all levels, while advancing transformative economic reforms, enhancing sectoral cooperation, and deepening integration into the EU internal market remain major economic challenges.
As anticipated by the European Commission, both Moldova and Ukraine “are ready” for Cluster 1 – Fundamentals to be opened. The first group of five negotiating chapters focuses on economic criteria, the functioning of democratic institutions, and public administration reform. Moreover, two additional screenings have been sent to the Council for both Chișinău and Kiev – on Cluster 2 – ‘Internal Market’ and Cluster 6 – ‘External Relations’. The unanimous approval of all 27 EU member states in the Council is now the only step required.
