Strasbourg – The question arises naturally. If a third country cannot realistically be stripped of its EU candidate status – or if doing so is nearly impossible – what is the point of considering them all, as a bloc, ‘safe countries’? What if a candidate country is slipping into democratic backsliding, yet there is no political will within the EU to take meaningful action?
This problem reflects the broader rightward shift on migration in Europe, led by the vast majority of the 27 governments in the Council and by a newly forged alliance between the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and far-right groups in the European Parliament. All are focused on pushing through the strictest possible legislation on returns, disregarding concerns over the rule of law and human rights.
According to the recitals of the legal text on ‘safe countries of origin’, EU candidate countries “were found to have advanced” in building institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities. “It can, therefore, be concluded that those third countries that have been granted candidate country status should be considered safe countries of origin.”
Yet a paradox is already emerging. A candidate state could be suspended indefinitely from the EU accession process for democratic backsliding, while still being labelled a ‘safe country’ – as may be the case for both Türkiye and Georgia. This situation could persist indefinitely, since terminating a country’s candidacy is extremely difficult unless the candidate itself decides to withdraw.
The presumption that EU candidate countries necessarily align with EU values and the rule of law “ought to be rebuttable,” warns Christophe Hillion, Professor of European Law at the University of Oslo, contacted by The New Union Post. Whenever accession negotiations or the accession process are stalled due to backsliding on fundamental principles, that should constitute “sufficient evidence” to rebut the presumption that the country is safe, he stresses.
The legal text, in fact, allows taking “due account” of the fact that the situation in a candidate country could change to the extent that the designation of that country as a safe country of origin “should no longer apply.” However, the conditions identified are extreme and do not account for intermediate steps.
First, if there is “a serious threat” to civilians’ lives or persons because of “indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.” Second, if “restrictive measures” – economic, financial, or diplomatic sanctions – have been adopted and are “relevant” to the designation as a ‘safe country’. And finally, if the EU’s rate of asylum application recognition is “higher than 20%” of the total number of decisions for that third country.
A shift to the (far) right
“In Europe, we are seeing a shift to the right among majorities and coalitions, with centre-right parties taking more hardline positions on migration,” explains Eleonora Testi, Senior Legal Officer at the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), speaking with The New Union Post. “Officially, they say they are doing this to prevent the far right from gaining more power, but all this does is play into their hands.”
The change in the attitude of the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), increasingly at odds with its traditional majority partners in Brussels – the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the liberal Renew Europe – has radicalised high-level political discourse and led to an alternative majority alongside far-right groups European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Patriots for Europe (PfE), and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN).
“At the moment, there is a willingness to work on deterrence and repatriation, rather than addressing long-term needs,” warns Testi, who cautions that “we will pay for all this in the future, but I think we will have to accept that this wave will pass for a while.”
Safe countries of origin
Let’s take stock of Europe’s shift to the far right on migration and asylum policy.
We can start with the two amended texts of the Asylum Procedures Regulation (part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which will enter into force on 12 June 2026) – one establishing a list of safe countries of origin at EU level, and one on the application of the concept of safe third countries.
The concept of ‘safe country of origin’ is used to place a person in an accelerated asylum procedure, which, in most cases, will take place at the border. This procedure must be completed within three months, because “it is considered likely that their application is unfounded, although this must then be verified on a case-by-case basis,” explains ECRE’s Testi.
Not only EU candidate countries and Kosovo are included in this list, but also Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Morocco, and Tunisia.
Although EU member states are required to carry out an individual analysis of each case, “obviously there is a bias among those handling the case if a country is declared safe by default.” This is particularly worrying as there are no exclusions for vulnerable social groups. In other words, some vulnerabilities may go unrecognised, and people “may be sent back to their country of origin because it is considered safe in theory, even though in reality they may face persecution.”
Safe third countries
A ‘safe third country’ is a non-EU country to which a person who has applied for international protection in the EU could be sent, on the basis that the country can provide the protection sought. As Testi points out, the risks here are “even greater,” because this concept “is used to declare an application for international protection inadmissible.”
By stopping at the initial stage of the application’s admissibility, “the case is not examined on its merits,” and the person may be deemed ineligible for protection in the EU because a third country is considered able to provide it.
To be considered safe, a third country must meet certain security criteria, including the access to effective protection. However, the level of protection required “is lower than that provided for in the Geneva Convention,” which defines refugee status and guarantees protection. “This excludes certain rights, such as access to the labour market and obtaining a residence permit,” despite representing “important rights for a person to be able to settle and live in dignity.”
The concept is already provided for in European legislation, but the reform removes the requirement for any prior connection between the person and the third country (such as the presence of family members or previous residence). Strikingly, a person from Afghanistan could be sent to Namibia if an EU government has signed a specific agreement.
In practice, it is not even clear to whom exactly this will apply, as individual EU member states have discretion. This leads us to another element of the new restrictive legislation.
The Return Regulation
The latest piece of European legislation on migration and asylum, sponsored by right-wing and far-right groups, is the Return Regulation, which could lead to “ICE-style control tools” even across the 27 EU countries, as denounced by a hundred civil society organisations.
This includes raids by law enforcement agencies in public spaces and private homes to search for undocumented migrants, technological surveillance, mass collection of personal data, reporting obligations for European citizens, and profiling and discrimination against communities affected by racism.
“A parallel system will be created, halfway between administrative and criminal law, simply because of their migration status,” warns Silvia Carta, Advocacy Officer at PICUM, a European network working for social justice for undocumented people, speaking with The New Union Post.
Article 23a of the Council’s negotiating position – which concerns investigative measures – is reflected in the Parliament’s position on the mandatory inclusion of detection measures. The co-legislators are likely to find common ground in negotiations. The article is “extremely vague and broad,” warns Carta, to the point that “at least in theory, there is nothing to prevent the possibility of entering homes to search for undocumented persons,” potentially without a warrant from judicial authorities.
In addition to private homes, raids would also be contemplated in so-called “relevant places,” essentially “shelters, NGO offices and so on.” Detection measures create fear and deter people from accessing basic services – healthcare, education, social services – leaving people without a way out of situations of violence, exploitation, and abuse.
Moreover, an “extensive” series of exceptions is introduced on the basis of the presence of persons considered potential security risks. “These have consequences associated with criminal law, but which are based not on actions but on the administrative status of the person,” Carta points out.
The wide-ranging concerns also include the obligation to immediately issue an automatic return decision at the end of regular stay, rather than a renewal of the stay. This “will speed up identification as a ‘person to be deported’, making it harder to pursue other avenues for regularising residence” once the permit expires.
Return decisions can also be issued to people who may face barriers to deportation. “Anyone could be subject to a return decision,” PICUM’s Carta warns. Statistics on return decisions are likely to rise, “inflating the phenomenon, given that the argument is always that not enough people are being returned,” she predicts.
Another major concern is the punitive measures, with the expansion of detention for those considered reluctant to cooperate with return procedures. “This is a very broad definition,” as for non-cooperation “it would be enough for a person not to have documents and be considered not to be acting in good faith.”
And then there is the expansion of the number of countries to which people can be deported, as the Return Regulation is linked to the concepts of safe country of origin and safe third country. “Return decisions can be made without even having a country in mind, deciding on it at a later stage,” completely ignoring that the person may be returned to a country they know or where they have ties.
Towards ‘return hubs’
According to the legislative text of the Return Regulation – almost ready for inter-institutional negotiations – a specific agreement between an EU government and a “safe third country” could establish the “transfer arrangements and conditions for the period of stay” – which may be “short or long term” – in the so-called ‘return hubs’.
The centres, located outside the territory of the 27 EU member states, where people whose asylum applications have been rejected could be sent before repatriation, are defined “in a very broad manner,” warns PICUM’s Carta. Although it is not written in black and white, the implicit idea is to hold people in closed centres, “either in detention or in any case in a situation of semi-restriction of movement,” adds ECRE’s Testi.
This is where EU candidate and potential candidate countries are expected to be involved. They will most likely be asked to host people who already have a return decision and then return them to their country of origin. “In reality, it is not yet clear whether the person will actually be returned, or whether they could remain in that third country,” Testi continues.
Even in this case, however, the transfer of people would not be immediate, as national courts would have to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether fundamental rights are respected, such as the right to defence. “But how can you access a lawyer if you are in a third country and locked up in a detention centre?” asks the ECRE Senior Legal Officer.
While problems that could block the implementation of the return hubs are already looming, “all these rules have been adopted with the intention of deterrence.” In short, the conceptual and political rightward shift in the field of migration and asylum is based on creating restrictive conditions “so that people will be afraid to come to Europe and then be taken to another country,” Testi warns.
