Brussels – What may seem like the most severe institutional crisis in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina offers another, more nuanced perspective—one that leaves room for hope about the Balkan country’s future.
On 27 March, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested Interpol to issue a ‘red notice’ urging states worldwide to arrest Republika Srpska’s President Milorad Dodik along with Nenad Stevandić, speaker of the Serb-run entity’s Assembly. The Bosnian Serb leader has been sentenced to one year in prison and banned from politics for six years for undermining the constitutional order. Defying the ruling, he has since travelled to Israel via Serbia.
“Dodik has miscalculated every move and has no more cards left to play,” said Czech MEP Ondřej Kolář (EPP), the European Parliament’s rapporteur for Bosnia and Herzegovina, in an interview with The New Union Post. As he is “merely struggling to stay politically alive,” the President of Republika Srpska now finds himself “increasingly isolated,” even within his own entity, “with almost no stakeholders supporting him apart from his own party.”
Where have all the allies gone?
During a conversation that Kolář himself described as “more realistic than optimistic,” the Czech MEP, who is drafting the latest report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, stressed that Dodik’s potential arrest is unlikely to trigger a popular uprising. “Even Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić seems ready to abandon him,” not only because supporting him has become “too politically costly,” but also because “Vučić must focus on his own political survival at home.”
All the speculation and rhetoric surrounding a ‘Greater Serbia’—the Serbian nationalist ideology advocating for a unified Serb state encompassing all historically significant regions—”is merely aimed at a domestic audience,” Kolář pointed out, posing a crucial question: “Who is that audience now? I doubt the vast crowds protesting in Belgrade have any interest in this project.” With each passing day, this looks increasingly like a game “both leaders are losing”—one they are not even allowed to play, as Belgrade and Sarajevo aspire to join the EU.
In this context, “the only remaining allies are Hungary and Russia,” the Czech MEP noted. Regarding Orbán, “what we see is that he is an advocate of Putin,” as he is doing everything possible to weaken the European Union. At the same time, while cyberattacks and hybrid influence are tools Russia “will continue to use,” it is crucial to note that “they will support him only as long as he remains useful to them.” For example, the President of Republika Srpska has urged Moscow to veto the extension of the EUFOR Althea mission at the UN. However, “the Russians are not so naïve to overlook the fact that if they did this, NATO would step in.”
MEP Kolář highlighted another major miscalculation by Dodik. He assumed that the new U.S. administration led by Donald Trump would reject the Dayton Agreement, whereas—”at least for now”—he has not challenged Bosnia’s institutional framework. However, “Trump cannot be trusted, he changes his mind every day,” making the White House seem like a wheel of fortune: “Every morning, no one knows what he will say or do.”
This unpredictability has direct consequences for Europe. “We need to be truly proactive if we want to enlarge the EU,” starting with the work of European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos. “The Western Balkans are the priority—we simply cannot afford failure this time.” As Dodik has “nothing to offer” the people who want to live by European standards, the EU must remain “resolute” when opening accession negotiations with a candidate country.
Kolář clearly stressed that “this is not the right time for sanctions” against the President of Republika Srpska and those responsible for the institutional crisis. The EU has tried this in the recent past but failed due to Hungary’s veto in the Council. “The same would happen now, and I believe we shouldn’t give Hungary any more ammunition to undermine the EU’s unity.” Furthermore, he warned that imposing sanctions “risks losing our grip on internal dynamics,” shutting doors where, for now, “there is still a small opening for engagement.”
How Dodik shaped Bosnia’s crisis
For years, Dodik has been a key obstacle to Sarajevo’s progress towards EU membership. Since October 2021, he has pursued a secessionist agenda, seeking to dismantle central state control over crucial areas such as the military, tax system, and judiciary—more than two decades after the country’s ethnic war ended.
Concerns grew in late March 2023 when the Bosnian Serb government introduced a draft law requiring foreign-funded organisations and foundations to register. The so-called ‘foreign agents’ law, modelled on legislation enacted in Moscow in December 2022, was approved by the Banja Luka National Assembly in late September 2023, drawing sharp criticism from Brussels.
At the same time, amendments to the Criminal Code reintroduced penalties for defamation, which took effect on 18 August 2023. These laws, imposing fines for defamation in the media, have sparked serious concerns over press freedom.
Dodik’s secessionist rhetoric has been further reinforced by his close ties with Russia. On 20 September 2022, he travelled to Moscow for talks with President Putin, defying Western pressure and endorsing Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian regions.
His provocations continued in January 2023, when Republika Srpska awarded Putin its highest honour during its National Day celebrations—a holiday deemed unconstitutional under Bosnian state law. Dodik’s second visit to Moscow on 23 May 2023 underscored the EU’s failure to impose sanctions against him.
