Brussels – That EU enlargement has entered one of its most dynamic phases in the past two decades is evident from a series of converging developments. Accession negotiations are advancing simultaneously with several candidate countries, the debate is intensifying over the possible timeline for future accessions, and an increasing number of proposals on how best to integrate new members into an enlarged Union are emerging.
“Team Enlargement” could soon become one of the keywords within and outside the EU institutions, if discussions evolve into a pragmatic approach aimed at building political consensus and overcoming the lack of alignment and support for the enlargement process among the current EU member states.
“A coalition of the willing is not there to replace the usual enlargement process – rather, it can act as a driver to move the process forward and shape it in a way that is better suited to today’s geopolitical and domestic challenges,” explains Gabrielė Valodskaitė, Programme Coordinator of the European Security Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), in an interview with The New Union Post. “It can act as a driver, enabler, and shaper.”
As co-author of a policy brief proposing a coalition of ten countries that brings together different approaches towards EU enlargement, Valodskaitė stresses that this “task force” – a smaller grouping than the EU-27 – may help mobilise “broader backing” among EU member states, as it would be “more agile, leaner, and better positioned” to address the concerns of each of the 27 national capitals.
Building “Team Enlargement”
According to the ECFR policy brief, “Team Enlargement” could be composed of ten members. France, Germany and the Netherlands are called ‘principled conditionalists’, as they focus on the importance of merit-based accession and the rule of law. Austria and Italy are the ‘conditional sceptics’ and the driving forces behind the Friends of Western Balkans group. Denmark, Poland, Lithuania and Sweden – which border Ukraine and the eastern neighbourhood and support its accession – are defined as ‘security maximalists’. Hungary is an outlier, because it supports the integration of Western Balkans countries but it is still sceptical about Ukraine’s accession.
After understanding both the reasoning that drives these “distinct clusters” of countries and the challenges they face, it may be easier to “identify the narratives and policy measures, such as safeguards and transition periods, that are most likely to resonate with both governments and their electorates.” In other words, each group would be tasked with a specific role within the coalition, leaving no concern or priority within the Union unheard when it comes to EU enlargement.
While the group is clearly heterogeneous and may contain views and domestic constraints that are difficult to reconcile, “if managed well, the clusters can provide both the impetus and credibility needed for EU enlargement,” Valodskaitė notes, stressing that “their underlying logics are not mutually exclusive and each has a role to play” in building Team Enlargement and that they “should draw on their respective strengths in this effort.”
‘Principled conditionalists’ should reinforce the framework’s credibility. ‘Conditional sceptics’ should help reassure more cautious governments that concerns related to migration, fiscal impacts, and economic disruption have been adequately addressed. ‘Security maximalists’ should make the strategic and geopolitical case for enlargement.
The ultimate goal is to develop “a credible and as watertight an enlargement strategy as possible,” meaning that the urgency of the issue must be recognised, EU citizens must be brought on board, and the domestic constraints of each member state must be taken into account. All at the same time.
The so-called ‘conditional sceptics’ – Italy and Austria – would be “the hardest to convince,” the ECFR programme coordinator acknowledges. However, “they could become supporters of an initial framework for future members,” particularly if they are able to secure “specific gains” and see some of their priorities addressed, “for example around controlled migration and economic security.”
In any case, Team Enlargement would be expected to “actively engage” with all the member states and work to gain their support. Valodskaitė does not expect the other 17 capitals to harden their stance because they feel left out of the project, as “the purpose of this grouping is not to exclude them,” but rather to provide the political will for EU enlargement and “lay a foundation that can then be further developed collectively.”
From principle to practice
In practice, Team Enlargement could be established through “four concrete steps,” Valodskaitė explains, outlining the strategy set out in the ECFR paper. The starting point is an agreement to develop the content of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s letter “into a full concept.”
Afterwards, “tailored messaging” for each cluster of countries should be developed, “shaping a narrative suited to today’s political environment.” For example, ‘principled conditionalists’ can lead and anchor the process in the rule of law, safeguards and credibility. ‘Conditional sceptics’ can demonstrate that enlargement would be managed in ways that protect economic stability and address public concerns. ‘Security maximalists’ can articulate the security rationale both to their domestic audiences and to the other coalition members.
The third step would be to present the enlargement framework at the General Affairs Council ahead of the European Council meeting on 15 October, when the 27 leaders are due to hold a strategic discussion on EU enlargement and institutional reform. If endorsed, the final step would be to implement the new framework, with Montenegro’s Accession Treaty representing “the first opportunity to test the framework in practice.”
One of the main benefits of this strategy is to “mitigate the risks” of an accession process that offers “multiple opportunities” for each member state to use its veto power. The work of Team Enlargement across these four steps “can build broader support for a new framework,” while strengthening confidence among the most sceptical members that EU enlargement can be “both strategically necessary and responsibly governed,” Valodskaitė continues.
To consider the Team Enlargement approach a success, at least the first and second steps would need to be implemented, while completion of the other two steps would be “a strong indication that the strategy is working.” Success would also mean that such a framework proves “politically resilient through difficult electoral cycles across member states” as early as 2027, including in France, Italy, Poland, Spain and Greece. It would also require candidate countries to adapt to “a far more politicised and fragile enlargement environment” within the EU and to demonstrate openness to discussing “tools that can help build confidence” among EU governments and citizens.
In this regard, engagement with public concerns and perceived challenges within the Union “could be improved,” as this will be a crucial factor in the success of any EU enlargement strategy. “The conversation needs to be more direct and tangible, and it should be brought closer to local and regional communities rather than remaining confined to capitals or expert debates,” Valodskaitė stresses. Therefore, “a whole-of-society approach” should be pursued to address what is most relevant to each domestic context in a “credible and inclusive” way.
