Brussels – On 22 January, US President Donald Trump unveiled his latest initiative aimed at reshaping the international order in his own image. Initially presented as a mechanism for Gaza’s reconstruction and endorsed by a UN resolution, the Board of Peace has since evolved into a broader platform with ill-defined objectives, raising concerns that it could undermine the role of the United Nations itself.

The European Union has yet to adopt an official position. EU sources said that, following an initial assessment, there are “strong doubts” about its compatibility with EU law. All member states – with the exception of Hungary and Bulgaria – have either declined the invitation or requested more time to analyse the proposal. However, three countries aspiring to EU membership have already accepted (alongside other 23), prompting controversy over the potential implications for their relations with the Union.
While Türkiye‘s position is closely bound to the regional peace process and its EU accession talks have been effectively frozen since 2018 – making its decision of limited relevance from Brussels’ perspective – the same cannot be said for the other two countries joining the initiative. Albania is widely regarded as one of the frontrunners in the EU enlargement process, while Kosovo continues to face substantial challenges, both in securing full recognition as a sovereign state and in obtaining candidate status.
From an EU accession standpoint, the issue is not whether Tirana and Pristina have the right to make such a decision, but whether the move was adequately coordinated with Brussels, in line with the expectations placed on potential future EU members. “It risks being perceived as out of step with the EU’s strategic direction, carrying reputational costs and potentially generating unnecessary friction in the accession process,” warns Daniel Prroni, a former researcher at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM), speaking to The New Union Post.
The controversial choice on the Board of Peace
Originally established through UN Security Council Resolution 2803 as an external initiative to oversee the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip until 2027 – before handing control back to the Palestinians – the Board of Peace has since evolved into a very different entity, with the potential to undermine the international order and bolster the legitimacy of dictators and autocratic regimes. Trump himself has claimed that the Board “might” replace the United Nations.
Membership is determined solely by Trump, who plans to charge $1 billion for permanent seats. The main Board – composed primarily of national leaders – is governed by its own private Charter. ‘Chairman Trump’ holds a lifetime membership and may adopt resolutions or initiatives without consulting the board. A seven-member Executive Board focuses on diplomacy and investment, while a ten-member Gaza Executive Board – led by a High Representative for Gaza – directs the administration of the Palestinian territory.

As Prroni observes, “it is striking how quickly both the government and the main opposition party lined up” behind Trump’s invitation to join the initiative. This is despite the fact that – upon examining the charter – it does not read as a one-off initiative focused solely on the Palestinian territories, but rather as a “competing vision” for organising international action. For this reason, Tirana’s decision to participate constitutes “a political, strategic and constitutional choice” that, he argues, should have been subject to wider public debate.
As with Albania, Kosovo’s participation in the Board “primarily reflects its close political and strategic relationship with the US,” says Dan Ilazi, Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS/QKSS), speaking to The New Union Post.
For Pristina in particular, engagement should be understood as “part of a broader effort” to raise international visibility and advance integration “into global political and security forums.” Drawing on its recent experience of post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and international assistance, Ilazi argues that Kosovo “can – and arguably should – contribute” to reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in Gaza.
However, Kosovo’s concrete role within the Board “remains unclear.” In practical terms, it appears highly unlikely that Pristina could provide a financial contribution of one billion dollars. “This is simply not realistic,” Ilazi notes, pointing to “legitimate questions” about both the expectations placed on the Balkan country and its actual capacity to meet them within the organisation.
The risks with the EU
When it comes to relations with the EU, Prroni recalls that – as member states are required to coordinate closely on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and to avoid moves that undermine a common EU line – “this kind of coordination is exactly what the accession process expects” from candidates and potential candidates under Chapters 30 and 31, which cover external relations and foreign and security policy. In this area, both countries have traditionally proved to be strong performers.
From a legal standpoint, the key question is whether participation in the organisation is compatible with the EU’s core values, which underpin the entire accession process. Should this give rise to concerns regarding compliance with Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), “it could be treated as an accession issue rather than merely a matter of foreign policy coordination,” the Albanian analyst warns.
Ilazi agrees that, if a common EU position on the Board of Peace emerges, the national institutions of both countries “will ultimately need to align with the EU.” At present, however, opposition comes only from individual member states rather than from a unified stance in Brussels, with Hungary and Bulgaria breaking ranks. “On that basis, Albania’s and Kosovo’s participation cannot credibly be framed as a failure to align with the EU,” Ilazi concludes.
































