Brussels – Hungary did it again. Viktor Orbán’s government has once more deployed its irreducible veto against Ukraine, this time preventing the EU from adopting its 2025 enlargement conclusions – one of the most anticipated moments for a policy that has increasingly become a “geostrategic imperative” for the European Union.
“Our attempts to find a solution have been rejected, and I very much regret this,” said Danish Minister for European Affairs Marie Bjerre at the press conference following an inconclusive General Affairs Council on 16 December, where Hungary’s opposition withstood all efforts by the Danish Presidency to broker a compromise. “As several member states said, this sends the wrong signal to candidate countries,” Bjerre added, stressing not only that EU enlargement “is important for the other 26 members,” but also that “candidate countries are delivering” under the merit-based approach.
As the adoption of formal enlargement conclusions requires unanimity, Hungary’s veto proved decisive, blocking not only the section related to Ukraine but the entire document. The only alternative to avoid leaving the meeting empty-handed was therefore to “transform the draft Council conclusions into Presidency conclusions, backed by 26 member states,” as the Danish minister made clear.
This solution – which mirrors the approach taken in recent European Councils under President António Costa on Ukraine – is not without precedent. In 2020, under the German Presidency, vetoes by Slovakia and the Czech Republic produced the same outcome. Five years on, however, and against a geopolitical backdrop fundamentally reshaped by Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Hungary’s opposition is more structural and aimed at undermining EU unity whenever possible on enlargement policy – at a moment when not only Ukraine’s accession, but that of several other candidate countries, is at stake.
The enlargement conclusions were also expected to enter the conclusions of the European Council on 18–19 December, according to the latest draft seen by The New Union Post. However, explicit endorsement by the 27 leaders in Chapter 5 on “Enlargement and Reforms” cannot be adopted, as no formal enlargement conclusions were approved by the General Affairs Council. As an EU diplomat anticipated, “general discussions” will nevertheless take place during the European Council, because “this is a strategic issue on the agenda.”
Highlights of the (unadopted) 2025 enlargement conclusions
Despite not formally constituting enlargement conclusions adopted by the General Affairs Council, the text supported by 26 governments offers valuable insights into the state of play and the roadmap for work to be carried forward in 2026.
Starting with the frontrunner in the accession process, Montenegro – which provisionally closed five additional chapters on the same day – is expected to push through the final stretch, closing all remaining chapters “as soon as possible, once the conditions are met.” All is now in place for the establishment of the Ad hoc Working Party on Drafting the Accession Treaty, with preparatory work focusing on the “key principles” of future accession treaties. Meanwhile, Podgorica still needs to advance reforms related to the rule of law and to “swiftly conclude” pending appointments to vacant positions through “transparent and inclusive consultation processes, as well as merit-based procedures.”
The other frontrunner is Albania, which has opened all negotiating clusters and now needs to intensify the pace of reforms, in particular to complete the fulfilment of the interim benchmarks across all negotiating chapters – especially those related to the rule of law, namely Chapters 23 and 24. This would allow Tirana to begin provisionally closing chapters. Further key steps are still required on fundamental rights, media freedom and pluralism, including ensuring the full decriminalisation of defamation, increasing transparency of media ownership and financing, and guaranteeing a safe and secure environment for journalists.
Ukraine – as was predictable – proved to be the main point of contention, but the text appears to be quite balanced, as several EU diplomats told The New Union Post. The Council welcomes the “successful and swift” completion of the screening process and the Commission’s assessment that all six clusters “are ready to be opened,” urging Kyiv to implement the reforms outlined in the plan adopted in Lviv on 11 December. The opening of negotiating clusters remains subject to a unanimous decision – “in accordance with the enlargement methodology and the negotiating framework” – while technical work continues. Security guarantees, including EU accession, will be provided “in full respect” of the national prerogatives of the current member states.
Moldova – whose EU accession process is linked to Ukraine’s under the so-called ‘package approach’ and is therefore blocked by Hungary’s veto – has likewise completed the screening process and is ready for the opening of all six clusters. The reinforced political mandate secured by pro-EU forces at the 2025 general elections should be followed by continued efforts to fight corruption, strengthen prosecution capacity and improve judicial independence, while awaiting the opening of Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ “without delay.”
Serbia represents a thorny issue, as EU integration remains Belgrade’s strategic priority, but the Council expects the country “to reflect this more clearly in both actions and words.” This includes not only “consistency” in implementing EU-related reforms and communicating “objectively and unambiguously” on the EU, but also respecting fundamental rights, the safety of journalists, and freedom of assembly in the context of domestic mass protests. “Full alignment” with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – especially in aligning with EU restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus – remains an “utmost priority” for the accession process.
The situation in Kosovo, related to Serbia, requires the reintegration of ethnic Serbs into institutions “at all levels” and, in view of the early elections on 28 December, not to politicise the work of the Central Electoral Commission. Regarding bilateral relations, both Pristina and Belgrade are expected to “refrain from provocative actions, avoid divisive rhetoric, and find sustainable and coordinated solutions,” enabling a new high-level meeting of the EU-facilitated Dialogue led by HRVP Kaja Kallas. Progress on their respective EU paths “depends on efforts made to fully implement all their commitments,” as both countries “risk losing important opportunities in the absence of progress” on the normalisation of their relations.
The Council still looks forward to Bosnia and Herzegovina taking “all relevant steps” to adopt the negotiating framework “the moment these conditions are met,” including fulfilling the 14 key priorities set out in the Commission’s 2019 opinion. Reform dynamics continue to be stalled, with the country yet to adopt two crucial laws – the Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and the Law on Courts – and appoint a chief negotiator for EU accession, as well as a national plan for the adoption of the EU acquis and a national IPA coordinator. Meanwhile, all political actors are urged to “renounce provocative or divisive rhetoric and actions, including questioning the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country.”
In the Western Balkans, North Macedonia‘s accession path remains stalled, despite EU integration still being its strategic goal. The key issue continues to be the constitutional amendments on the protection of national minorities – especially the Bulgarian minority – which have not yet been adopted. The Council reaffirms its readiness to convene another intergovernmental conference “without further delays or additional political decisions” – opening the first negotiating cluster – as soon as Skopje has implemented this commitment.
While Türkiye remains a candidate country, its accession negotiations have “effectively” come to a standstill, and “no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing.” The Council recalls its readiness to continue engaging with Ankara in areas of common interest “in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner,” despite its concerns about the “worrying backsliding and continued deterioration” in democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, as well as tense relations with Greece and Cyprus.
Actions taken by the authorities in Georgia “fall short” of EU expectations for a candidate country, with “serious general backsliding” in democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. This includes the adoption of repressive legislation undermining fundamental rights and freedoms, the judiciary’s political instrumentalisation, persecution of opposition leaders, arbitrary arrests of protesters and journalists, and a shrinking civic space. While supporting the aspirations of “the vast majority” of Georgian people for a European future, the Council condemns and calls for an end to disinformation and anti-EU narratives “spread by the authorities.”
