Chișinău – Moldova has chosen to continue on its path towards the European Union, albeit holding its breath until the last moment and, once again, with decisive support from the diaspora. While it is true that the parliamentary elections were broadly considered as a binary choice between a pro-EU and a pro-Russian course, it should not be forgotten that the results are more nuanced than a simple referendum.
At first glance, what can be concluded is that the first place of the pro-EU ruling party at the 2025 parliamentary elections is a sign of resilience for the pro-European forces. Yet the deep political—and to some extent social—polarisation, leaves little room for reassurance, either in Chișinău or in Brussels.
The final results show that support for the governing Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) has decreased only slightly, from 52.80% in 2021 to 50.20%. Overall, the damage was limited, given the expected decline after four years in government and the widespread criticism that they had not done enough to cushion the economic impact of the war in Ukraine and to deliver on promised reforms. But most importantly, this does not prevent the pro-EU ruling party from governing alone, without relying on coalition partners, allowing Moldova to continue its rapid progress towards the European Union.
What happened in the 2025 Moldova elections
On 28 September, 1,608,518 Moldovans cast their votes—out of 3,299,396 registered voters—to elect the new 101-member Parliament. Turnout was 52.21%, the highest in parliamentary elections since 2014, and even higher than in the first round of the 2024 parliamentary elections. It should also be noted that 281,170 Moldovans voted from abroad—mainly from Italy, Germany, Romania, France, and the UK—making the diaspora vote an important factor in the final result.
With the vote counting almost done, the ruling PAS party is projected to secure 55 seats in Parliament. Although this represents a drop of 8 seats from the previous term—justified by the presence of more parties in the new Parliament—the pro-EU party led by Igor Grosu and representing President Maia Sandu still commands a parliamentary majority, with the threshold set at 51 seats. As for the 2024 presidential elections, the diaspora provided a decisive boost, casting an overwhelming 78.61% of votes in favour of PAS.
PAS’s main rival, the Patriotic Bloc (BEP)—composed of the Party of Socialists (PSRM), the Party of Communists (PCRM), Future of Moldova (PVM), and the barred Heart of Moldova party (PRIM)—is second with 24.18% of the vote (and 26 seats). Former president Igor Dodon, who led the pro-Russian left-wing coalition, has called for a protest the day after the elections, accusing the West of interfering in the process of vote.
The the centre-left Alternative Bloc (BeA) follows far behind at 7.96% (8 seats), while the left-wing, pro-Russian populist Our Party (PN), led by former Bălți mayor Renato Usatîi, secured 6.20% of the vote (6 seats).
The ‘Tik-Tok effect’ gave Vasile Costiuc—a close ally of Romanian far-right politician Călin Georgescu and supporter of the reunification of Moldova with Romania—the chance to enter the new Parliament with 6 seats. His populist Democracy at Home Party (PPDA) surpassed the 5% threshold for individual parties by just 0.62 percentage points.
On election day, the Chișinău Court of Appeal rejected a request by the pro-Russian party Greater Moldova (PMM), led by former prosecutor Victoria Furtună, to challenge the Central Electoral Commission’s decision to bar the party from the race over allegations of voter bribery, illegal party financing, and money laundering linked to Russia.
Tension and polarisation
Several electoral violations were reported to the Central Electoral Commission by civil society organisations such as Promo-LEX—whose director, Ion Manole, spoke to The New Union Post on the eve of the vote. Reported incidents included unauthorised individuals inside polling stations, breaches of ballot secrecy, group voting, and so-called ‘carousel voting’, where voters are transported to cast multiple ballots.
Abroad, bomb threats targeted Moldovan polling stations in Brussels, Rome, Genoa, Bucharest, Alicante, and Asheville (US). Moldova’s Foreign Ministry accused Russia of attempting to disrupt the vote in countries where the diaspora was most likely to support the pro-EU ruling party.
Similar threats were reported at 14 locations in the Security Zone—the demilitarised area bordering Transnistria—through which voters from the separatist region were transiting to reach polling stations in territory controlled by Chișinău. On election day, the Moldovan Police Chief also warned that criminal groups were preparing provocations and unrest in the aftermath of the vote. Close attention is therefore needed to monitor any protests: who leads them, their messages, their supporters, and the level of confrontation.
Russia is likely the actor most interested in escalating social tensions, exploiting socio-economic issues—especially the rise in absolute poverty, which affects around a third of the population, particularly in rural areas. By continuing to spread disinformation and financing criminal networks through fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor, the Kremlin could seek to portray protests as a ‘popular uprising’, undermining Chișinău’s institutions, weakening Moldova’s Euro-Atlantic orientation, and potentially enabling a violent attempt to overthrow the government and the president.
The state of EU-Moldova relations
One week after the start of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, on 3 March 2022, Moldova submitted its request for EU membership. On 23 June 2022, the European Council endorsed the European Commission’s recommendation to grant Chișinău candidate status. At the European Council meeting on 14 December 2023, EU leaders gave the green light to open accession negotiations. Following the Council’s approval of the negotiating frameworks, the first intergovernmental conferences were held on 25 June 2024 in Luxembourg.
With the aim of opening the first EU accession negotiation cluster in 2025, the screening process has been ongoing since autumn 2024. As recognised by the Council, Chișinău continues to make progress on justice reform, the fight against corruption, and the implementation of the action plan on de-oligarchisation. At the same time, administrative and institutional capacities need to be strengthened at all levels, while advancing transformative economic reforms, enhancing sectoral cooperation, and deepening integration into the EU internal market remain major economic challenges.
As anticipated by the European Commission, both Moldova and Ukraine “are ready” for Cluster 1 – Fundamentals to be opened. The first group of five negotiating chapters focuses on economic criteria, the functioning of democratic institutions, and public administration reform. Moreover, two additional screenings have been sent to the Council for both Chișinău and Kiev—on Cluster 2 – ‘Internal Market’ and Cluster 6 – ‘External Relations’. The unanimous approval of all 27 EU member states in the Council is now the only step required.
