Brussels – What if the EU enlargement countries played a key role in strengthening European defence plans? And is the EU relying sufficiently on its crucial partners for its own security? These questions open a broader debate about what “defence readiness” truly means for the European Union and what its boundaries are where its limits lie when assessing the value of cooperation beyond the EU’s borders.
“Geography is one of the strong arguments for including the Western Balkans in this equation,” argue Bojana Zorić, policy analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), and Iliriana Gjoni, research analyst at Carnegie Europe, in an interview with The New Union Post discussing their latest report, recently published by EUISS. “They are already part of Europe and are situated in a highly valuable geographical area.”
With the Military Mobility Package and the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 now high on the EU’s agenda, “we need to consider how troops and equipment would be moved swiftly across Europe if border protection were required, particularly in light of Russia being identified as a threat,” Zorić notes. The Western Balkans are not only part of the EU enlargement process, but also “a geographical area historically shaped by geopolitical competition,” Gjoni adds.This means that “when the EU fails to address defence cooperation and relegates the Western Balkans to a second-tier role, other actors will step in.”
The balance between EU enlargement and European defence
EU enlargement and European defence readiness are “definitely interlinked,” but at the same time they proceed “in parallel.” In other words, their relationship is complex and requires careful balancing. On the one hand, alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a crucial element in the opening and closing of negotiating clusters and chapters. On the other hand, the EU accession framework provides no specific mechanisms to assess defence-sector readiness through formal criteria and benchmarks, as the CFSP focuses primarily on trade-related sanctions, policy declarations and participation in EU-led peacekeeping missions.
“As we move forward, we should think of defence as a core component of the EU enlargement process,” urges Zorić, suggesting either an expansion of the scope of the EU acquis or a closer link between the two processes. Assessing candidates’ readiness in the defence sector could help anticipate how effectively these countries would contribute once they become full EU members – a prospect that, for some, may materialise relatively soon. “We need to treat these two processes as truly one,” she emphasises.
Gjoni further suggests that security and defence issues “could be decoupled for candidates whose alignment is not in question, particularly in the current geopolitical context.” In this way, the integration process could be strengthened and accelerated in Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. It could also make a difference in Kosovo, “which is currently stuck but could be brought closer through the security and defence dimension, given that it demonstrates one of the highest levels of alignment with the EU.”
But what is the current state of the Western Balkans’s integration into European security structures? With three countries that are full NATO members – Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia – and two participating in the Partnership for Peace programme – Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia – the region is “already integrated in various ways, but the way they have been scaling up their defence spending has not been coherent,” Carnegie Europe’s research analyst makes clear. The report calls for modernisation, interoperability and integration into European structures to become more structured, enabling the Western Balkans to be “part of the broader EU defence architecture.”
One of the EU’s most significant tools in this regard is the new €150 billion SAFE instrument (Security Action for Europe) for joint procurement. It provides that 65% of procurement must come from EU sources (including Ukraine and EEA/EFTA members), with the remaining 35% allowed from non-EU sources, including the Western Balkans. “This is where we see the entry point,” Zorić stresses, noting that participation requires a security and defence partnership agreement – so far signed only by Albania and North Macedonia. As the EUISS policy analyst warns, “it remains unclear how this would translate into the development of defence industry cooperation with EU members.”
With several defence investment plans already approved, questions arise regarding the value of co-participating in this loan instrument through SAFE. “We wanted to show that there is added value in production capabilities,” the two analysts explain. “The Western Balkans offer certain defence equipment components and capabilities that Europe currently lacks.” Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are “the clearest examples,” but it must not be overlooked that these two EU candidates have not signed security and defence partnership agreements, and their domestic political situation is hindering full alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Strengths and challenges of the Western Balkans
According to the report, the Western Balkans could make an effective contribution to the European defence architecture, particularly from an infrastructural perspective. Situated between the Adriatic and the Black Sea, the region lies along the fastest east–west corridor for moving military forces from Western Europe to Romania and Bulgaria. “This comes at a price, because infrastructure in the Balkans is not as developed as in Western Europe, and some of it is not dual-use,” warns Zorić, emphasising the need for further investment in the region.
Regarding industrial capacities and ammunition production, “we need to be realistic,” as these remain at a “modest level” compared with the larger EU member states. However, entry points exist where the region could add value in areas where Europe currently lacks reserves, namely “ammunition production and propellants, but also maintenance capacity and industrial infrastructure.” The Western Balkans have a legacy of military industry that is now outdated, “but it could become an asset with just a modest investment,” Zorić notes.
At the same time, governance guardrails and benchmarks must not be overlooked. “We should see how each country is performing and reward every positive step with slightly greater access to EU defence bodies,” Gjoni says, warning that “governance is an important variable and we cannot accept opaque deals.” Since defence procurement has also been raised as an issue in the context of EU enlargement policy, “this is a way in which security cooperation can strengthen and streamline trust” between actors in the Western Balkans and at the EU level.
Although we generally refer to the ‘Western Balkans’, they are not a uniform group of countries. When defence cooperation is based on trust and alignment with shared values and objectives, this becomes even more evident in areas such as interoperability, the sharing of sensitive information, and the acquisition of non-Western systems. “The conditions and possibilities for cooperation are there, but we see that the political aspect of trust has become very important, especially since the start of the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,” Zorić recalls.
As she notes, this is likely the reason why the EU has established security and defence partnerships “only with like-minded partners” – such as Albania and North Macedonia – and why EU leaders “are cautious” in approaching co-production or joint industrial cooperation with the region. “We highlighted that the Western Balkans should do more on their side to prove that they are valuable partners and to address the shortcomings also connected to the EU enlargement process.”
