Brussels – All as expected – or almost. Although the deadlock in Parliament has finally been resolved, almost nine months after the elections Kosovo still has no government. And the spectre of early elections before the end of the year, along with a series of financial and institutional problems spilling over into 2026, is becoming increasingly real.
“This has been quite an extraordinary post-electoral process that Kosovo has never experienced before. But now, it is common sense in Pristina that new elections will be held by the end of the year. It is almost certain,” explains Dan Ilazi, Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS/QKSS), confirming his prediction in a recent interview with The New Union Post.
Yet all this brings complications for Kosovo, not only domestically but also at the European level. Concerning the EU integration, a prolonged lack of functional institutions means that Pristina is unable to approve the long-awaited agreements needed to unlock funds from the EU’s Growth Plan, nor can it do much to bring an end to the EU’s restrictive measures. “This is not a good context in which to be seen as a rational actor,” Ilazi warns.
What happened after the 2025 Kosovo elections
On 9 February 2025, the party of the current Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, Vetëvendosje, won the parliamentary elections. However, the result fell far short of his expectations. Unlike in the 2021 elections, Kurti does not have enough support in the 120-seat Assembly to form a government with Vetëvendosje’s 48 MPs plus the 10 MPs from the non-Serb, non-majority communities.
Kurti has rejected any cooperation with the Serb List, the largest party representing the Serb community. He attempted to reach out to the third-largest party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – with which he was in coalition when he first became Prime Minister in 2020 – but it rejected the proposal and suggested that Kosovo should form a technical government comprising all parties.
With opposition parties unable to form an alternative coalition, the process of electing the Speaker of Parliament has been blocked for months. The Constitutional Court intervened twice to resolve the institutional crisis, ruling that voting must be conducted openly and that a candidate who fails to secure support after three attempts can no longer be proposed. As a result, Parliament managed to elect a Speaker – Dimal Basha of Vetëvendosje – on 26 August.
However, another issue has further prolonged the stalemate. The two Deputy Speakers must be elected from the non-majority communities, one from the Serb community and one from the non-Serb. Vetëvendosje was able, on 10 October, to elect the former Minister for Communities and Returns, Nenad Rašić (For Freedom, Justice and Survival), as Deputy Speaker for the Serb community. The Serb List – controlling nine of the ten Serb seats – has taken the case to the Constitutional Court, denouncing the potential violation of the constitutional right of the largest party representing the Serb community to elect a Deputy Speaker.
What will happen now?
While the Constitutional Court has not yet issued a decision, Kurti has tried and failed to form a government. Having exceeded his 15-day deadline as the first nominee for Prime Minister, “now, there are two options,” Ilazi explains. The decision will follow consultations between President Vjosa Osmani and the main political parties on 31 October.
The President can either nominate a second candidate at her discretion, giving them 10 days to form a government, or dissolve Parliament if the political parties refuse to accept the mandate. “If this additional 10 days are not used, early elections could be held in December,” Ilazi notes, emphasising that the Constitution of Kosovo requires elections to take place within 40 days of Parliament’s dissolution.
It is also “highly unlikely” that early elections will be held before December, Ilazi continues, as the second round of local elections is scheduled for 9 November, “and this would place an excessive burden on the Central Election Commission.”
A theory being discussed is that President Osmani might grant Kurti the mandate to form a government again. While such a move “would not be illegal per se,” Ilazi warns it would still be “unusual and unethical for the same candidate to be given the mandate twice.”
All the risks for 2026
Early elections could offer a way out of the institutional deadlock that has paralysed Kosovo for almost nine months. At the same time, however, they will not resolve the institutional and financial challenges already looming over 2026.
On the institutional front, a paradoxical situation could arise in March 2026, when a new President must be elected. According to the Constitution, at least 81 members of Parliament must be present and voting in the first two rounds. Based on this year’s experience, Kosovo might still be in the process of constituting Parliament at the start of 2026, “which will not yet be ready to elect the new President,” warns the Head of Research at the KCSS.
The financial aspect is even more concerning. Vetëvendosje is collecting signatures for an extraordinary session of Parliament to approve the 2026 budget, even without a fully functioning government. Because, as Ilazi explains, “if early elections are held in December, the government would be legally unable to spend money when the new year begins.”
There are also significant implications for the EU’s Growth Plan. Parliament has yet to vote on two key agreements: the Facility Agreement and the Agreement on Loans. Without their approval, Kosovo will be denied access to more than €900 million and “might even risk a scenario in which the Commission decides to revoke these funds and reallocate them elsewhere.”
Moreover, “the focus on reforms has been lost,” Ilazi concludes. Despite being the first country in the Western Balkans to produce a Growth Plan reform agenda – which was positively assessed by the European Commission – “at present, work to implement the important reforms agreed in the document is stalling.”
