Tbilisi – The European Union has finally taken its first concrete step in response to the ongoing crisis in Georgia. However, it is not the sanctions against those responsible for the democratic backslide and violent repression that protesters hoped for. These protesters have been taking to the streets of Tbilisi and other cities for 19 consecutive nights, demanding new elections and a renewed commitment to EU membership.
At the Foreign Affairs Council on 16 December, the most the 27 ministers could agree on at this stage was the suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian officials—a measure that primarily targets members of the ruling Georgian Dream party. While this may seem like a modest response to the hundreds of thousands of people calling for international support to end the “regime” of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, it is a significant political message from Brussels.
Before the meeting, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas expressed hope for the adoption of sanctions against those responsible for violent actions. However, she acknowledged that “everyone must agree” for such a list to be adopted. Instead, the visa suspension marks the first step, and the European Commission will now draft a proposal for formal adoption in the coming days.
Sanctions and visa suspension
The path to imposing EU sanctions is complicated by the need for unanimity within the Council. Hungary, a close ally of Georgian Dream, holds veto power and has made it clear that it will block any sanctions targeting ruling party’s officials. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó had already warned on 10 December that “we oppose the addition of Georgian officials to any sanctions list, if such a proposal is made, Hungary will block it”.
Unlike sanctions, the suspension of the visa-free regime for diplomats only requires a proposal from the European Commission and approval by the Council, which can be done with a qualified majority—at least 15 out of 27 member states, representing more than 65% of the EU’s population. This allowed the EU to proceed with the suspension, isolating Hungary and its ally, Slovakia.
Kallas explained that “further measures are being considered, but for sanctions, we need unanimity, which is not the case at the moment.” The suspension of the visa regime will affect Georgian officials, preventing them from entering the EU without a visa. Ordinary citizens will not face any travel restrictions and will be able to continue to travel freely within the EU. At the same time, the EU will continue to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media, ensuring that the population does not suffer because of the actions of an increasingly defiant government.
Beyond the violence, there is growing concern about the democratic decline in Georgia. On 13 December, the national Parliament approved amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences that severely restrict freedoms of assembly and expression. One particularly worrying provision bans the use of gas masks or surgical masks during protests, even as the police continue to use tear gas and water cannons with added chemicals against demonstrators. Moreover, the new laws grant the police sweeping powers to seize personal belongings and detain individuals based on mere suspicion, without evidence or judicial warrants.
What lies ahead for Georgia?
EU sanctions are unlikely in the short term, particularly with Hungary’s veto power. However, some EU countries–including Germany, France, and Poland, as anticipated by Der Spiegel–may seek to bypass Budapest’s opposition by coordinating sanctions on a bilateral basis, as was the case with Estonia, Lithuania, and even Ukraine.
The topic of Georgia’s crisis will be discussed at the European Council meeting on 19 December. According to a draft of the conclusions, the Council will express “grave concerns” about the government’s actions, “which is contrary to the values and principles on which the European Union is founded.” The Council will also “deplore” the decision to suspend Tbilisi’s EU accession process until 2028. The violence against protesters, opposition politicians, and journalists will be “firmly” condemned, and the 27 Member States will demand accountability for those responsible.
Another critical issue will be the international response to the institutional crisis that began with the Parliament’s appointment of Mikheil Kavelashvili—former footballer and leader of the far-right party People’s Power—as the new de facto president on 14 December. In response, President Salomé Zourabichvili has vowed to stay in office until new elections are held, despite the threat of arrest.
The EU’s reaction to the installation of Kavelashvili will be a crucial test. No European leader has yet congratulated him, and given the current crisis, it is unlikely that any will. The treatment of Zourabichvili by EU institutions and Member States will also be closely watched. Having worked for years to advance Georgia’s EU integration, Zourabichvili is unlikely to accept anything less than recognition as the legitimate president.
Diplomacy can sometimes appear slow and ineffective, but the impact of non-recognition by the EU and its Member States of a president installed through a process tainted by electoral violations should not be underestimated. Such a stance could exert significant pressure on Georgia’s government and its institutions. As Kallas warned, “the current President is in office until 29 December, and much can happen in the meantime.”
