Strasbourg – Talking about EU enlargement is not enough. There is another, often overlooked, side of the coin: the urgent need for pre-enlargement reforms to ensure the European Union is structurally prepared to absorb more member states—whether all candidates or just a few frontrunners.
Without undergoing prior internal reform, an enlarged EU “would risk paralysis,” and the existing problems of effectiveness, democracy, and functioning—which are already evident with 27 members—”would certainly increase further,” warns MEP Sandro Gozi (Renew Europe) in an interview with The New Union Post.
Speaking in his capacity as rapporteur on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations, Gozi stresses that “it is practically unthinkable” for the Union to take on “a greater burden in terms of countries, financial commitments, and obligations” without addressing internal structural weaknesses.
Although not as ambitious as he personally would have advocated, Gozi describes his draft report as “balanced and pragmatic,” designed to secure “broad support” in the European Parliament. The risks of avoiding Treaty reform, he notes, are already evident: “We would hit institutional limits and expose ourselves to internal blackmail, as we have already seen with Orbán—and others could follow suit.”
The cost of not reforming the enlarged EU
The draft report—expected to be voted on by the Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee on 23 September—identifies a threefold challenge: streamlining decision-making, securing adequate resources to meet the EU’s strategic goals, and strengthening democratic legitimacy and accountability.
An enlarged EU “would gain greater economic power and leverage on the global stage,” the text reads. It also expresses concern that further delays in the EU enlargement process “could ultimately push non-EU countries on the European continent to align economically and politically with other blocs”, such as Russia and China. This risks the emergence of “rival economic zones” and increased “opportunities for destabilisation” in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.
At the same time, the history of EU enlargement shows that every wave of new members “brings new challenges of an institutional and political nature” that must be addressed before candidates become EU members. Otherwise, the Union as a whole risks “institutional gridlock”, with its functioning becoming “unwieldy and ineffective”. Deepening the EU’s institutional capacity and advancing European unification “should proceed hand in hand”, to ensure the ability to successfully integrating new members “without destabilising other Member States’ economies or exacerbating social tensions”.
Key challenges include the unanimity rule in the Council on foreign affairs and enlargement policy—”which could slow down accession of new members due to bilateral issues”—as well as the composition of the European Commission and the European Parliament, the “outdated” structure and governance of the EU budget, and the redistribution shocks resulting from the allocation of agricultural and cohesion funds.
Pushing pre-enlargement reforms “by 2029”
While the EU institutions “could and should” pursue “significant” Treaty reforms—given that the Union was conceived 75 years ago and now aims to become a continental power—MEP Gozi warns that “trying to do everything” in the EU enlargement process “without formally changing anything—simply adapting what we already have—is very dangerous.”
This is why, he argues, the most realistic path forward is to make the fullest use of “what is already available in the Treaties” to move beyond unanimity and the veto rule, while also “acknowledging the need for some specific Treaty reforms” to enable qualified majority voting on major issues. Without hesitation, he sets the deadline for these reforms: “Before 2029.”
The draft report outlines the pro-enlargement reforms needed over the next four years. First and foremost, the composition of the European Parliament must reflect the prospect of EU enlargement. While maintaining “a workable size” (currently 720 members), a permanent seat allocation mechanism is needed to guarantee “fair, transparent and durable” demographic and geographical representation. The same applies to the composition of the European Commission, which would require an “inevitable reduction” in the size of the College of Commissioners (currently one representative per member state).
Regarding the Council’s decision-making process, the text proposes a review of the system of rotating presidencies, a redefinition of qualified majority voting “to improve the balance between larger and smaller states,” and the retention of higher thresholds “for the most important and politically sensitive decisions.” Additionally, it advocates for simplified and more effective procedures, including “moving away from unanimity” through the application of qualified majority voting (QMV) in certain areas, including “the opening and closing of individual negotiation clusters and the sanctioning of backsliding during negotiations.”
Taking into account the power and resources challenge—particularly the goal of building a European defence union and revising the governance of the Multiannual Financial Framework (the EU’s long-term budget)—Gozi warns that “power must be under democratic control.” The democratic challenge includes granting the European Parliament “full legislative initiative” (the power to propose, amend, or repeal EU legislation). He also calls for reform of the electoral law, suggesting that part of the MEPs be elected “directly through votes for European political parties, in order to build that European dimension of democracy.”
Several flexibility instruments—such as passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstentions, PESCO, and opt-out mechanisms—”are already possible” under the current EU legal framework to implement institutional pre-enlargement reforms. Phasing-in solutions, temporary derogations, and transitional periods “can be negotiated for certain policy fields” in the context of EU accession procedures, while differentiated integration within the EU—namely, intergovernmental cooperation outside the framework of the Treaties—should be considered “as a last resort only.” Nevertheless, some targeted Treaty changes “are indispensable,” as already suggested by the resolution adopted on 22 November 2023.
Is there political will within the EU institutions?
The entire game of pre-enlargement reforms now hinges on the political will within the EU institutions. The report drafted by MEP Gozi serves as a key test of whether this priority can gain momentum before the end of the year. Should it pass the AFCO Committee, a vote in plenary session could be scheduled for October’s session.
In the Parliament, much will depend on how the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) decides to position itself. “The first informal contacts and meetings have been fairly positive and constructive,” the rapporteur confirms, describing his report as “a litmus test” for relations among pro-EU and pro-democracy groups. “Between now and September, does the EPP want to revive the Ursula majority?” Gozi anticipates that, after the summer break, this “pragmatic—neither maximalist nor federalist—position” should be put directly to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and EPP President Manfred Weber, “to understand whether they are on board.”
Meanwhile, hopes for a push from the Council remain slim. “If we had relied solely on the Council’s appetite for institutional reforms, we would still be at the Treaties of Rome,” Gozi ironies. However, European Council President António Costa’s request to the legal services to clarify the legal binding nature of the unanimity rule throughout the EU enlargement process “can help to initiate a debate and bring together a group of countries” willing to discuss new options. Gozi stresses that “we must make full use of all the flexibility clauses that exist within the Treaties,” just as his report seeks to strengthen the Union through pre-enlargement reforms.
