Brussels – The Danish Presidency has come to an end. As of 31 December, its six-month term at the helm of the Council of the European Union has concluded, and the baton has now passed to Cyprus. But did it succeed in strengthening the EU’s security by advancing an “ambitious, merit-based” enlargement process and preparing the Union through “appropriate internal reforms”?
Progress was made primarily on the external dimension, notably through intensive work on the so-called frontrunners of EU enlargement – Albania and Montenegro – which are increasingly considered as being close to joining the Union in the coming years. By contrast, on the internal front the outcome was a failure, stemming from the European Commission’s inability to present the long-awaited strategy that would have provided an initial framework for discussion.
A number of other aspects of the Danish Presidency’s six-month term also must be analysed in order to form a clearer picture of the current state of the EU’s “geostrategic” policy. These include the creative solutions designed to advance technical work with Ukraine and Moldova despite Hungary’s opposition, the difficulties along the accession paths of the other candidate countries, political stalemates, the unexpected announcement concerning the punitive measures against Kosovo, and the launch of the first EU Enlargement Forum.
What went well during the Danish Presidency
Montenegro and Albania remain the frontrunners in the accession process, a status they reaffirmed during the Danish Presidency.
Montenegro has provisionally closed five additional negotiating chapters, bringing the total to 12 out of 33. With Podgorica aiming to complete all technical work by the end of 2026 and to formally join the EU by 2028, the conditions are now in place for the establishment of the ad hoc Working Party on drafting the Accession Treaty – the main task remaining for the Cyprus Presidency.
Albania has opened all negotiating clusters and now faces the challenge of accelerating reform efforts, particularly in fully meeting the interim benchmarks across all chapters – especially those related to the rule of law, namely Chapters 23 and 24. This would allow Tirana to begin provisionally closing chapters and meet the goal of concluding negotiations by 2027, with full membership in sight by 2030.
Last-minute positive developments have slightly improved the situation for Kosovo, despite nearly a year of political stalemate and the impact of EU punitive measures in place since June 2023 at both the financial and institutional levels. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the measures will be lifted and that €205 million will be released at the beginning of 2026, with no vote in the Council required. This could generate positive spillover effects in Pristina, as a new government is finally expected to take office and revive dialogue with Brussels.
The event was organised by the European Commission, but the support and presence of Danish Minister for European Affairs Marie Bjerre were particularly noteworthy. The first EU Enlargement Forum represented a significant effort to stimulate dialogue both within and beyond the European Union on one of the key priorities of the 2024–2029 mandate. It aimed to consolidate institutional and social exchange of views capable of positively influencing the next stages of the EU enlargement process, albeit without offering new concepts or major innovations that might have given the process an unprecedented boost.
It would be impossible to speak of successes in EU enlargement policy under the Danish Presidency without mentioning Ukraine and Moldova, despite serious problems that may be resolved during the Cyprus Presidency. Screening for both candidates was completed in record time, leaving all six negotiating clusters ready to be opened for Kyiv and Chişinău. The formal opening of clusters, however, remains subject to unanimity in the Council, where the veto of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has proved decisive. Still, Copenhagen secured sufficient informal support to continue engaging with both candidates at working level, with no political decisions and no clusters of chapters formally opened or closed.
What went wrong (or not really well)
Orbán took his revenge on the very last occasion of the year. At the General Affairs Council on 16 December, Hungary’s veto against Ukraine withstood all efforts by the Danish Presidency to broker a compromise to adopt the 2025 enlargement conclusions, forcing them to be transformed into Presidency conclusions backed by the other 26 EU members. “Our attempts to find a solution have been rejected, and I very much regret this,” said Danish Minister Bjerre.
The EU’s preparations for an enlarged Union emerged as the weakest point of a presidency that had set out to advance work on “appropriate internal reforms.” To be fair, this is not Copenhagen’s fault at all. As reported by The New Union Post, the Commission was expected to publish its communication on pre-enlargement reforms on 4 November, but this was ultimately postponed after the EU Enlargement Forum, before being delayed again until “the end of 2025, or the beginning of next year.” Without even a communication – a soft-law instrument intended to outline a strategic approach but carrying no legally binding force – on the table, legislative work in the Council cannot begin.
Democratic backsliding and persistent shortcomings in respect for fundamental rights continue to undermine Serbia‘s EU trajectory, amid episodes of violent repression of domestic mass protests and President Aleksandar Vučić‘s ambiguous attitude towards Brussels, reflected both in his messaging and in Belgrade’s lack of alignment with EU restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus. Even under the Danish Presidency, no progress has been recorded on the implementation of the accession reforms required to open Cluster 3 – ‘Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth’.
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a highly delicate case. It is true that Sarajevo has finally managed to adopt the Reform Agenda required to access the EU Growth Plan, after having forfeited more than €100 million. However, two crucial laws – the Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and the Law on Courts – remain pending. Moreover, a chief negotiator for EU accession has yet to be appointed, as have a national plan for the adoption of the EU acquis and a national IPA coordinator.
North Macedonia and Georgia offer two further examples of EU integration processes that have continued to move off course. In North Macedonia, the opening of Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ remains blocked by the unresolved adoption of constitutional amendments on the protection of national minorities, particularly the Bulgarian minority. As a result, the country still lacks a clear path forward in its accession process, although progress could be unlocked through sufficient political will in both Skopje and Sofia. By contrast, Georgia is increasingly seen as a candidate “only on paper.” Georgian Dream’s democratic backsliding is now considered as largely irreversible, while Brussels has so far failed to adopt meaningful punitive measures, largely due to vetoes by Hungary and Slovakia.
Speaking of stalled accession paths, Türkiye cannot be regarded as a failure of the Danish Presidency specifically, as Ankara’s process has been blocked since 2018. Nevertheless, it remains a candidate country, with no intention of withdrawing its candidacy. Simply engaging in areas of common interest “in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner” can hardly be considered a success for any presidency of the Council.
